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Abstract
In efforts to reduce the impact of human error on the operation of chemical andmineral processing plants, reliable process monitoring solutions attempt to assistplant operators and engineers to detect and diagnose process faults before significantloss is incurred. An existing solution, the traditional multivariate statistical processmonitoring (MSPM) approach, is able to reliably detect abnormal process behaviourbut struggles to unambiguously identify the root cause of the abnormal behaviour.It was identified that this is caused by a lack of incorporation of existing processknowledge into the framework of the MSPM approach.
It was proposed to investigate a different fault diagnosis approach which directlyincorporates process knowledge into its framework. Lerner et al. (2000) and Lerner(2002) present such an approach, using probabilistic methods to infer processbehaviour given a particular process model. This model is in the form of a dynamicBayesian network (DBN), and would contain various models which each describeparticular process behaviour given information about the operational status of variousprocess components. In particular, these DBN models were able to describe normalprocess behaviour in addition to highly specific abnormal process behaviour causedby, for instance, a sensor fault or a blocked pipe. Using optimised methods, theauthors could then use a DBN model to make predictions about process behaviour andinfer, given observation of actual process behaviour, which combination of componentstatuses best describe that observation. Therefore, solving the fault diagnosis problemcould be reduced to performing inference in a DBN using this approach.
A probabilistic fault diagnosis (PD) approach based on Lerner et al. (2000) andLerner (2002) was therefore implemented and investigated in this thesis. A survey ofrecent DBN-based PD approaches was also performed, and it was determined thatrelatively little research had been done on the topic. Furthermore, published resultspresenting fault diagnosis performance for DBN-based PD approaches were typicallyfound to be useless for meaningful comparison with a traditional MSPM approach.In this regard, this thesis aimed to investigate the usefulness of the PD approach incomparison to theMSPM approach, while providing useful fault diagnosis performancemetrics to facilitate comparison with other fault diagnosis approaches.
The PD approach tested in this research also extended upon Lerner et al. (2000)
iii
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and Lerner (2002) by including models for regulatory control systems and recyclestreams based on the work by Yu and Rashid (2013). Additionally, from the samepaper, the concept of abnormality likelihood index (ALI) was implemented in the PDapproach. This enabled the PD approach to function more similarly to the MSPMapproach, facilitating direct comparison.
Generally, it was found that the PD approach could provide competitive faultdetection when compared with the MSPM approach. However, this was at the cost ofreal-time fault detection as well as longer detection delay for incipient faults. On theother hand, it was found that the PD approach performed better at root cause analysisthan the MSPM approach. In particular, the PD approach typically provided betterisolation for the root cause of fault conditions.
Despite some issues, similar results were observed for the PD approach whenscaling up to larger processes. Nonetheless, these issues may be addressed withadditional research, further improving the capabilities of the PD approach. Therefore,it was concluded that the PD approach is useful for fault diagnosis and should beinvestigated further in future research.
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Abstrak
In pogings om die impak van menslike foute op die bedryf van chemiese enmineraalprosesseringsaanlegte te verminder, probeer betroubare prosesmoniteringoplossings om aanlegoperateurs en -ingenieurs by te staan om prosesfoute op te spooren te diagnoseer voor beduidende verliese aangegaan word. ’n Bestaande oplossing,die tradisionele meervariaat statistiese prosesmonitering (MSPM) benadering, kanabnormale prosesgedrag betroubaar opspoor maar sukkel om die grondoorsaak vandie abnormale gedrag eenduidig te identifiseer. Dit is geïdentifiseer dat dit veroorsaakword deur ’n gebrek aan inkorporasie van bestaande proseskennis in die raamwerk vandie MSPM-benadering.
Dis voorgestel om ’n ander foutdiagnose benadering te ondersoek, wat proseskennisdirek in sy raamwerk inkorporeer. Lerner et al. (2000) en Lerner (2002) lewer so ’nbenadering deur probabilistiese metodes te gebruik wat prosesgedrag aflei gegewe’n bepaalde prosesmodel. Die model is in die vorm van ’n dinamiese Bayes-netwerk(DBN) en kan verskeie modelle bevat wat elk bepaalde prosesgedrag beskryf gegeweinformasie oor die operasionele status van verskeie proseskomponente. Hierdie DBNmodelle kon veral normale prosesgedrag bo-op hoogs gespesifiseerde, abnormaleprosesgedrag veroorsaak deur byvoorbeeld, ’n sensorfout of geblokkeerde pyp, beskryf.Deur geoptimaliseerde metodes te gebruik, kan die outeurs dan ’n DBN model gebruikom voorspellings oor prosesgedrag te maak en aflei watter kombinasie van werklikekomponent-statusse die observasie die beste beskryf, gegewe observasie van werklikeprosesgedrag. Die oplossing van die foutdiagnose probleem kan dus gereduseer wordtot die uitvoering van inferensie in ’n DBN, deur hierdie benadering te gebruik.
’n Probabilistiese foutdiagnose (PD) gebaseer op Lerner et al. (2000) en Lerner (2002)is daarom geïmplementeer en ondersoek in hierdie tesis. ’n Opname van onlangseDBN-gebaseerde PD-benaderings is ook uitgevoer, en dis vasgestel dat relatief minnavorsing oor hierdie onderwerp gedoen is. Verder, gepubliseerde resultate watfoutdiagnose uitvoering vir DBN gebaseerde PD-benaderings wys, is tipies nutteloosgevind vir die vergelyking met ’n tradisionele MSPM-benadering. In hierdie opsighet die tesis beoog om die nuttigheid van die PD-benadering in vergelyking met dieMSPM-benadering te ondersoek, terwyl dit nuttige foutdiagnosewerkverrigtingmetriekeverskaf om die vergelyking met ander foutdiagnose-benaderings te fasiliteer.
v
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Die PD-benadering wat in hierdie navorsing getoets is, het ook op Lerner et al.(2000) en Lerner (2002) uitgebrei deur modelle vir regulerende beheerstelsels enherwinningstrome in te sluit, gebaseer op die werk deur Yu and Rashid (2013). Daarby,uit dieselfde publikasie, is die konsep van abnormaliteit aanneemlikheidsindeks(AAI) geïmplementeer in die PD-benadering. Dit het die PD-benadering toegelaat ommeer soortgelyk aan die MSPM-benadering te funksioneer, wat ’n direkte vergelykingfasiliteer.
Oor die algemeen is gevind dat die PD-benadering kompeterende foutdeteksiekon verskaf, as dit met die MSPM-benadering vergelyk word. Dit was egter ten kostevan intydse foutdeteksie sowel as langer deteksie vertraging vir aanvangsfoute. Aandie ander kant is dit gevind dat die PD-benadering beter met grondoorsaak analisegedoen het as die MSPM-benadering. Die PD-benadering het in besonder tipies beterisolasie vir die grondoorsaak van foutkondisies verskaf.
Ten spyte van ’n paar kwessies, is soortgelyke resultate vir die PD-benaderingwaargeneem toe daar na groter prosesse opgeskaal is. Nietemin, hierdie kwessieskan geadresseer word met bykomende navorsing, wat die vermoëns van diePD-benadering verder sal verbeter. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die PD-benadering nuttigis vir foutdiagnose en moet verder ondersoek word in toekomstige navorsing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Human error is commonplace when performing manual tasks on chemical and mineralprocessing plants. These errors result from information overload due to distractions orinexperience, poor reasoning and judgement, or random error (Li et al., 2011). In mostindustrial processes, regulatory control (such as the actuation of valves) is automatedand does not require human operator intervention. However, abnormal events, such asthe failure of an actuated valve, cannot be managed by regulatory control systems andoften need to be manually diagnosed and resolved by operational staff.
Incorrect or late diagnosis of abnormal events may result in financial losses tothe plant including unsafe operation, equipment damage, decreased production rate,and off-specification product quality. Automation of abnormal event management hasbecome increasingly important as industrial trends have shifted toward using feweremployees with more responsibilities (Leopold et al., 2016), increasing the need forreliable decision-making by a plant’s operational staff. Reliable and efficient diagnostictools for the operational staff may significantly reduce the frequency of human erroroccurring and/or reduce its impact when it does occur.
Abnormal event management concerns the timely detection of abnormal events(i.e. faults), the analysis of fault symptoms and their possible root causes, and fixingthese root causes. This research is focused on the development of tools to aidabnormal event management, in particular the detection of faults and diagnosis oftheir possible root causes, through process monitoring. Process monitoring concernsthe use of (real-time) process data to infer particular details about process behaviour— as an example, for diagnostic purposes, this data may be used to determine whetherprocess behaviour is normal or abnormal.
This chapter serves as an introduction to process monitoring concepts andterminology, discusses the successes and shortcomings of previous research inthe field of abnormal event management with respect to data-driven fault diagnosis,briefly introduces an alternative model-based approach for fault diagnosis, states theexpected outcomes for this research, and presents a brief overview of the rest of the
1
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
thesis.
1.1 Aiding supervisory control with processmonitoring
Almost all industrial processes have multiple layers of control (see Figure 1.1).Regulatory control allows automated operating point changes and the ability tominimise the impact of process disturbances. The objectives of regulatory controlare strictly prioritised from safety to profit because every process variable (PV) is notindividually controllable and the interconnected nature of most industrial processesimposes an upper limit to regulatory control (Marlin, 2000). Although multivariateregulatory control addresses interaction of PVs directly in the control system design,no regulatory control system would be able to completely remove variability in all PVs.These blind spots of regulatory control are mostly addressed by supervisory controlwhich oversees the normal operation of regulatory control.
Process
Regulatory Control
Supervisory Control
Safety Interlock Systems
Design for Failure
Figure 1.1: Layers of control in a typical industrial process.
Currently, most supervisory control is manual. It relies on humans making goodjudgements, given available process data and their own observations and experience,when analysing whether or not the process is operating safely and efficiently andif not, to identify and address the cause thereof. Supervisory control thereforeextends beyond abnormal event management to include topics such as maintenance,operations training, health and safety, process optimization, and so forth. When
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
supervisory control works well, a process can operate without incident and nearoptimal efficiency for extended periods of time (Kaushik and Khanduja, 2009).However, the current manual approach to supervisory control in most chemical andmineral processing plants will always be subject to human error. Therefore, safetyinterlocks prevent incidents (both uncontrollable and those due to human error) fromscaling catastrophically by automatically shutting down affected areas of a plant. Thelast layer of control, if all else fails, is to design for failure such that in the case ofcatastrophic failure, loss is contained and manageable.
The cost of using safety interlocks and design for failure is extremely high dueto the need to replace equipment once activated in addition to operational downtime.Therefore, it is important to maintain control within the supervisory control layer.Ideally, fully automated supervisory control would provide a solution to this problem,but current research and technology is not advanced enough to provide such a solution(Bullemer and Reising, 2015; Dai et al., 2016). Instead, current research employs theexisting human input structure and attempts to develop tools to aid interpretation anddecision making in the context of supervisory control. The development of these tools(such as those used for fault diagnosis) is the focus of process monitoring.
1.1.1 The fault diagnosis problem
Fault diagnosis is a two-part endeavour: the first part concerns timely detection offaults and the second part concerns accurate root cause analysis of fault symptoms.The aim of fault diagnosis is to determine if a process is in a normal or faulty operatingmode and then, in the latter case, to reason about the cause of the faulty operatingmode (Himmelblau, 1978).
A fault (or abnormal event) is any abnormal deviation from normal operatingconditions (NOC). Assuming that the behaviour of a process changes according to itsoperating mode, a well-designed process should behave in accordance with its designspecifications almost exactly when in the normalmode. Conversely, in the faulty modeits behaviour deviates from that under the normal operating mode and may result inunsafe and/or inefficient operation. The cause of fault conditions must be addressedas soon as possible because its impact (loss of safety, production, or money) growsthe longer the fault persists.
Fault detection concerns the detection of abnormal events. This can be formulatedas a binary classification problem for the operating mode of a process, i.e. normal orfaulty. On most plants, timely and accurate detection of faults has the potential tosignificantly reduce the number of incidents and resulting loss. However, the task offault detection generally suffers from a lack of meaningful process data since onlycertain PVs are measurable and only a fraction of these are actually measured on mostplants. This is because it is expensive to buy and maintain reliable sensors especiallybeyond the immediate requirements of regulatory control. Therefore fault detection
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methods must be robust to sparse measurement conditions and able to improve indata-rich operations.
Despite these challenges, fault detection is an easier problem than the identificationof possible fault causes. The primary challenge when identifying the cause of a fault isto distinguish between the symptoms of the fault and the root cause of (or basic eventcausing) the fault, i.e. root cause analysis. For example, consider a pressure sensoron a fluid process stream producing abnormal readings: how does one determine ifthe sensor itself is faulty, if there is a leak in the pipe, or if an upstream pump is faulty?Manual root cause analysis could be applied on a trial and error basis, i.e. by servicingthe suspected faulty components during a scheduled maintenance period. However,the manual trial and error approach may not always be reliable and it may be morepractical to better identify the potential root causes of a fault from available processdata, i.e. as part of an online fault diagnosis system.
The challenge with respect to using process data in this manner is that reasoningabout the cause of fault symptoms (i.e. identified by abnormal deviation in one or morePVs) may lead to either the actual root causes of the fault, or more fault symptoms. Inthe latter case, this second set of fault symptoms is only related to, and not the actualroot causes of, the fault — this is typically an issue for more complex processes. Forinstance, due to the highly interconnected nature of industrial processes, it is easyfor a fault to start in one part of the process and propagate throughout most of theprocess before producing the first observed fault symptoms, especially when recyclestreams are present in the process (Kelly and Lees, 1986).
It is also important to note that root cause analysis becomes more difficult incases where a fault is subtle (such as for an incipient fault) where considerable timemay pass, after the fault manifests, before fault symptoms are observed or beforespectacular failure of a component occurs (such as in fatigue failure scenarios)(Himmelblau, 1978).
Fault diagnosis is the combination of fault detection and root cause analysis.Early approaches to fault diagnosis involved paper-based systems, such as hazard andoperability (HAZOP) studies and safe operating procedures (SOPs), which relied onoperators detecting faults and using lookup tables to identify possible causes (Lees,2012; Bullemer and Reising, 2015). These approaches worked well for experiencedoperators with extensive knowledge of the processes they were running. However,when there is a lack of such operators, process monitoring tools may assist operatorswho have limited process knowledge to better diagnose abnormal events (Sheridan,1981; De Keyser and Leonova, 2001; Yoshikawa and Zhang, 2014; Dai et al., 2016).
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1.1.2 Process monitoring and fault diagnosis
It may be possible to better perform fault diagnosis by presenting process data tooperators in a different manner that is more effective for this task. Consider the simpleheat exchanger shown in Figure 1.2, where temperature and flow measurements areavailable for all streams. Given that the sensors are working properly, it is possible tocalculate an overall heat transfer coefficient for the unit and report the single value tothe operator instead of, for example, four temperature and four flow measurements.When the overall heat transfer coefficient for the unit then drops below a certainthreshold value, the operator should know to schedule maintenance for the unit afterwhich it should operate as normal once again.
Hot fluid
Cold fluid
Coolant
Coolant
Figure 1.2: A simple heat exchanger.
This example illustrates a simple process monitoring solution which can provide anoperator with more useful information to better detect and diagnose a heat exchangerfault. However, even in this simple example it is possible that many other aspects ofthe process may go wrong such as varying fluid compositions, varying fluid densities,valve or sensor faults, and so forth. Furthermore, in a typical process such a heatexchanger would not be in isolation, but be surrounded by other process units whichmay be just as susceptible to other faults. Therefore, it requires significant effort andexperience from an operator to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information,to identify fault conditions from the relevant information, and then isolate the cause ofthat fault.
Although auto-diagnostic systems are not yet available, it is possible to reduceinformation overload to operators and work toward an approach that could eventuallybecome part of such an auto-diagnostic system. Ultimately, all process data maybe directly fed into a process monitoring solution which may fit into the broadersupervisory control scheme by alerting an operator only when human input isabsolutely necessary (Reis and Gins, 2017). However, such a reliable and robustsolution remains elusive, due to the highly complex and stochastic nature of industrialprocesses. Hence, current process monitoring solutions and tools provide a way
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
forward for improving fault diagnosis procedures by reducing the time required fordiagnosis, improving fault detection accuracy, and providing better leads to thepossible root causes of a fault.
Research in process monitoring for fault diagnosis is multidisciplinary and draws fromdisciplines such as statistics, machine learning, computer science, and engineering.Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003a,b,c) review a large selection of different approachesto tackling the problem of fault diagnosis. The authors view each approach as a seriesof transformations from raw measurements to a fault class related to the symptomsof the fault, as shown in Figure 1.3.
MeasurementSpace Feature Space DecisionSpace Class Space
Figure 1.3: Transformations of data for fault diagnosis. Redrawn fromVenkatasubramanian et al. (2003b).
Raw measurements are received from the process via sensors and are transformedinto features. This transformation may involve removing measurements which donot contribute to fault diagnosis, combining multiple measurements into somesingle calculated value (such as in the heat exchanger example), or projecting rawmeasurements onto a feature space with fewer dimensions. Feature extraction thusfacilitates a change in the number of measured PVs from the raw measurement spaceto the feature space, typically increasing the information content in each variablein the feature space relative to the information content in each variable in the rawmeasurement space. The next transformation, from the feature space to the decisionspace, computes some distance metric for a data sample describing how much thesample’s features deviate from an expected distribution of features obtained fromNOC. Finally, transformation from the decision space to the class space involvesallocating a fault class (such as normal, sensor fault, actuator fault) to a sample basedon the distance metric(s) computed during the transformation from the feature spaceto the decision space.
Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003b) identified that the first transformation fromthe raw measurement space to the feature space requires some sort of a prioriprocess knowledge and the subsequent transformation to the decision space requiresa suitable search strategy. This allowed the authors to classify vastly different faultdiagnosis approaches according to their use of a priori process knowledge or searchstrategies.
The authors identify three varieties of a priori process knowledge, namely: quantitativemodel-based, qualitative model-based, and historical process data-based. Quantitativemodel-based knowledge is typically based on some fundamental or empirical
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mathematical model of the process, whereas qualitative model-based knowledgeconsists of a series of rules (similar to those from HAZOP studies) which can be usedto trace back to some root cause of a fault. Historical process data is sampled processdata that has been collected over a long period of time, typically months. Most faultdiagnosis approaches use one of these forms of a priori process knowledge to enabletransformation from the raw measurement space to the feature space using somealgorithm (such as principal component analysis).
Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003a) identified two broad classes of search strategiesfor fault diagnosis approaches: topographic and symptomatic. Topographic searchidentifies novelties in new data by comparison to a normal operation template.Symptomatic search instead uses fault symptoms to trace back to some root cause.However, the authors noted that the choice of search strategy is limited by the choiceof a priori process knowledge since the a priori process knowledge determines thefeatures available in the feature space. Therefore, the authors found it easier to classifyfault diagnosis approaches according to their use of a priori process knowledge insteadof search strategy.
Along with the available a priori process knowledge, these classifications areuseful for determining which fault diagnosis approach is better suited for a particularprocess. However, in industry, simple solutions are often preferred due to the loweramount of effort required to develop and maintain them. This is why historical processdata-based fault diagnosis approaches, especially those using principal componentanalysis (PCA), have seen a surge in popularity in recent years. Unfortunately, previousresearch (Wakefield et al., 2018) found that while a simple PCA-based fault diagnosisapproach may provide satisfactory fault detection, it may yield inconclusive root causeanalysis due to the lack of incorporation of domain knowledge into the approach. Onthe other hand, model-based approaches may provide better root cause analysis atthe cost of additional modelling requirements and increased fault detection latency(Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003b).
1.2 Probabilistic fault diagnosis using dynamicBayesian networks
In contrast to the traditional PCA-based multivariate statistical process monitoring(MSPM) approach to fault diagnosis presented in Kourti and MacGregor (1995),model-based approaches are designed using (empirical) process models and directlyincorporate domain knowledge into the fault diagnosis framework. Model-basedapproaches typically attempt to explain abnormal process behaviour in terms ofdeviation of observed process behaviour from process model predictions.
Lerner et al. (2000) present such an approach which uses a probabilistic model
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to predict process behaviour under various operating modes and infer the most likelyoperating mode given raw measurements. The hybrid dynamic Bayesian networks(DBNs) used in Lerner et al. (2000) are a type of probabilisticmodel thatmodel temporalcausal relationships between discrete and continuous random variables (RVs) usingconditional probability distributions. Each discrete RV in the DBN represents the statusof a component (sensor, valve, etc.) in the process and the continuous RVs typicallyrepresent a process variable (pressure, flow, temperature, etc.). Given a particularoperating mode, the DBN model is able to generate probability distributions for thevalues of the PVs. Subsequently, the machinery of probability theory may be used toinfer the relative likelihoods of the different operating modes given raw measurements.Fault conditions are then detected based on the relative likelihood of the normal andvarious faulty operating modes. In the event of a fault, its root cause may also bededuced from the relative likelihood of abnormal behaviour in each process component(i.e. by examining the probability distributions of the discrete RVs). Although thisapproach is computationally complex and expensive, Lerner et al. (2000) developed aspecial method (detailed in Chapter 3) to manage this complexity.
1.3 Research outcomes
1.3.1 Aims
This research investigates a DBN-based probabilistic fault diagnosis (PD) approachbased on Lerner et al. (2000). Relatively few publications presenting DBN-basedPD approaches exist (Lerner et al., 2000; Lerner, 2002; Roychoudhury et al., 2006,2008, 2009, 2010; Yu and Rashid, 2013), most of which provide unusable resultsfor comparison with a traditional MSPM approach. This thesis aims to addressthis shortcoming, by comparing a DBN-based PD approach to a traditional MSPMapproach, in addition to serving as an introduction for process engineers to probabilistictechniques in a practical setting, i.e. fault diagnosis of processes.
Based on the results in Lerner et al. (2000), it is hypothesised that a DBN-basedPD approach will provide more accurate root cause analysis at the cost of increasedcomputational requirements when compared with a traditional MSPM approach.
1.3.2 Objectives
1. Dynamic modelling and simulation of example process units, includingautomated feedback control and the ability to simulate a variety of abnormalevents.
2. Design and application of a DBN-based PD approach based on Lerner et al.(2000).
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3. Benchmarking and comparison of fault diagnosis performance for the PDapproach and a traditional MSPM approach for case studies of varyingcomplexity.
1.3.3 Scope
a) This thesis is intended for an audience of graduate process engineers who have littlefamiliarity with probability theory and process monitoring. It is assumed, however,that the audience is familiar with mathematical modelling, simulation and basiccontrol of chemical and mineral processes.
b) Two case studies, inspired by Lerner et al. (2000), will be considered: atwo-tank system and a five-tank system. Both case studies will feature differentconfigurations of varying complexity. This includes the absence or presence ofregulatory control systems as well as recycle streams.
c) It is intended to show proof of concept for the PD approach, thus further scalabilityof the approach will not be considered in this thesis.
d) The MSPM approach will be based on Kourti and MacGregor (1995) and will usePCA for feature extraction and diagnose fault conditions using the Hotelling’s T 2and squared prediction error (SPE) statistics.
1.3.4 Contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions:
• Introducing concepts in probabilistic techniques from a practical (engineering)perspective.
• Design, documentation, and testing of a DBN-based PD approach based onLerner et al. (2000), including reporting fault diagnosis performance benchmarkresults for future comparison with other fault diagnosis approaches.
• Provision of software for the process simulations, DBN models, PD approach,and MSPM approach used in this thesis under an open-source license.
• Comparison of the PD approach with a traditional MSPM approach with respectto fault detection and root cause analysis.
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1.4 Thesis overview
The thesis is organised in the following manner:
• Chapter 2 presents a brief theoretical background. First it presents the conceptsof the traditional MSPM approach to give the reader a basic understanding ofa fault diagnosis approach. Then it presents existing approaches to measurefault diagnosis performance for any approach. Finally, it sets the stage for thePD approach by introducing basic concepts in probability theory and Bayesiannetworks.
• Chapter 3 details a PD approach based on Lerner et al. (2000). It presents theapproach on a conceptual level with more concrete examples provided in theappendices. It also details the modelling procedure used to create the DBNmodels used for process monitoring.
• Chapter 4 presents an overview of recent developments in DBN-based PDapproaches. A number of approaches are qualitatively compared with respectto the characteristics of a good fault diagnosis approach (Venkatasubramanianet al., 2003b). Additionally, some concluding remarks are made aboutstandardisation of testing results in future studies for better quantitativecomparison between various fault diagnosis approaches.
• Chapter 5 details the methods used for simulated data generation, the casestudies considered for testing, the implementation of the PD and MSPMapproaches, and the testing procedure used to determine the fault diagnosisperformance.
• Chapter 6 presents and discusses the fault diagnosis performance results forthe PD approach as well as the effect of different hyper-parameter selectionson these results. The performance of the PD approach is then compared withthat of the MSPM approach. The chapter concludes with some caveats and adiscussion of the limitations and some future directions of research for the PDapproach.
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a brief summary of important findings andrecommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Background
This chapter presents a collection of background material central to the rest of thisthesis. The chapter begins with the presentation of a traditional MSPM fault diagnosisapproach, covering both fault detection and root cause analysis. The MSPM approachshowcases the basic mechanics of most data-driven fault diagnosis approaches. Thisis followed by a presentation of existing qualitative and quantitative methods formeasuring the capabilities of a fault diagnosis approach for later comparison of theMSPM approach with the PD approach presented in Chapter 3. The chapter concludeswith a brief introduction to Bayesian networks (BNs) in the context of fault diagnosiswhich serves as background for the PD approach.
2.1 Multivariate statistical process monitoring
The traditional MSPM fault diagnosis approach considered in this thesis is basedon Kourti and MacGregor (1995). At its core, this approach uses historical processdata to build a model describing process behaviour under NOC. Large deviations ofraw measurements from the NOC model are considered abnormal1 and the measuredPVs which contribute the most to such an abnormal deviation are highlighted as faultsymptoms. In this section, the MSPM approach is presented in detail. The sectionbegins with a discussion of the characteristics of the historical process data neededto build the NOC model, then presents the methodology for feature extraction and themechanism by which raw measurements are transformed to the feature space (seeFigure 1.3). This is followed by the fault detection methodology, which includes thetransformations from the feature space to the decision space and then the class space.Finally the root cause analysis methodology is presented.
2.1.1 Data characteristics
Typically, the MSPM approach requires one set of historical process data obtainedunder NOC to develop the NOC model. This data is typically structured as samples of
1Note that the changes in correlation structure of measured PVs are also considered abnormal.
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the same measured PVs (which are typically continuous variables) at various pointsin time. A considerable amount of NOC data is typically required to build a model thatadequately captures the variation of process data during normal operation while notwrongly classifying normal operation as faulty. The amount of NOC data required is animportant limitation of the MSPM approach. Due to missing sensor readings, abnormaldisturbances, faults, and shift changes it may be difficult to collect sufficiently largesets of NOC data. Furthermore, it is usually not possible to know if any historicalprocess data collected was truly observed under NOC and thus free of faults.
In order to validate the diagnosis results of the MSPM approach, another set ofNOC data is typically kept aside from the one used to develop the NOC model. Thisdata set is used ensure that the MSPM approach correctly classifies samples fromthe additional data set as normal (not abnormal) operation. This additional data setmay be obtained either by splitting a large NOC data set into two smaller data sets orby collecting another set of historical process data under NOC. The data set used todevelop the NOC model is typically referred to as the training data, and the additionalNOC data set is typically referred to as the validation data.
Lastly, to test fault diagnosis performance, most literature use process simulationsto generate both normal and faulty data sets. The faulty data set is typically referredto as the test data and is used to benchmark the fault diagnosis performance of theapproach either to show proof of concept or for comparison with alternative faultdiagnosis approaches.
2.1.2 Feature extraction
Building a model of process variation from NOC data starts with feature extraction.PCA is a popular feature extraction technique which allocates the variance in a dataset to a set of orthogonal principal component (PC) vectors (Jolliffe, 1986). Each PCvector defines a direction in the input space that the NOC data is projected onto. ThePC vectors are the features of the NOC data set. Scores along each PC vector areobtained from projection of the NOC data onto the PC vectors. This enables variancein the NOC data set to be described by variances of the scores on each of the PCvectors and further enables the NOC data set to be described by a compact model(Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003c).
It is common practice that each variable in the NOC data be standardised suchthat it has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This will ensure that samplesprocessed by the MSPM approach have the same scale and makes the approach morerobust to outliers (Kourti and MacGregor, 1995). Let XNOC be anm × n matrix ofmmeasurements of n PVs.2 Let µNOC and σNOC each be a 1 × n vector of means andstandard deviations respectively, such that µi,NOC and σi,NOC respectively represent
2Note thatm and rank (XNOC) are assumed to be larger than n.
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the mean and standard deviation of each m × 1 column, xi,NOC, of XNOC. Eachvariable i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xsi,NOC is the i-thm× 1 column of the standardised data set,
XsNOC, obtained from
xsi,NOC =
xi,NOC − µi,NOC
σi,NOC
. (2.1)
The n× n empirical covariance matrix of XsNOC, ΣNOC, is defined as
ΣNOC =
(
XsNOC
)T
XsNOC
m− 1 . (2.2)
The directions of the PC vectors can be obtained by eigenvalue decomposition ofΣNOC.The eigenvalue decomposition of ΣNOC into P and Λ is described by Equation 2.3. Pis the desired n × n matrix of PC vectors such that each column in P describes thedirection of one PC. Λ is an n × n diagonal matrix for which the vector λ representsthe entries along the diagonal sorted in descending order, these are the eigenvalues of
ΣNOC.
PΛP−1 = ΣNOC (2.3)
Projection of the data inXsNOC onto the columns ofP yields anm×nmatrix of scores,
TNOC, that is obtained from
TNOC = X
s
NOCP. (2.4)
MATLAB® has a pca function that performs all of the operations from Equation 2.1through to Equation 2.4 and simplifies implementation of the MSPM approach inMATLAB® .
The projections of the data onto each PC captures the variance of the data inthe direction of that PC. Each PC explains a portion of the variance in the data alongits direction and each entry in λ is proportional to the variance explained by thecorresponding PC. Normalising λ thus yields the fractions of variance explained byeach PC in descending order.
Typically, most of the variance in XsNOC is explained by a small fraction of PCs.Choosing to retain only the first a PCs, which cumulatively explain a reasonablepercentage of the variance in XsNOC, typically enables dimensionality reduction ofthe extracted features without significant degradation of the information originallycontained in XsNOC (Dong and McAvoy, 1996).
Let Pa be an n × a matrix of a retained PCs, i.e. the first a columns of P. Let
Ta,NOC be the correspondingm×amatrix of scores for each of the PCs in Pa. XsNOCmay then be approximately reconstructed as XˆsNOC by the inverse of the projection inEquation 2.4, instead using Pa and Ta,NOC as shown in Equation 2.5.
XˆsNOC = Ta,NOC (Pa)
T (2.5)
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2.1.3 Fault detection
Fault detection is enabled by comparing the scores obtained from feature extractionof standardised NOC data to the scores obtained from feature extraction of newstandardised data samples. This section describes the procedure for obtaining thescores for the new standardised data samples and subsequently using them toperform fault detection.
Let x be a sample of size 1 × n containing one value for each PV. To ensurethat the sample has the same origin and scale as the NOC data, it is important tostandardise each variable i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in the sample using the mean and standarddeviation of the NOC data, i.e. µi,NOC and σi,NOC respectively, for each variable. Theneach entry in the standardised sample xs is given by
xsi =
xi − µi,NOC
σi,NOC
. (2.6)
The sample’s scores, t of size 1 × a, may be obtained from xs by projection onto theretained (from NOC data) PCs Pa according to Equation 2.7.
t = xsPa (2.7)
Comparison of t and Ta,NOC may be visualised by plotting them on a scatter plotrepresenting the feature space defined by Pa (and perhaps viewing only 2 or 3dimensions at a time). This approach enables qualitative comparison of new samplescores (t) to NOC scores (Ta,NOC).
Kourti and MacGregor (1995) present an alternative quantitative approach forfault detection based on two monitoring statistics, namely: (1) a modified Hotelling’sstatistic (T 2) and (2) the squared prediction error statistic (SPE). These are discussedbriefly in the ensuing subsections.
Fault detection using modified Hotelling’s statisticLet λa be the largest a eigenvalues in λ. The T 2 value for t, defined by Equation 2.8,describes the variance-weighted distance of t from the origin of the feature space.
T 2 =
a∑
j=1
t2j
λj
. (2.8)
Fault conditions may be detected by monitoring the T 2 statistic and setting a threshold,
T 2limit, beyond which deviation from NOC is defined as abnormal. In other words, whena sample produces a T 2 > T 2limit, its scores are considered significantly different fromthe scores obtained under NOC.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 15
Fault detection using squared prediction error statisticRecall that features are extracted once-off from a set of NOC data by performingeigenvalue decomposition of its covariance matrix (see Equation 2.3). Since new datais continuously generated during the operation of a process, it is possible for the newdata to have a different covariance matrix to the original NOC data set. When thishappens, eigenvalue decomposition of the new data set produces PCs and eigenvalueswhich are different from those produced from the original NOC data set. This meansthat the axes of the feature space for the new data set are different from those of theoriginal NOC data set. Because of this, there is a risk that information may be lost whenprojecting a sample onto the retained PCs of the original NOC data set. Informationloss can be monitored by comparing the approximate reconstruction of the sample,
xˆs, as shown in Equation 2.9 to the sample, xs, itself.
xˆs = t (Pa)
T (2.9)
Since xˆs should closelymatchxs, the differences between the entries in the two vectorscan be seen as information loss as result of projection onto the retained PCs of theoriginal NOC data set. The SPE statistic summarises information loss for a sample intoa single number, i.e. the sum of the squared residuals between xs and xˆs as shown inEquation 2.10.
SPE = n∑
i=1
(xsi − xˆsi )2 (2.10)
Therefore, if SPElimit is the threshold value for determining whether a sample representsnormal or fault conditions, then when SPE > SPElimit it suggests that a change inthe correlation structure of the monitored variables has occurred. In other words, theprocess model (describing NOC) is no longer valid and thus the features extractedfrom NOC data no longer reliably represent the features of current process data.
Figure 2.1 shows a graphical representation of fault detection using the twomonitoring statistics for two retained PCs. P1 and P2 create a two dimensional space(i.e. a plane) upon which the T 2 statistic operates. The remaining axis, upon which theSPE statistic operates, is a lumped representation of the features which differ from theretained ones and includes all the discarded features.
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Figure 2.1: MSPM approach for fault detection. Limits for the modified Hotelling’s (T 2)and squared prediction error (SPE) monitoring statistics describe an elliptical prism(for two retained PCs in the feature space) beyond which samples are classified asrepresenting fault conditions.
Fault conditions are detected when monitoring statistics of a sample exceed either the
T 2limit or SPElimit. Therefore, the limits place a bound on the monitoring statistics beyondwhich a sample can no longer be considered as representing NOC. In practice, theselimits should be chosen carefully for optimal and reliable detection of fault conditions.Section 2.2 discusses various metrics which may be used to quantify fault detectionperformance, enabling the MSPM approach to be tuned by off-line analysis.
2.1.4 Root cause analysis
Kourti and MacGregor (1995) also describe a method for determining which PVscontributed most to the detection of fault conditions. Recall from Equation 2.10 thatSPE is the sum of squared residual errors for a sample. Therefore, the contribution, ci,of any variable, i, in that sample to the samples total SPE value is simply that variable’ssquared residual error, i.e.
ci = (xi − xˆi)2 . (2.11)
Typically, for any sample, there are differences between xˆs and xs even under NOCdue to the dismissal of PCs. Therefore, each variable has a nominal contributionto SPE under NOC, c¯i,NOC, which may be calculated by taking the average of thatvariable’s contributions to SPE under NOC (i.e. using the training data set). The relativecontribution score (Aldrich and Auret, 2013) for a variable i in a sample, c˜i, accounts for
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that variable’s nominal contribution under NOC by considering ci as a portion of c¯i,NOC :
c˜i ≡ ci
c¯i,NOC
. (2.12)
Relative contribution scores enable easier identification of variables which contributemore to detection of fault conditions in a sample. If fault conditions are reported formultiple samples, the relative contributions for these samples can be averaged for eachvariable and used to determine which variables are more likely to be associated withthe detection of fault conditions. More specifically, if a variable’s (average) relativecontribution is greater than one, then that variable contributed more than its averagenominal amount to the detection of fault conditions and should be investigated further,as illustrated in Figure 2.2.3
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of a relative contribution plot. Here, the PVs (PV) 2, 3, 5, and7 contribute more than their nominal amount to the detection of fault conditions andshould be investigated further.
It is important to note that although the variables with high relative contribution actas indicators toward the cause of a fault, they may not necessarily point toward itsroot cause. For instance the symptoms of a fault, such as a stuck valve, in one areaof a process where there are no sensors may propagate to a downstream area in the
3Note thatWakefield et al. (2018) use contributions relative to the 99th percentile of nominal amounts.This is an alternative use of relative contributions which places more emphasis on contributions higherthan 99th percentile maximal values.
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processwhere there are sensors, some of whichmay then be identified as having higherrelative contribution to detection of the fault condition. Although these sensors maybe associated with the fault conditions, the actual root cause is the stuck valve in theupstreamprocess area. Therefore, the relative contributions can only identify indicatorsfor symptoms of fault conditions from which expert and process knowledge (Mauryaet al., 2004) or data-driven methods (Lindner and Auret, 2015) then need to be used todetermine the root cause of the fault.
2.2 Benchmarking fault diagnosis capability
Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003b) present various criteria for benchmarking thefault diagnosis capability of different fault diagnosis approaches. These criteriaenable comparison of different approaches with one another as well as comparisonof different model development and threshold selection for the same approach. Thissection presents a summary of both qualitative and quantitative criteria to analysefault diagnosis capability for various fault diagnosis approaches.
First, the characteristics of a good fault diagnosis approach are presented. Thesecharacteristics enable qualitative4 evaluation of a fault diagnosis approach based onlyon a detailed description of the approach, i.e. without requiring implementation. Inaddition to facilitating comparison of different approaches, these characteristics mayalso be used to guide the development of new fault diagnosis approaches. Next, theuse of simulated process data for controlled testing of fault diagnosis approaches isdiscussed. The use of simulated process data facilitates post-implementation analysisof fault diagnosis capability for an approach under ideal and non-ideal scenarios. Inparticular, quantitative metrics are typically used in literature to evaluate fault detectionperformance while the performance of root cause analysis tends to be qualitativelyevaluated. The evaluation of fault detection and root cause analysis performanceconcludes this section.
2.2.1 Characteristics of a good fault diagnosis approach
Ideally, a good fault diagnosis approach should possess each of the followingcharacteristics (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003b):
1. Quick detection and diagnosis
2. Good isolability
3. High robustness
4. Good novelty identifiability
4Note the criteria may also be quantified and are not necessarily only qualitative.
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5. Good estimation of classification error
6. High adaptability
7. Good explanation facility
8. Low modelling requirements
9. Reasonable storage and computational requirements
10. Good multiple fault identifiability
Quick detection and diagnosis refers to the sensitivity of the approach to truefault conditions and the detection latency of the approach. A highly sensitive faultdiagnosis approach would often produce some false positives. This occurs when theapproach reports that a fault is occurring, but in reality one is not. It is desirable to havea fault diagnosis approach that correctly detects fault conditions as soon as a faultoccurs. However, low false positives and high true positives are competing objectivessince the more sensitive a fault diagnosis approach is, the more susceptible to noise itbecomes.
Good isolability refers to the ability of an approach to distinguish betweendifferent root causes (basic events) of a fault under ideal conditions, i.e. no noise and nomodelling uncertainty. This ability relies heavily on the process knowledge embeddedin the process model used by the approach and the degree to which the approachrelies on its predictions. Typically, an approach with an accurate process model reliesheavily on the predictions of its model and is able to isolate faults well. However, it mayfail to reject the predictions of its model under conditions when that model becomesinvalid, i.e. when the model becomes inaccurate due to noise (uncertainty), processdisturbances, or operating point changes.
High robustness refers to the ability of an approach to perform well despite thepresence of noise and modelling uncertainties. It puts an emphasis on consistentlygood performance in diverse circumstances rather than good performance only underideal conditions. Therefore, a trade-off exists between having good isolability and highrobustness.
Good novelty identifiability is desirable for a fault diagnosis approach becausethe full set of faults that may manifest in a process is seldom known. Typically,faults that may manifest in a process are captured from process knowledge and data.Incomplete process knowledge results inmodelling uncertainties and partial knowledgeof the full set of basic events that maymanifest in a process. This can cause faults withunknown basic events to not be detected or to be incorrectly diagnosed.
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Good estimation of classification error refers to the ability of an approach toprovide an a priori indication of the confidence it has when determining whether or nota process is in a normal or faulty operating mode. A good estimate of classificationerror in a fault diagnosis approach enables users to better understand the reliability ofits subsequent diagnosis results.
High adaptability refers to the ability of a fault diagnosis approach to haveits process-specific intricacies (such as its process model) changed easily. Sinceprocesses evolve due to changes in raw feed materials or structural changes, it isdesirable to be able to easily update the model embedded in a fault diagnosis approachto reflect these changes.
Good explanation facility refers to the ability of an approach to explain the originand propagation of a basic event throughout a process. Similar to good estimation ofclassification error, this characteristic enables users to better understand the reliabilityof root cause analysis results.
Low modelling requirements refers to the amount of a priori knowledgerequired to create a fault diagnosis approach for a particular process. Ideally this shouldbe minimal, causing a potential trade-off with good isolability.
Reasonable storage and computational requirements enable a good faultdiagnosis approach to run in real-time on commercially available hardware.
Good multiple fault identifiability refers to the ability of an approach todetect and distinguish between the occurrence of two or more simultaneous faults(with different root causes).
Although no fault diagnosis approach possesses all of the above characteristics,most of these characteristics are qualitative scales and can still be used as a basis forevaluating and comparing fault diagnosis approaches.
2.2.2 Process modelling for simulated data generation
For quantitative evaluation of fault diagnosis capability, most fault diagnosisapproaches are developed (trained) and evaluated using data generated fromsimulations of processes. Process simulations provide more control (versus a physicalplant) over process behaviour by allowing the user to manipulate process disturbancesand the occurrence of abnormal events. This enables the user to generate processdata under known conditions with known abnormal events and use the data to evaluatethe capability of an approach to reliably and accurately diagnose a fault.
When creating a process model for simulated data generation one typically begins
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with a mathematical process model which represents normal operation of the processand then adds fault models representing abnormal events which can be triggered andcontrolled by the user as per their requirements for the generated data. The proceduresfor creating such a model are discussed in the ensuing subsections and an exampleapplication thereof is made available for a simple two-tank system in Appendix B.1.This same two-tank system is used to generate data for measuring the fault diagnosisperformances of the approaches considered in Chapter 6.
2.2.2.1 Modelling for normal operating conditions
Chemical and mineral processing operations are often complex, consisting of manysmaller process units which interact with one another to convert raw materials (inputs)into products and waste (outputs). To illustrate, a generic black-box process is shownin Figure 2.3.
PROCESS
Process
Inputs
Process
Outputs
Figure 2.3: A generic process which transforms input (raw materials) streams intooutput (products and waste) streams.
The goal of open-loop process modelling is to determine, to a particular degree ofgranularity, the relationships between the inputs and outputs of a process in theabsence of regulatory control. Empirically these relationships may be determined byperturbing some of the process inputs and observing the response of the processoutputs.
For the purpose of developing a regulatory process control system, determiningthese relationships as input-output transfer functions in the Laplace domain maybe sufficient. In order to design and implement a typical feedback process controlsystem, it is only required that there exist manipulatable inputs (such as control valves)which are sufficiently correlated with the measured outputs of the process (Marlin,2000). However, simple Laplace domain transfer function models are not sufficient togenerate data for benchmarking fault diagnosis capability. The key reasons for thisare because transfer functions models are linear and use lumped parameters. Theformer means that the model may no longer be valid when process inputs change,typically due to operating point changes, this causes process behaviour to differ fromthat at the initial point of linearisation. The latter means that many fundamental modelparameters, a few of which may change under fault conditions, are typically lumped
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into transfer function constants and the effect of a fault causing changes in a few ofthese parameters typically has unknown effects on the transfer function constantswhen a fundamental model is not available.
The laws of physics and thermodynamics as well as domain-theoretic knowledge,such as that of fluid mechanics and mineral processing, and semi-empirical relationsare typically used to develop fundamental process models. Note that the followingoutline of fundamental process modelling is highly condensed and for more detailedtreatments thereof, the interested reader is referred to Marlin (2000), Isermann (2006)and Perry and Green (2007).
A fundamental process model is a set of differential and algebraic equations(DAEs) that describes the relationships between the inputs and outputs of a processin the absence of regulatory control. It is typically built from the ground up, i.e. usingdeductive reasoning, in an attempt to explain physical phenomena. This requiressignificantly more knowledge and effort to develop than an empirical model sincefundamental model dynamics are typically more complex and they require thatthe theory of the physical phenomena causing the dynamics be well understood.Fundamental process models typically consist of three types of equations: governingequations, constitutive equations, and constraints.
The governing equations are the conservation of mass (Equation 2.13) and theconservation of energy (Equation 2.14) defined over a particular control volume —such as for an individual unit process which has various process streams entering andexiting that unit. These governing equations are typically differential equations (DEs).Note that governing equations for the various unit processes may be combined withone another to obtain the governing equations for an entire process.
{accumulation of mass} = {mass in} − {mass out}
dm
dt
= m˙in − m˙out
(2.13)
{accumulation of energy} = {energy in} − {energy out}
dE
dt
= E˙in − E˙out
(2.14)
The constitutive equations are based on theory and heuristics from a variety of fields,such as fluid mechanics, chemical reaction engineering and mineral processing. Forexample, flow through a constriction is modelled using the Bernoulli relationships fromthe field of fluid mechanics. Equation 2.15 illustrates such a relationship using F asthe flow, k as the constriction resistance, and P as pressure. Naturally, the constitutiveequations will be different depending on the particular phenomena being modelled.However, these equations are typically in the form of algebraic equations (AEs).
F = k
√
P (2.15)
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Lastly, constraints specify, mathematically, the physical limitations of a process.Outside the limits of the constraints, process behaviour is undefined and cannot bemodelled or explained by a typical fundamental process model. For example, thepercentage that a valve is open may only be between 0% and 100%.
2.2.2.2 Modelling for faults
Given a process model which represents process behaviour under NOC, one maysimulate the occurrence of abnormal events by adding fault models to the NOC processmodel. These fault models typically affect fundamental process model parameters inspecific ways depending on the class of fault and the way in which they manifest.
Venkatasubramanian et al. (2003b) discuss four fault classes where each classrefers to the origin of a fault, namely:
1. Gross parameter changes in a model.
2. Structural changes.
3. Malfunctioning sensors.
4. Malfunctioning actuators.
A gross parameter change in a model occurs when a process enters a differentoperating mode for which the fundamental model parameters are different, eitherdue to set point change or when disturbances not explained by the model occur.A structural change occurs when process equipment (such as pipes and tanks)malfunction, this typically results in a change in correlation structure (and possiblycausation) between PVs. Malfunctioning sensors and actuators refer to faults such assensor bias and sticky valve operation respectively.
Faults may manifest either in an abrupt, incipient, or intermittent manner (Isermann,2006). This affects how the impact of the fault grows over time with particularemphasis on the basic event causing the fault conditions. An abrupt fault manifestssuddenly and typically has a greater impact on process behaviour over a short periodof time than an incipient fault, which manifests more slowly. Typically, abrupt faultsare more easily detected than incipient faults. For abrupt and incipient faults, the basicevent typically persists over time until it is diagnosed and fixed; this is not the casefor intermittent faults. An intermittent fault occurs when process behaviour cyclesbetween being normal and abnormal. This causes fault conditions to disappear andappear sporadically, without persisting for over long periods of time. This behaviourmakes intermittent faults the most difficult to resolve in comparison to abrupt andincipient faults.
Ideally, a fault diagnosis approach should be evaluated for all possible combinations
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of fault class and manifestation with each fault manifesting singly, i.e. only one faultin each set of test data. The use of process simulations enable the user to specifyseverity, timing, manifestation, and duration of various basic events which allows forthe generation of different test data sets under known conditions. Therefore, processsimulations can facilitate evaluating the fault diagnosis capability of an approach in areliable manner.
2.2.3 Evaluation of fault detection performance
Fault detection metrics provide quantitative means to assess fault detectionperformance given (simulated) process data. The metrics presented here rely on theconcepts of false, missing, and true alarms. An alarm refers to a fault diagnosisapproach reporting that fault conditions are present in a sample of process data. Thisis referred to as a false alarm (false positive) if it occurs under NOC, and as a truealarm (true positive) if it occurs under fault conditions. If there is no alarm during faultconditions (when there should be one) then this is referred to as amissing alarm (falsenegative). Table 2.1 illustrates these concepts.
Table 2.1: Illustration of true, false, and missing alarm concepts in fault detection.
Diagnosis Actual Fault NormalAlarm True alarm False alarmNo alarm Missing alarm —
False alarm rate (FAR) is the frequency of a diagnosis result being a false alarm underNOC. It can be calculated, under NOC, by the number of false alarm samples as afraction of all NOC samples tested from a given data set. Namely:
FAR = #samples false alarm#samples NOC tested (2.16)
True alarm rate (TAR) is the frequency of a diagnosis result being a true alarm underfault conditions. It can be calculated, under fault conditions, by the number of truealarm samples as a fraction of all fault conditions samples tested from a given dataset. Namely:
TAR = #samples true alarm#samples fault conditions tested (2.17)
The missing alarm rate (MAR) is simply 1 −TAR.
Most fault diagnosis approaches produce some measure which describes thedeviation of a sample from NOC. If the deviation from NOC is beyond some thresholdfor that measure, an alarm is reported. Tuning an approach refers to finding an optimal
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threshold such that FAR is minimal and TAR is maximal. In practice, tuning is a difficulttask because only NOC data is typically available.5 Nonetheless, a good fault diagnosisapproach should report FAR close to zero and TAR close to one for a wide range ofpossible threshold values, allowing for some robustness to bad threshold selection.
Irrespective of threshold selection, the fault detection performance for an approachmay be summarised by a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROCcurve shows the best possible fault detection performance for an approach and givesan indication of the degradation thereof as a result of incorrect threshold selection(Fawcett, 2006; Powers, 2011; Aldrich and Auret, 2013). It is generated by plotting TARagainst FAR for various threshold selections. An example of an ROC curve is shown inFigure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Typical receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
The ROC curve is also a good tool for comparison of different fault diagnosisapproaches. The shape of the curve is particularly important. If the curve is below oron the diagonal line, then fault detection performance for the approach (regardlessof threshold selection) is worse than random chance and the approach is useless forfault detection. Typically, ROC curves are bowed out and away from the diagonal line
5Given that simulated process data is used in this thesis, fault data is assumed to be available whichallows the research to compare approaches given ideal threshold selection.
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as shown in Figure 2.4. For ROC curves of this shape, the closer the curve passesto the (0,1) point (which represents ideal performance), the better the fault detectionperformance of the approach overall (i.e. regardless of threshold selection).
For ROC curves which are bowed out (to the left) and away from the diagonalline, the area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a useful metric for comparing the faultdetection performance of various approaches with one another.6 The closer the AUC isto 1, the better the fault detection performance of an approach. In contrast, the closerthe AUC is to 0.5, the worse the fault detection performance of an approach — an AUCof 0.5 indicates that the ROC curve lies on the diagonal line.
Fawcett (2006) further investigate ROC curves and present a metric which isuseful for combining information contained in both FAR and TAR. This metric is calledF1 score (Equation 2.18) and it determined from the harmonic mean of precision andTAR, where precision is defined by Equation 2.19.
F1 score = 2× precision× TARprecision + TAR (2.18)
precision = #samples true alarm#samples true alarm + #samples false alarm (2.19)
Maximising F1 score is akin to moving toward the (0,1) point of the ROC curve. A valueof one for F1 score indicates that FAR is equal to zero and TAR is equal to one.
2.2.4 Evaluation of root cause analysis performance
The evaluation of root cause analysis is considerably more subjective than that of faultdetection. This is because some fault diagnosis approaches, such as MSPM, treat rootcauses as observed PVs related to a basic event (fault) even though the basic eventitself may be a mechanical fault, such as a worn pump impeller. Therefore, for thepurposes of this thesis, a root cause need not necessarily be the same as the basicevent, but only related closely enough to it.
Note that another challenge is that of fault propagation through a process (Kellyand Lees, 1986). Essentially, a basic event may cause a fault in one area of a process,which in turn causes many fault symptoms to appear throughout the process atdifferent inter-related areas of the process. This makes it difficult to find and assign aparticular root cause to a fault since this requires that the fault symptoms be tracedback through the inter-related areas of the process; this becomes considerably moredifficult if the process contains cyclic structures such as recycle streams or controlloops.
6Note that AUC is still a useful metric for differently shaped ROC curves, but requires more carefulanalysis.
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Currently we are not aware of any quantitative measures for assessing root causeanalysis performance. Therefore, the characteristics in Section 2.2.1 pertaining toroot cause analysis are considered instead. Specifically, we consider good isolabilityand explanation facility most important to the assessment of root cause analysisperformance. Good isolability allows a fault diagnosis algorithm to distinguishbetween different possible root causes and select the most probable one, while goodexplanation facility describes the propagation of a fault from its root cause to theobserved fault symptoms.
Good novelty identifiability and good multiple fault identifiability are also desirablefor root cause analysis. A fault diagnosis approach with good novelty identifiabilityand good root cause analysis performance would be able to distinguish novel basicevents from its set of known basic events.7 A fault diagnosis approach with goodmultiple fault identifiability and good root cause analysis performance would be ableto perform root cause analysis of multiple simultaneous faults. However, in orderto have these characteristics, a fault diagnosis approach must produce good rootcause analysis performance to begin with. Therefore, good novelty and multiplefault identifiability should have lower priority than good isolability and explanationfacility when developing a new approach and comparing different approaches with oneanother.
2.3 Introduction to Bayesian networks
Model-based PD approaches offer an alternative approach to purely data-driven faultdiagnosis. In particular, because the probabilistic models used in these approachesare developed using process knowledge, these approaches should have the potentialto provide better root cause analysis performance when compared to a traditionalMSPM approach. The PD approach presented in Chapter 3 lies at the core of this work.It also affords the opportunity to familiarise the uninitiated reader with concepts inprobability theory using probabilistic techniques in the context of fault diagnosis.
This section begins with a brief introduction to probability theory from a univariate8perspective before considering the multivariate case and introducing BNs. This isfollowed by a discussion of representations for probability distributions over discreteand continuous RVs which are used to demonstrate inference using a simple BN.9
7An adaptive fault diagnosis approachwould also have these novel basic events added into itsmodelto improve root cause analysis in the future.8It is expected that most undergraduate process engineering programmes cover basic probabilitytheory with respect to the univariate case. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with some basicprobability theory and if not, the reader is referred to the textbook by Wasserman (2004).9Amore comprehensive treatment of BNs may be found in the textbooks by Barber (2011) and Kollerand Friedman (2009).
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2.3.1 Probability theory and Bayesian networks
Probability distributions are defined over variables or sets of variables. These variablesare termed random variables to distinguish them from variables in the traditionalmathematical sense. The set of possible values that a RV may be assigned is termedits domain. For example, if the RV is the outcome of a coin flip, its domain could be theset {heads, tails}.
An important distinction can be made between discrete and continuous RVs.Typically, if the number of possible values a RV may assume is finite, it is considered adiscrete RV; otherwise it is a continuous10 RV.
Consider a univariate probability distribution, Pr (X), over the RV X . It definesa function which maps assignments of X , i.e. X = x, to non-negative numberscalled probabilities or probability densities. Each Pr (X = x) is referred to as aprobability for the discrete case and as a probability density for the continuouscase. A probability (density), i.e. Pr (X = x), describes the relative likelihood that Xassumes a particular assignment x in its domain. In order to be a legitimate probabilitydistribution, Pr (X) must satisfy the following criteria:
1. Pr (X = x) ≥ 0 for all x in domain (X)
2. ∫
domain(X)
Pr (X = x) = 1
Note that the second criteria is an integral over the entire domain ofX (domain (X)),i.e. all possible values that X may assume. For the discrete case, the integralsimplifies to a summation of all the probabilities in the probability distribution, i.e.∑
domain(X) Pr (X = x).
The same criteria apply for the multivariate case of probability distributions, where aprobability distribution is defined instead over multiple RVs. A multivariate probabilitydistribution defines a function that maps an assignment of values to each RV to aprobability (density) in the probability distribution.
As an example, consider the multivariate probability distribution, Pr (X), overthe set of RVs X = {X1, . . . , Xk}. Each probability (density), Pr (X = x), representsthe relative likelihood that X assumes a particular combination of values, x, describedas vector of length k containing one assignment, xi in domain (Xi), to each Xi,i.e. for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This type of probability distribution is also known as a jointprobability distribution (JPD).
The probability distribution over one (or more) of the RVs in a JPD, Pr (Xj ∈ X), isknown as amarginal probability distribution. The marginal probability distribution for
10It is assumed in this work that the domain of continuous RVs isR.
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Xj can be obtained from the JPD, Pr (X), bymarginalising out allXi where i 6= j, i.e.by taking the integral of Pr (X) over the domain (Xi) for all i 6= j:
Pr
(
Xj
)
=
∫
domain(X˜)
Pr (X) , where X˜ = {Xi ∈ X|i 6= j}. (2.20)
Conditional probability distributions (CPDs) define probability distributions over RVswhich are dependent on the values assumed by other RVs. A CPD defines a functionthat maps a set of values, y, assumed by a set of RVs, Y, to a probability (density)under the condition that the set of RVs, X, which Y depend upon, assume the set ofvalues x. In other words, for each X = x the CPD, Pr (Y|X = x), defines a functiondescribing a probability distribution over Y. Furthermore, the elements of X arereferred to as the parents of Y and the elements of Y are referred to as the childrenof X.
To better understand the concept of CPDs, consider that one typically expectswarm weather conditions during summer and cold weather conditions duringwinter. This relationship is described by the dependency of the RV WEATHER(W ) on the RV SEASON (S): in this case S is the parent of W and has thedomain {summer,winter} while W has the domain {warm, cold}. To reflect theaforementioned intuition, Pr (W = warm|S = summer) should be higher than
Pr
(
W = cold|S = summer), and similarly Pr (W = warm|S = winter) should belower than Pr (W = cold|S = winter).
An important relationship exists between JPDs and CPDs which allows CPDs tobe used to create JPDs. Let X and Y be any two sets of RVs. For an x such that
Pr (X = x) 6= 0, the CPD over Y given X = x, Pr (Y|X = x), is defined as
Pr
(
Y|X = x) = Pr (Y,X = x)
Pr (X = x)
. (2.21)
The JPD over X and Y may be obtained by rearranging Equation 2.21 and multiplying
Pr
(
Y|X = x) by Pr (X = x) for all X = x. One can then specify those CPDsinstead of working directly with JPDs; the former is more convenient than the latter.
Equation 2.21 also enables the decomposition of a JPD into a product of CPDswhich is a vital aspect of BNs and is known as the chain rule of probability. Considerthe JPD, Pr (X), over the set of RVs X = {X1, . . . , Xk}. The JPD may be arbitrarily
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decomposed into a product of CPDs by repeatedly applying Equation 2.21:
Pr (X) = Pr (X1, . . . , Xk)
= Pr (X1) Pr
(
X2, . . . , Xk|X1
)
= Pr (X1) Pr
(
X2|X1
)
Pr
(
X3, . . . , Xk|X1, X2
)
= Pr (X1) Pr
(
X2|X1
)
. . .Pr
(
Xk−1|X1, . . . , Xk−2
)
Pr
(
Xk|X1, . . . , Xk−1
)
(2.22)
This decomposition is arbitrary because in practice, some of the RVs in X may beindependent of one another and would have no influence on one another. To illustratethis concept of independence, let Xa and Xb be two disjoint subsets of X. Xa and Xbare independent of one another, if
Pr (Xa,Xb) = Pr (Xa) Pr (Xb) . (2.23)
This implies that
Pr
(
Xa|Xb = xb
)
=
Pr (Xb = xb,Xa)
Pr (Xb = xb)
=
Pr (Xb = xb) Pr (Xa)
Pr (Xb = xb)
= Pr (Xa) ,
(2.24)and
Pr
(
Xb|Xa = xa
)
=
Pr (Xa = xa,Xb)
Pr (Xa = xa)
=
Pr (Xa = xa) Pr (Xb)
Pr (Xa = xa)
= Pr (Xb) .
(2.25)
Accounting for the independences between RVs, the chain rule in Equation 2.22 can besummarised by
Pr (X) = Pr (X1, . . . , Xk) =
k∏
i=1
Pr
(
Xi|par (Xi)
) (2.26)
where par (Xi) are the parents ofXi.
CPDs can be used to describe the relationship between multiple parent RVs (X)and one child RV (Y ) much like in an AE where y = f(x). This makes CPDs usefulfor encoding individual process model equations which, when put together using thechain rule, describe the full process model as a JPD.
As an example, consider the measurement of liquid level in a tank as shown inFigure 2.5. Two RVs L and Lm represent the actual liquid level and the sensor reading,respectively.
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L
Lm
Figure 2.5: Schematic for liquid level example. L and Lm represent the actual liquidlevel and the sensor reading respectively.
A third RV SL represents the status of the sensor which may be normal or faulty. Theactual liquid levelL is independent of the sensor statusSL and the sensor readingLm isdependent on both L and SL. Therefore the JPD, Pr (L,Lm, SL) may be decomposedas
Pr (L,Lm, SL) = Pr
(
L|Lm, SL
)
Pr
(
SL|L,Lm
)
Pr
(
Lm|L, SL
)
= Pr (L) Pr (SL) Pr
(
Lm|L, SL
) (2.27)
by taking advantage of the independence structure between the RVs.
This decomposition may be represented graphically by drawing a node for eachRV and drawing an edge between dependent RVs. The direction of each edge is fromthe RVs on the right of the conditional bar (|) to the RVs on its left, i.e. from parent tochild. Applying this procedure to the liquid level example leads to Figure 2.6, wherediscrete and continuous RVs are represented by rectangles and circles respectively.The combination of Figure 2.6 and the CPDs for each RV is called a Bayesian network(Pearl, 1985).
Definition 2.1: Bayesian network (BN)
Let X be a set of RVs {X1, . . . , Xk}. Let G be a directed acyclic graph(Thulasiraman and Swamy, 1992) defined by the tuple, 〈X,E〉, of nodes Xand edges E such that one node is associated with each RV in X. Let θ bea set of CPDs {θ1, . . . , θk}, one associated with each RV Xi ∈ X, such that
θi ∈ θ is the CPD:Pr (Xi|par (Xi))whose dependence structure is defined byG.
A BN, B, is a compact representation of the JPD, Pr (X), defined by thetuple: 〈G,θ〉. The JPD may be computed using Equation 2.26.
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Lm
L
SL
Figure 2.6: BN for liquid level example. L and Lm represent the actual liquid level andthe sensor reading respectively and SL is the status of the sensor: normal or faulty.Shading on Lm indicates that it is an observed RV (i.e. we will condition on its valuebased on a sensor reading).
Typically, CPDs are defined in the causal direction such that a direct causal relationshipexists from the set of RVs on the right of the conditional bar to that on its left. Bayes’theorem is a logical corollary of Equation 2.21 which enables one to compute a CPDwith reversed dependency, i.e. Pr (X|Y) instead of Pr (Y|X). Since we have
Pr
(
X|Y)Pr (Y) = Pr (X,Y) = Pr (Y|X)Pr (X) , (2.28)
Bayes theorem follows:
Pr
(
X|Y) = Pr (Y|X)Pr (X)
Pr (Y)
. (2.29)
When X is a set of causes and Y is a set of effects, then Bayes’ theorem enablesinference — reasoning from effects to causes in the presence of uncertainty.
Consider again the liquid level example of Figure 2.5 whose BN defines relationshipsbetween the sensor status (cause) and the sensor reading (effect). Assume that anormally functioning sensor produces a noisy reading of the actual liquid level, while afaulty sensor produces an arbitrary reading irrespective of the actual liquid level. Giventhat a sensor reading is observed, Bayes’ theorem may be used to reason whether ornot that particular reading was the result of a normally functioning sensor or a faultyone. This may be phrased as the query: “What is the probability distribution over thesensor status given observation of the sensor reading?” and can be formulated usingBayes’ theorem as
Pr
(
SL|Lm = lm
)
=
Pr
(
Lm = lm|SL
)
Pr (SL)
Pr (Lm = lm)
. (2.30)
The numerator on the right-hand side is the product of the likelihood11 function
11Note that we use unnormalised likelihood as a surrogate for the conditional probability ofobservation.
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Pr
(
Lm = lm|SL
) and the prior Pr (SL). The likelihood function specifies thedependence of the sensor reading on the sensor status, i.e. the probability that anyparticular sensor reading is observed given that the sensor status is known. The prior isthe probability distribution over the sensor status before the sensor reading is observed.The denominator is the normalisation constant Pr (Lm = lm). It is the marginalprobability of observing any particular sensor value. It normalises the numerator suchthat the posterior on the left-hand side, Pr (SL|Lm = lm), sums to 1. The posterior isthe probability distributionwhich answers the query. Using these terms, Bayes’ theoremmay be rewritten as
posterior = likelihood function× priornormalisation constant . (2.31)
All of the probability distributions in Equation 2.30 can be computed from the JPD,
Pr (L,Lm, SL). The numerator may be computed by marginalising outL from the JPDand the denominator may be computed by marginalising out L and SL from the JPD.Recalling that the JPD may be computed as a product of CPDs, the query in Equation2.30 becomes:
Pr
(
SL|Lm = lm
)
=
∫
L
Pr
(
Lm = lm|L, SL
)
Pr (L) Pr (SL)∫
L,SL
Pr
(
Lm = lm|L, SL
)
Pr (L) Pr (SL)
. (2.32)
Section 2.3.2 presents some typical representations of probability distributions whichare used for a numerical example in Section 2.3.3 demonstrating the mechanism forcomputing Equation 2.32.
2.3.2 Representation of probability distributions
This subsection considers the representation of different types of probabilitydistributions. Note that explanations here are typically illustrative of use-cases in thiswork and do not always apply to the general case.
Discrete case Probability distributions over discrete RVs are typically representedas tables. Recall that for a discrete RV, A, the number of values, ai in domain (A),it may assume form a finite or countable set. The table describing the probabilitydistribution of A contains the probability Pr (A = ai) for a single value ai to beassumed by A.
In the multivariate case, a probability distribution table contains a probability for eachassignment of values to the discrete RVs. Consider the JPD, Pr (A,B,C), over the setof binary discrete RVs {A,B,C}. There exists one entry,Pr (A = ai, B = bi, C = ci),in a table for each combination of assignments, ai, bi, and ci, to A, B, and C ,respectively. An example probability distribution containing these three RVs is shownin Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: An example probability distribution over a set of 3 binary RVs.
A B C Pr (A,B,C)
a1 b1 c1 0.16
a1 b1 c2 0.20
a1 b2 c1 0.06
a1 b2 c2 0.10
a2 b1 c1 0.10
a2 b1 c2 0.16
a2 b2 c1 0.18
a2 b2 c2 0.04
As another example, the marginal probability distribution over A, Pr (A), may beobtained from the JPD by summing the entries in the JPD for which A = ai for each
ai in domain (A). Using the probability distribution in Table 2.2, the first entry in themarginal probability distribution of A is
Pr (A = a1) = 0.16 + 0.2 + 0.06 + 0.1 = 0.52. (2.33)
This illustrates procedure described in Equation 2.20 and holds for obtaining themarginal probability distributions over multiple discrete RVs as well.
Continuous case Probability distributions over continuous RVs are oftenrepresented as functions. This is because the number of values that a continuousRV X may assume is infinite. It is assumed in this work that these values are allreal values. One particularly common function used to represent Pr (X = x) is theGaussian function.12 The Gaussian function is parametrised by the mean, µ, andvariance, σ2, ofX and is written as
Pr (X = x) =
1√
2piσ2
exp
(
−1
2
(
x− µ
σ
)2)
. (2.34)
Note that Pr (X = x) is actually a probability density. Probabilities for continuous RVscan only be computed for sets of values — this is done by integrating the probabilitydensity function (PDF) over the set of values.
A Gaussian distributed continuous RV has its probability distribution completelydefined by its mean, µ, and variance, σ2. Therefore, the shorthand: N (X : µ, σ2) isused to refer to such a RV,X , with mean µ and variance σ2. A similar shorthand holdsfor the multivariate case as well, but instead µ is a vector of means (µ) and σ2 is asquare covariance matrix13 (Σ).
12Note that we will typically only use the Gaussian function to represent continuous probabilitydistributions in this work.13Note that Σ is always a symmetric positive semi-definite matrix.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 35
To illustrate, let X be a set of continuous RVs {X1, . . . , Xk} with mean vector
µ and covariance matrix Σ. µ is a vector of length k where each entry µi in µ is themean of the RV Xi ∈ X. Σ is a square matrix of size k × k where each entry alongits diagonal, i.e. each σ2i in diag (Σ), is the variance of the RV Xi and each of theoff-diagonal entries, σ2i,j where i 6= j, in Σ is the covariance between the RVsXi and
Xj . The probability density of the vector of assignments x to X is
Pr (X = x) =
1√
det (2piΣ)
exp
(
−1
2
(x− µ)T Σ−1 (x− µ)
)
. (2.35)
The shorthand N (X : µ,Σ) is used to refer to a set of Gaussian distributedcontinuous RVs, X, with mean vector µ, and covariance matrix Σ.
Hybrid case Hybrid probability distributions are defined over a mixture of discreteand continuous RVs. For each combination of values assumed by the set of discreteRVs, a hybrid probability distribution typically contains one probability and oneconditional PDF over the set of continuous RVs. If all those PDFs are Gaussianfunctions, then this probability distribution closely resembles a mixture of Gaussians(Koller and Friedman, 2009), however, since there are discrete RVs involved we willrefer to such a probability distribution as a hybrid mixture of Gaussians. In the contextof this hybrid mixture of Gaussians, the relative likelihoods are referred to as weightsand the functions are referred to as mixture components.
Consider the hybrid mixture of Gaussians, Pr (A,B,X), defined over the set ofbinary discrete RVs {A,B} and the set of continuous RVs X = {X1, . . . , Xk}. Thishybrid probability distribution may be represented as a table containing one Gaussianmixture component Pr (X|A = ai, B = bi) and one probability Pr (A = ai, B = bi)for each combination of assignments, ai and bi, to A and B as shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: An example probability distribution for a hybrid mixture of Gaussians.
A B Pr (A,B) Pr
(
X|A,B)
a1 b1 0.10 N (X : µ1,Σ1)
a1 b2 0.20 N (X : µ2,Σ2)
a2 b1 0.25 N (X : µ3,Σ3)
a2 b2 0.45 N (X : µ4,Σ4)
Continuous RVs can be marginalised out from the hybrid mixture of Gaussiansdistribution applying the marginalisation procedure to each of the mixture components.Marginalising discrete RVs out from the hybrid mixture of Gaussians is morecomplicated since the number of mixture components will be reduced as a resultthereof. This process is known as collapsing a hybrid mixture of Gaussians into
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one containing fewer mixture components and can be done approximately using theM-projection method (Lauritzen, 1996; Koller and Friedman, 2009).
The M-projection method approximates the collapsed hybrid mixture of Gaussians bya Gaussian which maintains the same overall mean and overall covariance matrix asthe original hybrid mixture of Gaussians. It does this by computing a weighted averagemean vector and covariance matrix of the mixture components which need to becollapsed into a Gaussian. If only a subset of the discrete RVs need to be marginalisedout from the hybrid mixture of Gaussians, then the procedure for marginalising outdiscrete RVs from a discrete JPD determines which mixture components need tobe collapsed together — recall that the hybrid mixture of Gaussians contains oneGaussian for each combination of assignments to the discrete RVs. Also note thatwhen marginalising out a subset discrete RVs, the probabilities associated with themixture components being collapsed cannot be directly used as weights duringM-projection and need to be normalised first, i.e. to preserve the weighted averageaspect of M-projection.
To collapse a set of mixture components, let wi be the weight of the i-th Gaussian,
N (X : µi,Σi), in a set of n Gaussians. The mixture components may be collapsedinto a single Gaussian,N (X : µ˜, Σ˜), according to Equations 2.36 and 2.37.
µ˜ =
n∑
i=1
wiµi (2.36)
Σ˜ =
n∑
i=1
wiΣi +
n∑
i=1
wi (µi − µ˜) (µi − µ˜)T (2.37)
Conditional cases CPDs define a probability distribution over a set of RVs for eachcombination of values assumed by the set of RVs being conditioned on.
Discrete CPDs Consider the CPD, Pr (A,B|C), defined over the set of binarydiscrete RVs {A,B,C}. A probability distribution over A and B can be defined foreach assignment ci to C as shown in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: An example CPD over a set of binary RVs. Note that Pr (A,B|C = ci) sumto one for each ci.
C A B Pr
(
A,B|C)
c1 a1 b1 0.32
c1 a1 b2 0.12
c1 a2 b1 0.20
c1 a2 b2 0.36
c2 a1 b1 0.40
c2 a1 b2 0.20
c2 a2 b1 0.32
c2 a2 b2 0.08
The JPD over {A,B,C} is the product of Pr (A,B|C) and Pr (C) according toEquation 2.26. The probability distribution Pr (C) weights the probability distributions
Pr
(
A,B|C = c1
) and Pr (A,B|C = c2). If these distributions are equally weighted,i.e. Pr (C = ci) = 0.5 for c1 and c2, then the JPD, Pr (A,B,C), is the same as thatin Table 2.2 and may be obtained by multiplying each entry in Table 2.4 by 0.5 andsumming entries which agree on their assignments to A and B.
Discrete CPDs will be useful for representing the probability distributions of processcomponent statuses over time. For example the probability of a sensor transitioningfrom a normal status to a faulty, between consecutive observations, should berelatively low whereas the probability of the sensor keeping the normal status shouldbe relatively high.
Continuous CPDs Although alternative forms of purely continuous CPDsexist, a commonly used (since it is computationally convenient) representation ofcontinuous CPDs is the linear Gaussian (Koller and Friedman, 2009).
The linear Gaussian representation assumes a linear relationship between themean(s) of one (multivariate) Gaussian N (X : µ,Σ) and another univariate14
GaussianN (Y : µy, σ2y). We assume that Y and X are related by the formula
Y = β0 + β
TX + , (2.38)
where  : N (0, σ20). It then follows that
Pr
(
Y |X = x) : N (Y : β0 + βx, σ20) (2.39)
and
Pr (Y ) : N
(
Y : µy = β0 + β
Tµ, σ2y = σ
2
0 + β
TΣβ
)
. (2.40)
14Note that it is assumed that this is always univariate in this thesis. This assumption is justified bythe use of BN representations for JPDs — we use Equation 2.26 and a just-in-time linearisation methoddescribed in Section 3.4.2 to do this.
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Note that β is a vector of coefficients, containing one βi for each RVXi ∈ X.
The JPD over X and Y , Pr (X, Y ), requires computation of the covariance betweeneachXi and Y , cov (Xi, Y ). The mean vector of the JPD is simply a concatenation of
µ and µy and its covariance matrix is a square matrix containing Σ and σ2y as well assome additional covariance terms, i.e.
Pr (X, Y ) : N
Y : [µ
µy
]
,
[
Σ
...
· · · σ2y
] . (2.41)
The remaining entries of the covariance matrix, cov (Xi, Y ), are calculated as:
cov (Xi, Y ) =
∑
j
βjΣi,j. (2.42)
Continuous CPDs are useful for representing relationships between continuous RVs,such as the dependence between a PV and a noisy sensor reading.
Given a multivariate Gaussian over two sets of RVs Q and O representing thePVs and sensor readings respectively, one may also condition the Gaussian todetermine Pr (Q|O = o). In particular, if Pr (Q,O) is represented by
N
Q,O : [µQ
µO
]
,
[
ΣQQ ΣQO
ΣOQ ΣOO
] , (2.43)
then Pr (Q|O = o) is also a Gaussian, represented by N (Q|O = o : µ′Q,Σ′QQ).Here µ′Q and Σ′QQ are determined by Equations 2.44 and 2.45 respectively (Eaton,1983).
µ′Q = µQ + ΣQOΣ
−1
OO (o− µO) (2.44)
Σ′QQ = ΣQQ −ΣQOΣ−1OOΣOQ (2.45)
Hybrid CPDs Consider again the hybrid mixture of Gaussians representationof Table 2.3 on page 35. Each Gaussian in the mixture is a hybrid CPD, a probabilitydistribution over a set of continuous RVs X given a combination of assignments to aset of discrete RVs {A,B}. Each particular combination of values assumed by the setof discrete RVs selects one of the Gaussians in the mixture.
Such a hybrid CPD is useful for representing relationships between the status ofprocess components, such as sensors and actuators, and PVs, such as pressuresand flows. The status of the components selects the operational mode of a process,defined by relationships between PVs, which affects the likelihood of observing aparticular set of sensor readings.
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It should be noted that the case of augmented CPDs, where discrete RVs depend oncontinuous RVs, is considerably more complex and since augmented CPDs are notused in this research, they are not further discussed here.
2.3.3 Liquid level inference example (continued)
Consider again the liquid level example of Figure 2.5 on page 30. Recall that thegoal was to compute the query (probability) described by Equation 2.32. The taskof computing this query was referred to as inference because probable causes werebeing inferred from observed effects. Namely, in this example, the sensor reading, Lm,is an observed RV and the status of the sensor, SL, is unknown.
The probability distributions in Table 2.5 are assumed for purpose of the example.Note that assumptions include that: the tank is half-full; the actual liquid level in thetank does not change; the level sensor takes independent measurements of the liquidlevel in the tank; and that the status of the level sensor is initially unknown.
Table 2.5: Liquid level example probability distributions in BN. L and Lm represent theactual liquid level and the sensor reading, as a percentage full, respectively. SL is thestatus of the sensor: normal or faulty.
SL Pr (SL) Pr
(
Lm|SL, L
)
normal 0.5 N (µLm = µL, σ2Lm = 6.25 + σ2L)faulty 0.5 0.01 for 0 ≤ lm ≤ 100
Pr (L) = N (µL = 50, σ2L = 0.25)
Pr
(
Lm|SL = normal) is obtained by substituting themean and variance ofPr (L) into
Pr
(
Lm|SL = normal, L) as in Equation 2.46 — a special case of Equation 2.40 with
β = [1].
N (Lm : µLm = 50, σ2Lm = 6.5) (2.46)
Figure 2.7 is a visualisation of Pr (Lm|SL) for the cases of SL = normal and SL =faulty when L = 50%.
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Figure 2.7: Probability distributions of sensor reading given different sensorstatuses. The solid line and dashed lines represent Pr (Lm|SL = normal) and
Pr
(
Lm|SL = faulty) respectively.
Suppose a sensor reading is taken, and the sensor reads a value of 52% as indicated inFigure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Probability distributions of sensor reading given different sensor statusesand an observation of 52% sensor reading.
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Before the reading, the status of the sensor is unknown and there is a uniformlydistributed belief (i.e. a probability distribution) over its two possible values. The goalis to update this belief in accordance with the observation, but this process is notimmediately clear without the mechanism of Bayes’ theorem. Using the current belief,
Pr (SL), as the prior in Equation 2.30, the posterior belief, Pr (SL|Lm = 52%), maybe computed as follows.
For each case of sensor status, the product of the likelihood function and prior,i.e. the numerator of Equation 2.30, needs to be computed.
Consider the case when the sensor status is normal. Applying Equation 2.34 to
Pr
(
Lm|SL = normal), the probability density for Lm assuming the value 52% is0.1150. Thus, the value of the numerator of Equation 2.30 for this case is:
Pr
(
Lm = 52%|SL = normal)Pr (SL = normal) = 0.1150×0.5 = 0.0575. (2.47)
Next, consider the case when the sensor status is faulty. The probability density forLmassuming the value 52% is 0.01 due its uniform probability distribution. The value of thenumerator of Equation 2.30 for this case is:
Pr
(
Lm = 52%|SL = faulty)Pr (SL = faulty) = 0.01× 0.5 = 0.005. (2.48)
The normalization constant, Pr (Lm = 52%), is the sum of the above two values, i.e.Equations 2.47 and 2.48.
Pr
(
Lm = 52%
)
= 0.0575 + 0.005 = 0.0625 (2.49)
Dividing Equations 2.47 and 2.48 by Equation 2.49 yields the posterior probabilitydistribution of the sensor status as shown in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Posterior belief of sensor status after observation for a sensor reading of52%.
SL Pr
(
SL|Lm = 52%
)
normal 0.92faulty 0.08
Table 2.6 shows that the probability (or belief) that the sensor is functioningnormally has been strengthened by the observation. This is primarily due to theprobability density of Pr (Lm = 52%|SL = normal) being much greater than that of
Pr
(
Lm = 52%|SL = faulty), i.e. 0.1150 0.01.
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Now suppose that another reading is taken (independent of the previous reading), andthe sensor reads a value of 57% as shown in Figure 2.9. How does the new sensorreading affect the previously updated belief in Table 2.6?
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Figure 2.9: Probability distributions of sensor reading given different sensor statusesand observation of 57% sensor reading.
Starting with the current belief, in Table 2.6, as the prior in Equation 2.30, calculationssimilar to those in Equations 2.47, 2.48, and 2.49 ensue to compute the new posterior,
Pr
(
SL|Lm = 57%
). The calculations are performed as follows:
Pr
(
Lm = 57%|SL = normal)Pr (SL = normal) = 0.0036× 0.92 = 0.0033(2.50)
Pr
(
Lm = 57%|SL = faulty)Pr (SL = faulty) = 0.01× 0.08 = 0.0008 (2.51)
Pr
(
Lm = 57%
)
= 0.0033 + 0.0008 = 0.0041 (2.52)
Table 2.7: Updated posterior belief of sensor status after observation for a sensorreading of 57%.
SL Pr
(
SL|Lm = 57%
)
normal 0.806faulty 0.194
The result of updating the previous belief with the new observation (Table 2.7) nowshows a continued belief that the sensor status is normal. This is because, even
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though the probability density of Pr (Lm = 57%|SL = faulty) is greater than thatof Pr (Lm = 57%|SL = normal), the belief that the sensor is faulty is consideredfar less likely by the prior belief. Since it was strongly believed that the sensorstatus is normal, a new observation would have to be further away from the mean ofthe probability distribution Pr (Lm|SL = normal) in order for the belief to report arelatively higher probability for the sensor being faulty.
In contrast, if the prior belief for the second sensor reading had not been updated toreflect the posterior belief after the first sensor reading, i.e. if the initial belief in Table2.5 was maintained, then the posterior belief in Table 2.7 would have reported thatsensor is faulty with probability 0.735.
It can be concluded that previous observations influence how a belief is updatedwith new observations in the future. This insight plays a large role in the diagnosis offault conditions in processes where sensor readings are continuously monitored. Inthis case, the sensors provide a stream of observations which can be used to maintainand update beliefs about the operating mode of the process as well as the distributionsof the underlying PVs. This idea is further discussed in Chapter 3 by presentation of aPD approach based on DBNs.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 3
Probabilistic Fault Diagnosis Approach
Chapter 2 presented some background theory including a traditional MSPM faultdiagnosis approach, tools and methods for benchmarking fault diagnosis capabilityof an approach, and some introductory concepts from probability theory and BNs.This chapter presents a mixture of background theory and methodology for thedevelopment and implementation of a DBN-based PD approach based on Lerner et al.(2000) and Lerner (2002).
The chapter begins with a formalisation of DBNs in the context of this thesis,including relevant assumptions. Next, the problem of exponential blow-up in the sizesof JPDs with respect to time in a DBN is discussed and an approach, i.e. an inferenceengine, tackling this problem is presented. The use of this inference engine for faultdiagnosis is also detailed. This is followed by several enhancements which attemptto reduce the computational requirements of the inference engine and concludes thedetailed presentation of concepts involved in the PD approach. Finally, methods usedfor the development of DBNs for process monitoring purposes are detailed before thechapter is concluded. This chapter also provides background for the discussion ofother DBN-based PD approaches presented in literature in the next chapter
3.1 Dynamic Bayesian networks
Section 2.3 introduced some basic probability theory concepts as well as BNs, andthen demonstrated how probabilistic reasoning may be used to detect possible faultconditions in a simple example involving the measurement of liquid level in a closedtank. Conceptually, this demonstration can extend to processes which have manymore process components (such as valves, sensors, pumps, etc.), each with their owndiscrete statuses, and many more PVs (such as pressures, flows, temperatures, etc.).However, the statuses of process components and values of PVs typically change overtime. To account for this, discrete-time stochastic processes may be represented byDBNs — a tool for modelling RVs changing over time.
44
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This section presents some background theory on DBNs (including assumptionsrelevant to this thesis) before introducing an example case study, based on the one inSection 2.3, which will be later used to showcase the functionality of the PD approach.1
3.1.1 Theoretical background
For a particular point in time, t, all of the RVs that represent the statuses of processcomponents and values of PVs are referred to as the state of a process. In a DBN, thestate at time t is denoted as X(t) where eachX(t)i ∈ X(t) is one RV in the state.
Collectively these RVs are referred to as being in the time slice t because, inthis setting, t is typically restricted to only take integer values for which the differencein real time between any two consecutive time slices, t and t + 1, is constant.Furthermore, time is only allowed to move forward from an initial process state at timeslice 0 — this is represented by the probability distribution over the process state RVs
in time slice 0, i.e. Pr(X(0)). The process state with respect to time may then be
represented by the following CPD:
Pr
(
X(t+1)|X(0), . . . ,X(t)
) for t > 0. (3.1)
Note here thatX(t+1) depends on {X(0), . . . ,X(t)}, the entire history of process statesbefore time t+ 1. However, a simplifying assumption, called the Markov assumption2,is typically assumed to restrict the nature of the dependence of X(t+1). A first orderMarkov assumption restricts the nature of this dependence to only X(t) by assumingthat
Pr
(
X(t+1)|X(0), . . . ,X(t)
)
= Pr
(
X(t+1)|X(t)
)
. (3.2)
This implies that the RVs X(t+1) are only dependent on the RVs X(t) for any time slice
t > 0. In other words the future state X(t+1) is independent of all past states X(t′),where t′ < t, if the present state X(t) is known — this type of independence is alsoknown as conditional independence.
Typically, it is further assumed that the process being modelled is stationary3.
This means that the CPDs Pr(X(t′+1)|X(t′)) are the same for all time slices t′ ≥ 0,
and may be denoted by:
Pr
(
X(t
′+1)|X(t′)
)
≡ Pr (X′|X) . (3.3)
1A more comprehensive treatment of DBNs may be found in the textbooks by Barber (2011) andKoller and Friedman (2009).2The Markov assumption facilitates the compact representation of DBNs.3Note that stationary process behaviour typically applies under NOC and that when a fault manifests,process behaviour will typically become non-stationary. Rather, in this thesis, we attempt to modelstationary process behaviour under NOC, detect deviation from this behaviour, and identify the causeof deviation given a library of broadly descriptive fault signatures.
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This allows for the transition model for process states from one time slice to the nextto be conveniently encoded in one CPD, viz. Pr (X′|X).
A process for which the aforementioned assumptions are valid is referred to asa Markovian process (Dynkin, 1965). For such a process, the state transition CPD,
Pr
(
X′|X), may be represented by a two-time-slice Bayesian network (Definition 3.1).
Definition 3.1: Two-time-slice Bayesian network (2-TBN)
For a Markovian process whose RVs, representing the time slice t process state,are denoted by X(t), the CPD Pr (X′|X) describes the transition of the processstate from time slice t′ to t′ + 1 for all t′ ≥ 0. Recalling Definition 2.1, this CPDmay be represented by a BN. In particular, this BN is referred to as a two-time-sliceBayesian network (2-TBN) since its nodes represent RVs in two time slices, t′ and
t′ + 1.
Finally, the DBN representing the JPD of process states from time slice 0 to t + 1,
Pr
(
X(0), . . . ,X(t+1)
), is defined by Definition 3.2.
Definition 3.2: Dynamic Bayesian network (DBN)
Let B→ be a 2-TBN that represents the probability distribution Pr (X′|X) and
let B0 be a BN that represents the probability distribution Pr(X(0)). A DBN isdefined by the pair: 〈B→,B0〉.
For any time slice t+ 1, Pr(X(0), . . . ,X(t+1)) can be computed by:
Pr
(
X(0), . . . ,X(t+1)
)
= Pr
(
X(0)
)
·
t∏
t′=0
Pr
(
X(t
′+1)|X(t′)
)
= Pr
(
X(0)
)
·
t∏
t′=0
Pr
(
X′|X)
3.1.2 Example: Draining liquid level
Consider again the liquid level example of Figure 2.5 on page 30, but suppose the liquidin the tank is draining slowly over time as shown in Figure 3.1.
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L
Lm
Figure 3.1: Schematic for draining liquid level example. L is the actual level of liquid inthe tank and Lm is its measured value.
A DBN may be used to model this process because the actual liquid level decreasesover time. Note that the independence structure for all RVs in one time slice is thesame as that of the original BN in Figure 2.6 on page 31. Therefore, all the intra timeslice (i.e. within a time slice) edges in the 2-TBN, B→, and initial BN, B0, are the sameas in Figure 2.6. These edges represent (approximately) the immediate, with respect totime, effect of one RV on another — they are approximate due to differences in processdynamics and the fixed time step progression of a DBN.
The remaining edges in the 2-TBN which need to be added are called inter timeslice edges. These edges represent the effect of one RV on another over a period oftime (approximately) equal to the difference in real-time between time slices. Theliquid level at time slice t + 1, L(t+1), decreases relative to its value at time slice t,
L(t). Therefore, an edge from L(t) to L(t+1) should be created in B→ to show thisrelationship.
Additionally, an edge from S(t)L to S(t+1)L should be created in B→ to define a‘memory’ for the sensor status. This edge is created to encode the persistence of faultconditions as an inertial dependence, namely:
if Pr(S(t)L = normal) > Pr(S(t)L = faulty) ,
then Pr(S(t+1)L = normal) > Pr(S(t+1)L = faulty) ,
otherwise Pr(S(t+1)L = normal) < Pr(S(t+1)L = faulty) .
(3.4)
Figure 3.2 shows the structure of the 2-TBN, B→, for this example. Note thatsensor measurements are considered to be independent over time. Therefore, no edgeis drawn from L(t)m to L(t+1)m . Also note that these models may not necessarily be
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exact, but aim to capture enough of the process dynamics to reasonably track processbehaviour and hence be useful for fault diagnosis purposes.
L
(t)
m
L(t)
S
(t)
L
L
(t+1)
m
L(t+1)
S
(t+1)
L
Figure 3.2: Structure of 2-TBN for draining liquid level example. L is the actual level ofliquid in the tank, Lm is its measured value, and SL is the status of the sensor.
3.2 Derivation of DBN inference
Section 3.1 presented the concept of DBNs, stated that they may be used to modelprocess behaviour over time, and introduced a simple example process that maytake advantage of DBN modelling. In our case the purpose of the DBN is to facilitatequerying the state4 of the process as a probability distribution over a set of RVs, X, ata particular point in time, t+ 1, given some initial (prior) belief about the state definedby B0. X(t+1) consists of all of the process component statuses and PV values (actualand measured) for time slice t+ 1.
There are a few important details to note about Pr(X(t+1)), the first being the
time slice t + 1. This is intentionally specified because the PD approach uses a DBNmodel to predict process behaviour for time slice t + 1. The prediction takes theform of a probability distribution for the entire process state, i.e. including probabilitydistributions for measured PVs. Sensor readings taken at the same time slice arethen used to infer information about the remaining unobserved RVs in the processstate. In particular, the probability distribution over the discrete RVs in X is of interestfor fault diagnosis purposes since these RVs describe the process component statuses.
Furthermore, Pr(X(t+1)) is a hybrid probability distribution therefore it becomes less
practical to compute Pr(X(t+1)) as t increases — due to a problem referred to as
exponential blow-up. This section first discusses the problem of exponential blow-up
4Note that this refers to determining the overall operational mode of the process, i.e. normal or faulty,and the distributions of values for various PVs at a particular point in time.
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and then presents an approach to tackle this problem using an inference engine (basedon Lerner et al. (2000) and Lerner (2002)) tailored to our needs.
3.2.1 Problem of exponential blow-up
Recall from Definition 3.2 that a DBN consists of an initial state defined by B0 anda transition model defined by B→. In order to compute Pr(X(t+1)) one would
typically compute the JPD Pr(X(0), . . . ,X(t+1)) according to Definition 3.2 and then
marginalise out all states not in time slice t + 1 — additionally, one would typicallycondition the JPD on all the observations up to time t + 1 as well. To illustrate, in
order to compute Pr(X(1)) one would first compute the JPD Pr(X(0),X(1)) and
then marginalise out X(0). Similarly, to compute Pr(X(2)) one would first compute
the JPD Pr(X(0),X(1),X(2)) and then marginalise out {X(0),X(1)}. This becomes
problematic as t increases when X contains discrete RVs.
When multiplying two independent discrete probability distributions, the numberof entries in the resulting probability table is always more than the number of entriesin the probability tables of either discrete probability distribution. In fact, in this case,the number of entries in the resulting probability table is the product of the number ofentries in the probability tables of each discrete probability distribution.
To illustrate, if there are t + 1 independent discrete probability distributions whoseprobability tables each containm entries each, then the JPD over all involved discreteRVs will be a probability table containingmt+1 entries.5 This probability table becomesexponentially larger as t increases, hence describing the problem which is calledexponential blow-up. This problem makes exact computation of the JPD intractableas the amount of memory required to store the probability table of the JPD increasesexponentially with t. Naturally, this is not practical for an online processmonitoring tool.
Note that the above explanation focuses on the multiplication of independentdiscrete probability distributions. However, there are both discrete and continuous RVsin X, and they have some dependencies between one another. Therefore, the problemof exponential blow-up is further described below — in the context of the PD approach.
Since all continuous RVs are modelled using the family of Gaussian probabilitydistributions in this thesis, Pr (X) may be represented as a hybrid mixture ofGaussians (see Section 2.3.2). In Pr (X) each set of assignments to the discrete RVsin X defines one Gaussian mixture component in Pr (X) — Table 2.3 illustrates this
5It is important to note that we frame this discussion in the context of simple probabilistic methods,and that more advanced methods (such as those presented in Minka (2001)) may reduce or avoid thisaltogether.
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type of probability distribution.
Now suppose that Pr(X(0)) contains m possible sets of assignments to the
discrete RVs in X and therefore m corresponding Gaussian mixture components.
To compute Pr(X(0),X(1)), one would multiply Pr(X(0)) with Pr (X′|X), a
conditional hybrid probability distribution with m2 assignments to the discrete RVsin {X,X′} and m2 corresponding (conditional) Gaussians over the continuous RVs
in {X,X′}. Since Pr (X′|X) is dependent on Pr(X(0)) the JPD Pr(X(0),X(1))
will have m2 assignments to the discrete RVs in {X(0),X(1)} and m2 correspondingGaussians over the continuous RVs in {X(0),X(1)}.
The number of entries (number of assignments to the discrete RVs and correspondingGaussians over the continuous RVs) in the JPD over the various process states
increases m-fold with the number of process states. In other words, if Pr(X(0))
containsm entries, then Pr(X(0),X(1)) containsm2 entries, Pr(X(0),X(1),X(2))
containsm3 table entries, and so forth. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
t = 0
t = 1
t = 2
P(X(0))
P(X(0),X(1))
P(X(0),X(1),X(2))
Figure 3.3: Illustration of exponential blow-up when computing a JPD of process states
starting an initial state, Pr(X(0)), containing two entries (possible assignments to the
discrete RVs in X and corresponding Gaussians over the continuous RVs in X). Eachcircle represents one entry in the JPD of process states for a time slice.
An entry contains a probability for the particular process operating mode associatedwith it, and a probability distribution over the PVs (both actual and measured).
Following a particular entry in Pr(X(0)) in Figure 3.3 using the arrows leading from
the entry all the way to one in time slice 2, reveals one possible trajectory for processbehaviour over time (up to time slice 2). Each trajectory describes changes to theprocess operating mode over time as well as its effects on the probability distributionsover the PVs.
Under NOC , the trajectory describing normal process behaviour should usuallybe the most likely, while trajectories describing multiple process component faults
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should be least likely. This means that as the number of trajectories increases (due totime), the number of trajectories with low relative likelihoods also increase, potentiallyexponentially. Some trajectories may not be worthwhile to track, because of the addedcomputational requirements and inevitably low relative likelihood. In other words,tracking a reduced set of trajectories may not necessarily degrade tracking of processbehaviour over time and may allow us to control the problem of exponential blow-up byavoiding further computation on relatively unlikely trajectories. However, this approachis still relatively computationally expensive compared to the one presented in the nextsection.
3.2.2 Solution: Approximate process state tracking
Up to this point the approach to compute a process state for time slice t + 1 wouldalways involve the use of an initial state at time slice 0 to compute the JPD over allprocess states from time slice 0 to t + 1. However, as described in Section 3.2.1, thiscreates the problem of exponential blow-up as t increases and results in the trackingof many trajectories describing relatively unlikely process behaviour (these are notparticularly useful for tracking actual process behaviour).
A more practical approach, as presented in Lerner et al. (2000) and Lerner (2002),would instead use the belief about the process state at time slice t to produce only theset of process state transitions from time slice t to t + 1, and use those transitionsto compute the belief about the process state at time t + 1. However, doing thisresults in approximation of the belief about the process state at time slice t+ 1 for alltime slices t > 0 — since only transitions from the belief about the process state attime slice t are used to compute the belief about the process state at time slice t + 1instead of the full set of trajectories up to time t+ 1. This means that several (unlikely)trajectories remain unexplored as t increases.
In theory, not exploring unlikely trajectories is not particularly detrimental to trackingprocess behaviour because (as described in Section 3.2.1) actual process behaviourover time is typically tracked by the few trajectories which maintain high relativelikelihood over time. Therefore, although approximating the belief about the processstate at time slice t + 1 may not be as accurate and reliable as computing the exactbelief about the process state for the same time slice, the approximated beliefs aboutprocess states over time may still reasonably represent and track actual processbehaviour.
However, how closely the approximated beliefs about process states track actualprocess behaviour depends on how the approximation is performed. Recall that, inorder to approximate the time slice t + 1 belief about the process state from a JPDcontaining the state RVs at both time slices t and t + 1, one must marginalise outthe state RVs in time slice t from the JPD. Since, in our case, this JPD is representedas a hybrid probability distribution, doing this involves collapsing a hybrid mixture
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. PROBABILISTIC FAULT DIAGNOSIS APPROACH 52
of Gaussians depending on the assignments to the discrete RVs in time slice t + 1.Typically, if the mixture components are similar in terms of mean and variance,collapsing the hybrid mixture of Gaussians should not have adverse effects on theprocess behaviour described by the approximated belief about the process state. Onthe other hand, if the mixture components are dissimilar, then information loss due tocollapsing becomes an issue.
To illustrate, consider a mixture of (univariate) Gaussians with two dissimilarcomponents, i.e. with entirely different means and variances. Given the weighting ofeach mixture component, the mixture may be collapsed into one Gaussian probabilitydistribution according to Equations 2.36 and 2.37. Figure 3.4 shows such a mixtureof Gaussians with two dissimilar mixture components and their collapsed Gaussianprobability distribution given equal weighting for each mixture component. Noticethat the mean and variance of the collapsed Gaussian probability distribution areconsiderably different from either mixture component.
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Figure 3.4: Collapsing a mixture of two Gaussians with dissimilar mixture componentsand equal weighting.
In particular, if the twomixture components describe process behaviour under differentoperating modes, then the result of collapsing the two mixture components into oneGaussian probability distribution describes entirely different process behaviour. This isfurther illustrated for the case of the draining liquid level example on page 46. Supposethat the process state for time slice t+ 1 needs to be computed from the JPD:
Pr
(
L(t), L(t)m , S
(t)
L , L
(t+1), L(t+1)m , S
(t+1)
L
)
. (3.5)
This requires that all the RVs at time slice t be marginalised out from the JPD. Alsosuppose that the sensor status, SL, could be either normal (n) or faulty (f), then thisJPD is a hybrid probability distribution containing four Gaussian mixture components,
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one for each combination of assignments to S(t+1)L and S(t)L . Since the approximatebelief about the process state at time slice t + 1 only contains S(t+1)L , this meansthat the mixture components which depend on the same assignment to S(t+1)L (forexample n) need to be collapsed into one Gaussian which is dependent on that sameassignment toS(t+1)L . This also means that the collapsing ignores assignments toS(t)L .
To illustrate this using the example, first one would marginalise out {L(t), L(t)m }from the JPD, then for each assignment to S(t+1)L one would collapse the relevantmixture components into a Gaussian for each of those assignments. For example, forthe case of S(t+1)L =n, one would collapse the mixture components
Pr
(
L(t+1), L(t+1)m |S(t+1)L = n, S(t)L = n
) , and
Pr
(
L(t+1), L(t+1)m |S(t+1)L = n, S(t)L = f
)
into the Gaussian:
Pr
(
L(t+1), L(t+1)m |S(t+1)L = n
)
. (3.6)
Because of this problem Lerner et al. (2000) and Lerner (2002) develop an alternativeapproach for approximating beliefs about process states. In their approach theyavoid the problem of exponential blow-up while reducing information loss as aresult of collapsing by collapsing only similar Gaussian mixture components whenapproximating beliefs about process states. The rest of this subsection details suchan approach based on Lerner (2002).
First, some notation and terminology need to be established. Recall that allprocess state RVs are represented by X — this includes component statuses andPV values. The exact belief about the process state for time slice t is denoted by
Pr
(
X(t)
) and its approximate counterpart is denoted by P˜r(X(t)) — from this point
onward approximated beliefs about process states are exclusively used.
X is also partitioned into observed (measured) O and unobserved (queried) Q RVs.Information about all of the RVs in O is assumed to be available for each time slice viasensor readings, while the RVs in Q (i.e. latent RVs) describe underlying details aboutprocess states. These details typically need to be inferred and cannot be determinedexactly due to lack of sensors. Therefore, a probability distribution over Q onlydescribes particular beliefs about the RVs in Q and hence that probability distributionover Q will be referred to as a belief state. In particular, the goal of our inferenceengine is to infer a probability distribution over Q, given process observations up to
time slice t+ 1, i.e. the belief state: P˜r(Q(t+1)|O(t+1) = o(t+1), . . . ,O(1) = o(1)).
Since both continuous and discrete RVs are in X, O, and Q it is also convenient
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to introduce the subscripts Γ and ∆ which will denote continuous and discrete RVssubsets respectively. For example X∆ denotes all the discrete RVs in X, while x∆describes a particular set of assignments which may be assumed by those RVs.Because X∆ describes the statuses of various process components in a process,each unique x∆ also describes different process operating modes which may, forexample, correspond to NOC , or a particular sensor bias fault, or multiple simultaneouscomponent faults, and so forth. Furthermore, as a result of the dependency of someRVs in XΓ on those in X∆, this enables X to model multiple different processbehaviours using a compact structure, i.e. a BN.
Since the approximate belief state for time slice t+1 is conditioned on all observationsup to time slice t + 1, one may assume that our inference engine requires, at somepoint, all observations up to time slice t + 1. However, note that this requirementmay be reduced to just the observations for time slice t and t + 1. This is achieved
by first using P˜r(Q(t)|O(t) = o(t)) and O(t) = o(t) to construct P˜r(X(t)), then
computing transitions of process behaviour from P˜r(X(t)), P˜r(X(t+1),X(t)), and
using this as well as the observations for time slice t + 1 to approximate the beliefstate for time slice t + 1. One would then follow this procedure for all t > 0, startingwith t = 1. As a result, the approximate belief state for time slice t + 1 would
incorporate all past observations. Because of this, note that P˜r(Q(t)) and, as a
result, P˜r(X(t)) subsume all past observations even though this will not be explicitly
indicated throughout the rest of this thesis.
As previously discussed, when marginalising out discrete RVs from hybrid probabilitydistributions, some of the Gaussian mixture components need to be collapsed. In our
case, P˜r(X(t+1),X(t)) is a hybrid mixture of Gaussians containing the transitions of
process behaviour which we require to approximate the belief state at time slice t+ 1.In order to approximate this belief state, we will have to collapse some of the mixturecomponents (Gaussians). However, to reduce the problem of information loss weuse an alternative collapsing scheme which collapses the components based on theirsimilarity to one another instead of the assignments of values to discrete RVs on whichthey are conditioned. Note that this similarity will only apply to the components defined
over the RVs in P˜r(X(t+1)Γ ), since we are interested in approximating the belief stateat time slice t+ 1. Further note that we will discuss how similarity is determined afterdiscussing how to represent the structure resulting from this non-traditional collapsingscheme approach. This is necessary because similar components may be conditionedon different assignments of values to {X(t+1)∆ ,X(t)∆ } which means that a traditionalhybrid probability distribution cannot be used to represent the result.
To illustrate this, consider the draining liquid level example system on page 46
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of Section 3.1.2. Suppose we compute P˜r(X(t+1),X(t)) and marginalise out X(t)Γ forthis system and obtain the hybrid mixture of Gaussians in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Illustration of JPD of process states for draining liquid level example. The
Pri andNi indicate place holders for probability and Gaussian probability distributionrespectively.
X
(t)
∆ X
(t+1)
∆ P˜r
(
X
(t)
∆ ,X
(t+1)
∆
)
P˜r
(
X
(t+1)
Γ |X(t)∆ = x(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ = x(t+1)∆
)
S
(t)
L S
(t+1)
L P˜r
(
S
(t)
L , S
(t+1)
L
)
P˜r
(
L(t+1), L
(t+1)
m |S(t+1)L , S(t)L
)
n n Pr1 N1
n f Pr2 N2
f n Pr3 N3
f f Pr4 N4
Traditionally, marginalising out X(t)∆ here would result in two components in the hybridmixture of Gaussians P˜r(X(t+1)), one from the collapsing of N1 and N3 and theother from the collapsing of N2 and N4. Also, the weight of each component in
P˜r
(
X(t+1)
) would be the sum of the probabilities for each transition involved in the
collapsing, i.e. Pr1 and Pr3 for {N1,N3} and Pr2 and Pr4 for {N2,N4}. However,as previously discussed, this approach risks information loss when components beingcollapsed into one Gaussian are dissimilar.
Suppose N1, N2, and N3 are similar, i.e. in terms of mean and variance, to oneanother andN4 is entirely different. The aforementioned traditional collapsing schemewould certainly lose some information when collapsingN2 andN4 into one Gaussian.To reduce information loss, our inference engine would instead choose the collapsingscheme which collapsesN1,N2, andN3 into one Gaussian and keepsN4 separate —but how do we store this information and use it for inference for future time slices?
All of the components being collapsed into one Gaussian are similar, but areconditioned on different assignments to {X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ }. Each component beingcollapsed into one Gaussian must also be weighted for compatibility with Equations2.36 and 2.37. In the context of our inference engine, this means that the transition,characterised by the particular assignment to {X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ }, also receives thesame weighting as its corresponding mixture component. In fact, a probabilitydistribution over {X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ } can be induced from these weights by assigning aprobability of zero to all entries in Pr(X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ ) which cannot be associatedwith a corresponding weight, and using the appropriate weights to determine the
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. PROBABILISTIC FAULT DIAGNOSIS APPROACH 56
probabilities of the remaining entries.6
To illustrate this, consider collapsing N1, N2, and N3 into one Gaussian. Theinduced probability distribution over {X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ } in this case would be:
Table 3.2: Illustration of induced probability distribution over {X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ } for drainingliquid level example when collapsingN1,N2, andN3 into one Gaussian. Note thatN1,
N2, and N3 are each associated with a particular assignment to {X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ }, thustheir weights can each correspond to a particular entry in Pr(X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ ).
X
(t)
∆ X
(t+1)
∆ Pr
(
X
(t)
∆ ,X
(t+1)
∆
)
S
(t)
L S
(t+1)
L Pr
(
S
(t)
L , S
(t+1)
L
)
n n Pr1
Pr1+Pr2+Pr3
n f Pr2
Pr1+Pr2+Pr3
f n Pr3
Pr1+Pr2+Pr3
f f 0
The result of this collapsing thus describes a hybrid probability distribution where everyassignment to its discrete RVs describes the same one Gaussian. This probabilitydistribution may be used to represent one hypothesis about the state of the processfor time slice t + 1. The likelihood of this hypothesis is the sum of the likelihoods ofeach Gaussian component collapsed into the Gaussian of the hypothesis, i.e. for thecase of collapsingN1,N2, andN3 into one Gaussian: Pr1 + Pr2 + Pr3. Note that thisalso implies that a different hypothesis with its own likelihood and hybrid probabilitydistribution would exist forN4.
It is better to further formalise this discussion in terms of Q since we are primarilyinterested in the unobserved RVs. Suppose one has the approximate belief state
P˜r
(
Q(t)|O(t) = o(t), . . . ,O(1) = o(1)
) and the observations o(t) at time slice t, one
can then use the 2-TBN to compute
P˜r
(
X(t+1),Q(t)|O(t) = o(t), . . . ,O(1) = o(1)
)
. (3.7)
Conditioning on the observations o(t+1) for time slice t+ 1 and marginalising out Q(t)Γyields
P˜r
(
Q(t+1),Q
(t)
∆ |O(t+1) = o(t+1), . . . ,O(1) = o(1)
)
. (3.8)
This is a hybrid mixture of Gaussians describing transitions of process behaviourfrom a given approximate belief about the process state. Each Gaussian describes a
6Note that this procedure constructs new a probability distribution and should not be viewed as amodification of another probability distribution.
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probability distribution overQ(t+1)Γ and determines which entries in 3.8 (i.e. transitions)should be combined with one another, based on the similarity of their Gaussians,when creating hypotheses. Each hypothesis thus consists of a Gaussian over Q(t+1)Γ ,a probability table overQ(t+1)∆ (note we ignoreX(t)∆ when creating this), and a likelihood.
We also define a BN, separate from the original DBN, which simply stores hypothesesfor a time slice t.7 We refer to this BN as a belief network, and denote it as B(t)bel. B(t)belcontains three RVsH(t)bel, ∆(t)bel, and Γ(t)bel, and has the structure illustrated in Figure 3.5.
H
(t)
bel
∆
(t)
bel Γ
(t)
bel
Figure 3.5: Illustration of time slice t belief network structure. H(t)bel is a discrete RVsused to denote hypotheses and allows for selection of different hypotheses in the beliefnetwork. ∆(t)bel is a discrete RVs conditioned on Hbel, for each assignment to H(t)bel itcontains one discrete probability distribution over the RVsQ∆. Γ(t)bel is a continuous RVsconditioned onH(t)bel, for each assignment toH(t)bel it contains onemultivariate Gaussianover the RVs QΓ.
A hypothetical belief state in B(t)bel can be accessed by conditioning H(t)bel on a specifichypothesis h(t)bel. Doing this produces Pr
(
∆
(t)
bel,Γ
(t)
bel|H(t)bel = h(t)bel
), a hybrid probability
distribution whose discrete part describes a probability table over Q(t)∆ and whosecontinuous part describes a multivariate Gaussian over Q(t)Γ . The likelihood of thishypothetical belief state is Pr(H(t)bel = h(t)bel).
It is then assumed that one can approximate the time slice t belief state bymarginalising outH(t)bel from B(t)bel, i.e.∫
H
(t)
bel
Pr
(
H
(t)
bel,∆
(t)
bel,Γ
(t)
bel
)
≡ P˜r
(
Q
(t)
∆ ,Q
(t)
Γ |O(t) = o(t), . . . ,O(1) = o(1)
)
. (3.9)
One may then apply the approach described on page 55, using this approximate beliefstate for time slice t and the observations for time slice t and t + 1, to computetransitions in the same form as 3.8. Recall that each transition has associated with
7Note that we introduce another BN here to better explain the concepts in our inference approachsince we only use simple probabilistic methods. Future (alternative) iterations of the PD approach maynot necessarily require this separate BN.
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it a Gaussian over Q(t+1)Γ . We next define how to measure similarity between theseGaussians and use this to describe a procedure for combining transitions in Algorithm1 at the end of this subsection.
For two Gaussians defined over the same set of RVs, the average Kullback-Leiblerdivergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951) from the one to the other is used as a measureof similarity. Suppose N1 and N2 are two Gaussians defined over the same set ofRVs. Assume that N1 and N2 have the means µ1 and µ2 and covariances Σ1 and
Σ2 respectively. LetDKL (N1||N2) be the Kullback-Leibler divergence fromN1 toN2which is calculated as (Cover and Thomas, 2005):
DKL
(N1||N2) =1
2
(
trace
(
Σ−12 Σ1
)
− d
)
+
1
2
(
log
det (Σ2)
det (Σ1)
+ (µ2 − µ1)T Σ−12 (µ2 − µ1)
) (3.10)
where d is the dimension of the Gaussians, i.e. number of RVs over which theGaussians are defined.
Note that DKL (N1||N2) and DKL (N2||N1) are different from one another.Therefore, a similarity metric, J , is defined as the mean of the two, i.e.
J (N1,N2) = 1
2
(
DKL
(N1||N2)+DKL (N2||N1)) (3.11)
This similarity metric describes how dissimilar two Gaussians are to one anotherand ranges between zero and infinity. In other words, when J is small then the twoGaussians are more similar, and when J is large then the two Gaussians are moredissimilar. Furthermore, when J is zero then the Gaussians are exactly the same.
In order to determine which transitions have similar Gaussian mixture components,a similarity threshold parameter, c, is defined. This parameter describes a fixedthreshold for J beyond which two Gaussians, Ni and Nj , being compared with oneanother are considered not similar enough, i.e. Ni andNj are considered similar when
J
(Ni,Nj) ≤ c and dissimilar when J (Ni,Nj) > c. This allows the inference engineto find and apply a suitable collapsing scheme which partitions the transitions intodisjoint subsets, each of which contains those transitions which have similar Gaussiancomponents. The transitions in each such subset can then be combined to create ahypothesis. These hypotheses may then populate the time slice t+ 1 belief network.
Algorithm 1 describes the procedure for finding and applying this collapsing scheme.By considering the transitions in descending order of likelihood, the algorithm firstpicks the most likely transition, from a set of unpartitioned transitions, to become thebase for a new hypothesis. All remaining unpartitioned transitions which have similar
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. PROBABILISTIC FAULT DIAGNOSIS APPROACH 59
Gaussian mixture components to this base transition are then also added to thatsubset and removed from the set of unpartitioned transitions. This is done repeatedly,picking the most likely unpartitioned transition each time, until the set of unpartitionedtransitions is empty or, for further optimisation of computational resources, the numberof these subsets, and therefore hypotheses, equalK . Therefore, after theK-th subsetis populated, the transitions in each subset are combined with one another to createone hypothesis per subset and the rest of the unpartitioned transitions are discarded.
In summary, the procedure requires that the user specify two parameters: c and
K . c is the similarity threshold for J in Equation 3.11; if c =∞ then any two Gaussiansare considered similar and if c = 0 then no two Gaussians are considered similarunless they are exactly the same. K is the maximum number of hypotheses createdwhen combining transitions. If c = 0, K hypotheses are created, each correspondingto one of the most likelyK transitions, and the remaining transitions are discarded. Incontrast if c =∞ then only one hypothesis is created and all transitions are combinedinto one hypothesis with probability equal to unity.
The reader is referred to Appendix A.1 for a complete example demonstratingthe application of this inference engine in the context of fault diagnosis, using thedraining liquid level example on page 46 as a case study.
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Algorithm 1 Procedure for combining transitions (Lerner, 2002). Note thatthis procedure constructs various probability distributions, thus some probabilitydistributions may not be legitimate until return.
1: procedure COMBINETRANSITIONS(A,c,K)
2: A = 〈wg,Ng〉g=1,...,n is a hybrid mixture of n Gaussians representing the
transitions in P˜r(Q(t)∆ ,Q(t+1)|O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ,O(t+1) = o(t+1)).
3: c is the threshold for the similarity metric J .
4: K is the maximum allowed number of hypotheses.
5: Let B(t+1)bel be an empty belief network containing the RVs H(t+1)bel , ∆(t+1)bel , and
Γ
(t+1)
bel as in Figure 3.5.6: SortA in order of decreasing weights wg.7: Mark all Gaussians inA as unused.
8: Set u = 1
9: while u < K andA contains unused Gaussians do
10: Let 〈w,N〉 be the first unused Gaussian inA.
11: Find all indices of Gaussians, l ∈ L, such that 〈wl,Nl〉 ∈ A is unused and
J(N ,Nl) ≤ c according to Equation 3.11.12: Mark 〈w,N〉 and 〈wl,Nl〉l∈L as used.13: w′ ← w +∑l∈Lwl.
14: Pr(H(t+1)bel = h(t+1)bel,u )← w′
15: Divide w and all wl by w′, i.e. normalise.16: LetN ′ be the Gaussian resulting from collapsing 〈w,N〉 and 〈wl,Nl〉l∈Laccording to Equations 2.36 and 2.37.
17: Pr(Γ(t+1)bel |H(t+1)bel = h(t+1)bel,u )← N ′
18: for each entry, {q(t)∆ ,q(t+1)∆ }, in Pr
(
Q
(t)
∆ ,Q
(t+1)
∆
) do
19: Set Pr(Q(t)∆ = q(t)∆ ,Q(t+1)∆ = q(t+1)∆ )← 0
20: Find all transitions among 〈w,N〉 and 〈wl,Nl〉l∈L whosediscrete RVs assignments match {q(t)∆ ,q(t+1)∆ } and add their weights to
Pr
(
Q
(t)
∆ = q
(t)
∆ ,Q
(t+1)
∆ = q
(t+1)
∆
)
21: end for
22: Pr(∆(t+1)bel |H(t+1)bel = h(t+1)bel,u )← ∫Q(t)∆ Pr(Q(t)∆ ,Q(t+1)∆ )23: Increment u.
24: end while
25: return B(t+1)bel26: end procedure
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3.2.3 Fault detection and root cause analysis
Since the inference engine produces a probability distribution over all possible discreteRVs (process component statuses), one can easily analyse this distribution to learnmore about process abnormalities and their possible root causes. In order to determineprocess abnormality, an Abnormality Likelihood Index8 (ALI) (Yu and Rashid, 2013) isintroduced here. This index simply considers the probability of all operating modeswhich are abnormal, i.e. for a time slice t:
ALI(t) = 1− Pr(X(t)∆ = x(t)∆,NOC) (3.12)
where x(t)∆,NOC is the particular assignment (at time slice t) to the set of discrete RVs
which represents NOC. Typically this will be the first entry in the table for Pr(X(t)∆ ).The case study in Appendix A.1 is extended in Appendix A.2 to show tracking of theprocess state over time as well as the usage of ALI values over time. The user mayalso choose a particular threshold for ALI over time, denoted as ALIlimit. For time slice
t, when ALI(t) > ALIlimit the process is considered to be behaving abnormally.
Once abnormal process behaviour is detected, root cause analysis follows asimilar procedure by considering the ALI of each individual component instead of theoverall ALI, i.e. for a component C ∈ X∆ at time slice t:
ALI(t)C = 1− Pr
(
C(t) = c
(t)NOC
) (3.13)
where c(t)NOC is the particular assignment (at time slice t) to C which represents thenormal status. This will also typically be the first entry in Pr(C(t)). After computing
the ALIs for each component, one can then compare those ALIs with one another andidentify the components with high ALIs as possible fault causes.
Ideally, for a single fault cause, the component ALI of the root cause should beconsiderably higher than the ALIs of all other components for each sample reportedas being abnormal. Averaging these component ALIs for all samples reported as beingabnormal and plotting the averages on a bar plot, produces a component ALI plotwhich can be used to quickly identify fault causes in a similar manner to the relativecontribution chart in Figure 2.2 on page 17.
8Note that this concept was not included in Lerner et al. (2000) or Lerner (2002).
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3.3 Computational enhancements to inferenceengine
The approximation of process states in the inference engine overcomes the problemof exponential blow-up and enables inference to be performed online with limitedcomputational resources. In order to further reduce computational burden, Lerner(2002) describes two enhancements which are compatible with this approach. Thefirst, transition enumeration, can be used to decrease the computational time neededto process new observations and the second, subsystem decomposition, can be usedto reduce the amount ofmemory required to store hypotheses, whichmay also facilitatestoring more hypotheses. These are detailed in this section and used in our PDapproach.
3.3.1 Transition enumeration
Recall that the procedure for combining transitions requires the hybrid mixture of
Gaussians P˜r(Q(t)∆ ,Q(t+1)|O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ,O(t+1) = o(t+1)). Each entry in this mixture
describes, by way of {x(t+1)∆ ,x(t)∆ }, a particular change of operational mode from timeslice t to t+1, and has associated with it a likelihood as well as a Gaussian overQ(t+1)Γ— we will refer to each entry as a transition. As described in the previous section, wecombine transitions based on the similarity of their Gaussians. This partitions thetransitions into disjoint subsets which can be used to create hypotheses and in turnpopulate a belief network.
When creating a hypothesis from a disjoint subset containing more than onetransition, transitions which have relatively low likelihoods typically contribute lessto determining the attributes of that hypothesis. This is a consequence of usinga weighted combination of the relevant attributes those transitions to create theprobability table over Q∆ and the Gaussian over QΓ associated with that hypothesis.Furthermore, the likelihood of the hypothesis is the sum of the likelihoods of thosetransitions. This also means that when creating a hypothesis from a disjoint subsetcontaining only one transition which has a relatively low likelihood, that hypothesis willalso have a relatively low likelihood. Since a belief state can be approximated as aweighted combination of hypotheses, hypotheses which have relatively low likelihoodswill typically also contribute less to determining the attributes of that approximatebelief state.
Because of the particular design of the DBNs in this thesis, we can choose which
of the transitions in P˜r(Q(t)∆ ,Q(t+1)|O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ,O(t+1) = o(t+1)) to enumerateinstead of computing all of them. This is advantageous since the creation ofa hypothesis does not necessarily require all transitions to be enumerated, andfurthermore all remaining unpartitioned transitions are discarded at the end of
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Algorithm 1. Instead of enumerating all transitions, only enumerating select transitions
in P˜r(Q(t)∆ ,Q(t+1)|O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ,O(t+1) = o(t+1)) may result in the creation ofhypotheses with comparatively similar attributes. Thus we may still obtain a similarapproximation for the time slice t + 1 belief state, while reducing computationalrequirements.
The DBN designs used in this thesis are restricted such that continuous RVs donot have children which are discrete RVs, i.e. no augmented CPDs. Because of this,one can condition a DBN on a particular set of assignments to {X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ } andcompute a Gaussian over X(t+1)Γ associated with this particular set of assignments.This Gaussian may then be used to determine the likelihood of the time slice t + 1observations o(t+1)Γ under the process operating mode changes described by the giventransition. Once the likelihood of the observed process behaviour is known, it is alsopossible to compute the posterior likelihood of the transition by multiplying the priorprobability of the transition by that likelihood.
Since the posterior likelihood of a transition is dependent on the prior probabilityof that transition, it is less likely that a transition which has a low prior probability willhave a relatively high posterior likelihood. This strongly applies to transitions whichdescribe simultaneous abnormalities for multiple components — these events aretypically unlikely a priori and do not become more likely a posteriori. In particular, wewish to avoid enumerating these transitions which have low prior probabilities, and inturn relatively low posterior likelihoods, since they typically have little impact on theapproximation of the belief state.
We refer to the procedure for doing this as transition enumeration. It consistsof the four key steps listed below. They are subsequently discussed in moredepth. Note that transitions which are not enumerated will have zero likelihood in
P˜r
(
Q
(t)
∆ ,Q
(t+1)|O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ,O(t+1) = o(t+1)
) and can be discarded, with limited
repercussions, when applying Algorithm 1 after transition enumeration.
1. Computing the prior transition probabilities, P˜r(Q(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ |O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ).
2. Finding all transitions which are eligible for enumeration. Also note theintroduction of two parameters Tmax, and PrT which we define there.
3. Computing a Gaussian over X(t+1)Γ for each transition that was deemed eligiblefor enumeration.
4. Computing a posterior likelihood for each transition that was deemed eligible forenumeration.
Computing P˜r(Q(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ |O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ):The prior transition probabilities are relatively straightforward to compute. As in
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Section 3.2.2, one would use the approximate belief state at time slice t and theobservations at time slice t to create an approximate belief about the process state attime slice t which can be propagated through a 2-TBN to produce all of the transitions.However, a key difference here is that all continuous RVs as well as observations fortime slice t + 1 are temporarily ignored. In other words, only the discrete part of theapproximate belief about the process state at time slice t is propagated through the
2-TBNresulting in P˜r(Q(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ |O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ). Each entry in this probability table isthe prior probability for a transition.
Finding all transitions which are eligible for enumeration:As previously discussed, we do not wish to enumerate transitions which have low priorprobabilities. Thus we choose the top T transitions with the highest prior probabilitiesandmark these as eligible for enumeration. The user may specify constraints to restrict
T to some maximum or sufficient value, both of which reduce the computationalrequirements of the inference engine.
The first constraint, a maximal value for T , is easy to impose by simply selecting
the top T = Tmax transitions from the sorted P˜r(Q(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ |O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ), where
Tmax is the maximum number of transitions which may be deemed eligible forfurther enumeration. For large processes, this is useful for limiting the computationalrequirements of the inference engine to some absolute maximum such that thecomputational time for processing new observations is reasonable.
The second constraint, a sufficient value for T , exploits the idea that sometransitions describe the occurrence of relatively unlikely events, such as simultaneousabnormalities for multiple components, and have low priori probability and as a resultwould have relatively low posterior likelihood. This value for T should be just largeenough to be able to reasonably approximate the time slice t + 1 belief state andshould not be fixed in each time slice. The second constraint is imposed by choosing
T such that the cumulative prior probabilities for the T transitions is at least PrT .
Preferably a combination of the two constraints should be used such that oneonly enumerates Tmax transitions when this is necessary, otherwise one shouldenumerate a sufficient number of T < Tmax transitions such that their cumulativeprior probabilities is at least PrT . Once the T transitions, deemed eligible forenumeration, have been found, their associated Gaussians and posterior likelihoodscan be computed.
Computing a Gaussian for each eligible transition:A Gaussian for a eligible transition can be computed by choosing one eligible transitionand considering only the continuous RVs in the approximate belief about the processstate and 2-TBN which depend on the particular set of assignments to {X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ }
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obtained from that transition. Doing this produces the Gaussian
P˜r
(
Q
(t)
Γ ,X
(t+1)
Γ |O(t)Γ =o(t)Γ ,X(t)∆ = x(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ = x(t+1)∆
) (3.14)
where x(t)∆ and x(t+1)∆ are determined from the chosen transition. Note that we willdenote (X(t)∆ = x(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ = x(t+1)∆ ) with the shorthand τi hereafter.
The next step is to marginalise out Q(t)Γ from 3.14 since these RVs are no longerrequired. This results in
P˜r
(
X
(t+1)
Γ |O(t)Γ =o(t)Γ , τi
)
. (3.15)
Then, it is left to determine (1) the likelihood of the time slice t + 1 observationsfor the continuous RVs and (2) the probability distribution over Q(t+1)Γ given thoseobservations. The first part is done by marginalising out Q(t+1)Γ from 3.15, then usingEquation 2.35 to determine the likelihood of the observations o(t+1)Γ :
P˜r
(
O
(t+1)
Γ = o
(t+1)
Γ |O(t)Γ =o(t)Γ , τi
)
. (3.16)
The second part is done by conditioning 3.15 on the observationso(t+1)Γ using Equations2.44 and 2.45, resulting in
P˜r
(
Q
(t+1)
Γ |O(t+1)Γ = o(t+1)Γ ,O(t)Γ =o(t)Γ , τi
)
. (3.17)
Following this procedure for each eligible τi produces a likelihood of the time slice
t+ 1 observations for the continuous RVs and a Gaussian over Q(t+1)Γ for each eligibletransition.
Computing an a posteriori probability for each eligible transition:The posterior likelihood of each eligible transition, τi, is computed by multiplying itsprior probability by the likelihood of the time slice t+1 observations for the continuousRVs as calculated above, i.e.
P˜r (τi)× P˜r
(
O
(t+1)
Γ = o
(t+1)
Γ |O(t)Γ =o(t)Γ , τi
)
. (3.18)
Note that the posterior likelihoods for all eligible transitions will not sum to unitybecause the eligible transitions are subset of all possible transitions given anapproximate belief about a process state. Therefore, either (1) the posterior likelihoodsof the eligible transitions need to be normalised or (2) the likelihoods of the hypothesescreated from them need to be normalised in order to ensure that the hypotheses in thetime slice t+ 1 belief network has a legitimate probability distribution.9
9Note that normalisation here refers to dividing the elements in a set of values by the sum of thosevalues.
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In the first case, one simply sums all the posterior likelihoods of the eligibletransitions and divide each by the total before applying Algorithm 1. In the second case,one would apply Algorithm 1 directly to the enumerated set of eligible transitions, i.e.using their posterior likelihoods. Doing this means that the likelihoods of hypotheses inthe time slice t+1 belief network will not sum to unity and hence need to be normalised.
In this thesis method (1) was used to avoid added complexity in calculationswhen also using the subsystem decomposition enhancement.
3.3.2 Subsystem decomposition
Recall that each hypothesis hbel in a belief network consists of a hypothesis probability
Pr (Hbel = hbel), a discrete probability distribution over Q∆ Pr (∆bel|Hbel = hbel),and a Gaussian over QΓ Pr (Γbel|Hbel = hbel). A concern for large processes is thatthe number of entries in the discrete probability distributionsmay be very large, causingmemory issues with respect to the storage of multiple hypotheses in a belief network.This is because the size of the discrete probability distribution grows exponentially asone monitors more process components. These large discrete probability distributiontables are also typically less practical because the larger these distributions are,the more zero probability entries they will contain — due to those entries typicallydescribing abnormalities for multiple components simultaneously.10
A convenient solution to this problem is to decompose the belief network intosmaller subsystems which represent individual unit processes — such as reactors,tanks, columns, and so on. Each of these subsystems may then maintain theirown hypotheses which contain smaller sized discrete and continuous probabilitydistributions over only the RVs associated with those subsystems. This enables lowerstorage requirements for storing hypotheses versus a non-decomposed belief network,allowing a decomposed belief network to store more hypotheses on the same amountof storage. Conveniently, these subsystem hypotheses may also be used to producemore detailed process monitoring solutions such as subsystem abnormality detectioninstead of overall process abnormality detection.11
Introducing decomposed belief networks:Some modifications need to be made to our inference engine so that it mayaccommodate a decomposed belief network. However, before presenting thesemodifications, the concept of a decomposed belief network will be further detailed.
10Note that this is not necessarily amajor problem as onemayworkwith sparse table representations.However, there are drawbacks to such representations, in particular the requirement that a majority oftable entries must be equal to zero. Thus sparse table representations will not work for cases such asinitial hypotheses where a majority of entries are non-zero.11Since the aim of this thesis is to contrast a model-based PD approach with a traditional MSPMapproach, only overall process abnormality will be monitored however.
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The concept of a decomposed belief network generalises the non-decomposed beliefnetwork (as illustrated in Figure 3.5). Three RVs corresponding toH(t)bel, ∆(t)bel, and Γ(t)belused to describe hypotheses for the entire process, are also used in a similar mannerto describe hypotheses for each subsystem in a decomposed belief network. Considera decomposed belief network for time slice t, where the hypothesis RV for a subsystem
i is denoted asHi(t)bel. ∆i(t)bel and Γi(t)bel respectively denote the discrete and continuousprobability distributions associated with Hi(t)bel, allowing for selection of differenthypotheses for subsystem i by conditioning onHi(t)bel. For each subsystem hypothesis,
∆i
(t)
bel contains one discrete probability distribution over the discrete RVs in subsystem
i which are denoted as Qi(t)∆ ⊂ Q(t)∆ . Similarly, for each subsystem hypothesis, Γi(t)belcontains one multivariate Gaussian over the continuous RVs in subsystem i which aredenoted as Qi(t)Γ ⊂ Q(t)Γ . Furthermore, the Qi∆ form a partition of Q∆ and similarlythe QiΓ form a partition of QΓ.
It is also important to note that these subsystems are not necessarily independent ofone another, but will have certain subsystem dependence conditions imposed on theirdependencies, namely:
1. The discrete part (∆ibel) of one subsystem may only be dependent on thediscrete parts of other subsystems, and the continuous parts (Γibel) of onesubsystemmay only be dependent on the continuous parts of other subsystems.
2. Neither discrete nor continuous parts of any subsystem may directly depend onthe hypothesis RV of another subsystem.
3. The hypothesis RV of any subsystem may not depend on the hypothesis RV ofanother subsystem.
4. All dependencies in a belief network may not form cyclic structures in that beliefnetwork.
Figure 3.6 illustrates a decomposed belief network for time slice t containing threesubsystems.
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of a decomposed belief network containing three subsystemswith some subsystem dependencies. Each subsystem i ∈ {1, 2, 3} stores itshypotheses using the RVs, Hi(t)bel, ∆i(t)bel, and Γi(t)bel, associated with that subsystem.Also notice that the subsystem dependence conditions are obeyed in this network.
Using decomposed belief networks to compute transitions:It is now left to discuss the usage and population of a decomposed belief network.In other words, given a decomposed belief network for time slice t, how does onecompute transitions of subsystem belief states from time slice t to t+ 1 and use thesetransitions to populate a decomposed belief network for time slice t+ 1?
The first part can be done in one of two ways (both of which will affect thesecond part): either one can compute transitions for each subsystem (i.e. trackthe behaviour of process subsystems rather than overall process behaviour), or onecan compute transitions using the approximate belief state over the entire processas has been done previously. In order to use the first approach one must createsubsystem DBNs from the entire process DBN and use the inference engine onthose to create subsystem hypotheses. However, Lerner (2002) notes that doingthis typically produces subsystem DBNs which are similar in size (number of nodes)to that of the entire process DBN. This happens due to the interconnected natureof processes and is required so that the influence of all process observations areaccounted for in those transitions, i.e. including observations associated withother subsystems. Therefore, this thesis uses the second approach. This involvescomputing an approximate belief state using a decomposed belief network, and canbe done, in part, bymarginalising out all of theHibel in that decomposed belief network.
Note that using this approach creates a probability distribution for each
∆ibel and each Γibel. However, the approximate belief state is in the form
P˜r
(
Q
(t)
∆ ,Q
(t)
Γ |O(t) = o(t), . . . ,O(1) = o(1)
), thus one needs to construct this
probability distribution. In this thesis, we do this by first computing a marginalprobability distribution for each RVs in Q using the probability distributionsobtained from the decomposed belief network, after marginalising out all
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Hibel.12 These marginal probability distributions are then used to define theCPDs in a BN, Bt, which has the same structure as the initial BN B0. Doing thisallows one to use Bt to approximate the time slice t belief state in the form
P˜r
(
Q
(t)
∆ ,Q
(t)
Γ |O(t) = o(t), . . . ,O(1) = o(1)
).
Modifying procedure for combining transitions:Using the approximate belief state for time slice t, one can generate transitionsbetween full system states in the same way as described in Section 3.2.2 or Section3.3.1. These transitions will then need to be combined to create subsystem hypothesesto populate the time slice t+1 decomposed belief network. Because some subsystemsare dependent on other subsystems some important modifications need to be madeto the procedure for combining transitions in Algorithm 1. In order to present thesemodifications, we introduce the concept of RVs relevant to a subsystem.
We shall use Ri to denote the set of RVs relevant to subsystem i. Ri is defined asall the RVs, discrete and continuous, in subsystem i as well as their direct parent RVsin the decomposed belief network, excluding any hypothesis RVs. Ri is partitionedinto two sets, Ri+ and Ri−, which denote those RVs in and outside subsystem irespectively. Furthermore, the subscripts ∆ and Γ are also compatible with Ri, Ri+,andRi− and once again denote discrete and continuous RVs subsets.
To illustrate this concept, consider subsystem 2 in Figure 3.6. Excluding anyhypothesis RVs, the RVs relevant to subsystem 2 are those associated with subsystem2, i.e. those in ∆2bel and Γ2bel, and those which subsystem 2 is dependent on, i.e.those in ∆1bel. Table 3.3 further illustrates how this set of relevant RVs are distributedinto the various subsets ofR2.
Table 3.3: Illustration of the concept of RVs relevant to a subsystem for subsystem 2 inFigure 3.6.
R2 = {∆2bel,Γ2bel,∆1bel} = {Q2∆,Q2Γ,Q1∆}Discrete parts Continuous parts
R2∆ = {∆2bel,∆1bel} = {Q2∆,Q1∆} R2Γ = Γ2bel = Q2Γ
R2+∆ = ∆2bel = Q2∆ R2+Γ = Γ2bel = Q2Γ
R2−∆ = ∆1bel = Q1∆ R2−Γ = ∅ = ∅
Note that because of the dependencies of some subsystems on other subsystems,some subsystem hypothesis probability distributions have to be stored as CPDs.Subsystem 2 is an example of such a case: for a hypothesis in this subsystem, theprobability distribution over Q2∆ stored in ∆2bel is conditional on Q1∆. This meansthat if Ri− = ∅, then ∆ibel and Γibel have discrete probability distributions andGaussians overRi+∆ andRi+Γ respectively, for each subsystem i. On the other hand, if
12Note these marginal probability distributions subsume all observations up to time slice t.
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Ri−∆ 6= ∅ then ∆ibel has discrete CPDs overRi+∆ givenRi−∆, and similarly ifRi−Γ 6= ∅then Γibel has conditional Gaussians overRi+Γ givenRi−Γ .
Given a set of transitions, the procedure for combining them to create hypothesesneeds to consider each subsystem separately. After finding a suitable collapsingscheme for a subsystem, it is easy to create hypothesis probability distributions inthe appropriate form for that subsystem because the transitions describe JPDs overthe entire process. This simply requires that some marginalisation and conditioningbe performed after combining transitions such that subsystem hypothesis probabilitydistributions are in the appropriate form for each subsystem.
Although the same collapsing scheme can theoretically be used for each subsystem,it is more valuable to use different collapsing schemes in each subsystem as impliedabove. This enables each subsystem to maintain its own unique hypotheses whichbetter define a belief state describing process behaviour for that subsystem. As aresult, when transitions are uninformative about the behaviour of RVs associatedwith that subsystem, then more hypotheses can be maintained for that subsystemwhile other subsystems may maintain fewer hypotheses. In order to use differentcollapsing schemes in each subsystem, the metric for determining the similaritybetween transitions must be dependent on the RVs relevant to a subsystem. Inparticular, for a subsystem i, instead of comparing the similarities of the Gaussiansassociated with each transition, one must first marginalise and condition those suchthat they are defined overRi+Γ givenRi−Γ before comparing them.
This means that when Ri−Γ 6= ∅ then one would compare similarity betweenconditional Gaussians.13 The conditional Kullback-Leibler divergence from oneGaussian, N1 (Ri+Γ |Ri−Γ ), to another, N2 (Ri+Γ |Ri−Γ ), is calculated as (Cover andThomas, 2005):
DKL
(
N1
(Ri+Γ |Ri−Γ ) ||N2 (Ri+Γ |Ri−Γ ))
= DKL
(
N1
(Ri+Γ ,Ri−Γ ) ||N2 (Ri+Γ ,Ri−Γ ))−DKL (N1 (Ri−Γ ) ||N2 (Ri−Γ )) .(3.19)
The metric for determining similarity between two transitions for subsystem i is thendefined as:
Ji (N1,N2) =1
2
DKL
(
N1
(Ri+Γ |Ri−Γ ) ||N2 (Ri+Γ |Ri−Γ ))
+
1
2
DKL
(
N2
(Ri+Γ |Ri−Γ ) ||N1 (Ri+Γ |Ri−Γ ))) (3.20)
Algorithm 2 summarises the modified procedure for combining transitions which
13Note that Equation 3.19 is still useful when Ri−Γ = ∅ since the Kullback-Leibler divergence for aGaussian over an empty set is zero.
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results in a decomposed belief network. The procedure still requires that the userspecify two parameters, c andK , where c is the similarity threshold for Ji in Equation3.20 and K is the maximum number of hypotheses that may be created in eachsubsystem.14 If c = 0,K hypotheses are created per subsystem, each correspondingto one of the most likelyK transitions, and the remaining transitions are discarded. Incontrast if c =∞ then only one hypothesis is created per subsystem and all transitionsare combined into one hypothesis with probability equal to unity.
14In practice, one may also define different values of c andK for each subsystem.
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Algorithm 2 Subsystem decomposition modified procedure for combining transitions(Lerner, 2002). Note that this procedure constructs various probability distributions,thus some probability distributions may not be legitimate until return.
1: procedure MODIFIEDCOMBINETRANSITIONS(A,c,K)
2: A = 〈wg,Ng〉g=1,...,n is a hybrid mixture of n Gaussians representing the
transitions in P˜r(Q(t)∆ ,Q(t+1)|O(t)∆ = o(t)∆ ,O(t+1) = o(t+1)).
3: c is the threshold for the similarity metrics Ji for each subsystem i.
4: K is the maximum allowed number of hypotheses per subsystem.
5: LetB(t+1)bel be an empty belief network containing the RVsHi(t+1)bel , ∆i(t+1)bel , and
Γi
(t+1)
bel for each subsystem i as illustrated in Figure 3.6.6: SortA in order of decreasing weights wg.7: for each subsystem i do
8: A′ ← marginalise out all RVs not in {Ri+Γ ,Ri−Γ } from every Gaussian,
〈wg,Ng〉g=1,...,n, inA.9: Mark all Gaussians inA′ as unused.
10: Set u = 1.
11: while u < K andA′ contains unused Gaussians do
12: Let 〈w,N〉 be the first unused Gaussian inA′.
13: Find all indices of Gaussians, l ∈ L, such that 〈wl,Nl〉 ∈ A′ is unusedand Ji(N ,Nl) ≤ c according to Equation 3.20.14: Mark 〈w,N〉 and 〈wl,Nl〉l∈L as used.15: w′ ← w +∑l∈Lwl.
16: Pr(Hi(t+1)bel = hi(t+1)bel,u )← w′.
17: Divide w and all wl by w′, i.e. normalise.18: Let N ′ be the Gaussian resulting from collapsing 〈w,N〉 and
〈wl,Nl〉l∈L according to Equations 2.36 and 2.37.
19: Pr(Γi(t+1)bel |Hi(t+1)bel = hi(t+1)bel,u )← conditionN ′ onRi−Γ .
20: for each entry r in Pr(Ri(t)∆ ,Ri(t+1)∆ ) do21: r ← 0.
22: Find all transitions among 〈w,N〉 and 〈wl,Nl〉l∈L whose discreteRVs assignments match those for r and add their weights to r.
23: end for
24: Pr(∆i(t+1)bel |Hi(t+1)bel = hi(t+1)bel,u ,Ri−∆(t+1)) ← marginalise out Ri(t)∆
from Pr(Ri(t)∆ ,Ri(t+1)∆ ) and condition onRi−∆.
25: Increment u.
26: end while
27: end for
28: return B(t+1)bel .29: end procedure
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3.4 Process modelling using DBNs
At this point all core concepts describing the inference engine for our PD approachhave been presented, but little attention has been given to the DBN models uponwhich the inference engine will operate. In our case, the purpose of a DBN model is toapproximately represent process dynamics — since exact representations are typicallynot possible due to process dynamics being linearised and time being discretised inthese models.
The DBN model consists of two parts: an initial process state, and a transitionmodel. The initial process state is represented by an initial BN whose structure is thesame as the intra time slice (within a time slice) structure of the transition model. Thenodes in the initial BN represent values of PVs and statuses of process componentsat time slice 0, and their CPDs describe an initial probability distribution over theprocess state when multiplied together. The transition model uses a 2-TBN to describe(approximately) the transition of a belief about a process state between successivetime slices. The structure of the 2-TBN and its node’s CPDs are arguably the mostimportant parts of our PD approach. Since the same 2-TBN is used to describe allpossible transitions of a process state, it needs to be carefully developed and specifiedto closely model real process dynamics.
This section begins with a discussion of the methods used in this thesis todevelop a suitable structure for the 2-TBN.15 The intra time slice structure of this2-TBN can also be re-used to define the structure of the initial BN. Next, a specialisedapproach for dealing with non-linear PV relationships is presented, before presentingour methodology for determining the node CPDs in the 2-TBN and initial BN.
3.4.1 Defining the 2-TBN structure
The 2-TBN transition model can be procedurally created from a fundamental processmodel and existing process knowledge. This is further described in the ensuingsubsections.
3.4.1.1 Generating a skeleton 2-TBN from a fundamental processmodel
A skeleton 2-TBN is a 2-TBN which describes (the structure of) a fundamental processmodel. It is a 2-TBN which describes the normal operating behaviour of a process.Lerner et al. (2000) describe an approach to generate a skeleton 2-TBN from aprocess description which involves using Bond and temporal causal graph modellingtechniques to produce fundamental process models and using those models togenerate a skeleton 2-TBN.
15Note that this section also contains new methods which extend upon existing methods presentedin Lerner et al. (2000), Lerner et al. (2000), and Yu and Rashid (2013).
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These techniques are not typically used in fundamental process modelling byengineers with chemical and mineral processing backgrounds — in most cases,process models are described by equations (see Section 2.2). Therefore, assumingavailability of such equation-based models, it is unnecessary to follow the approachproposed by Lerner et al. (2000).
In fact, the same skeleton 2-TBN can be generated from process model equations byexploiting the particular structure of these equations. This is described in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Generate a 2-TBN from DAEs describing a process model.LetΦ be a set of DAEs describing a processmodel and also letX be the set of variablesinΦ, not including any constants or model parameters. Furthermore, the DEs inΦmustbe in the standard form, i.e. dXi
dt
= f (X), and no AEmay define anyXi already definedby a DE. Let B→ be the 2-TBN of the DBN model to be constructed.
1. For each variable in X create a node in B→ at time slice t and t+ 1
2. For each AE in Φ, create an edge in B→ from the variables on the right hand sideof the equation to the variable on its left hand side in both time slices. Note thatthis implies assumed causal direction in the AEs even though edges in DBNs arenot necessarily causal.
3. For each DE in Φ, create an edge in B→ from the variables on the right hand sideof the equation to the variable on its left hand side in both time slices. Also addan edge across the two time slices between the of the variable on the left handside of the equation.
Appendix B.3.1 demonstrates the use of this method for generating a skeleton 2-TBNfrom a fundamental model of a two-tank system. The structure of the skeleton 2-TBNcan then be refined to include sensor models, fault scenarios, control systems and soforth. Alternatively, one may alter the time granularity of the 2-TBN to model processdynamics, sensors, faults, and control systems differently. This is further discussed inthe next subsection before moving on to the various modifications that can be made toa skeleton 2-TBN.
3.4.1.2 Choosing DBN time granularity
A DBN models process dependencies at a specific time granularity, which may differfrom its associated mathematical process model. The appropriate time granularity fora DBN model depends on the sampling rate of the sensors as well as the dynamicsof the process being modelled. Assuming all sensors sample at the same rate, thereexists a trade-off between choosing to model the DBN using a small time granularity orlarge time granularity — this refers to the amount of real-time which passes between
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successive time slices. A small time granularity allows the DBN to capture fast processdynamics at the cost of its time slices not synchronising with new sensormeasurementschedules. This means that multiple time slices may need to be processed betweennew observations and could be wasteful. On the other hand, choosing to model theDBN using a larger time granularity, allows time slices of the DBN to be synchronisedwith new sensor measurement schedules. When performing inference for a time slicein such a DBN, one can thus expect new sensor measurements to be available for thattime slice.
Lerner (2002) discusses this problem in the context of a reverse water gas shift processwhich features a variety of different process dynamics, from near instantaneous tothe order of hours, and sensors that sample on a per-second basis. Ultimately Lerner(2002) remarks that there is little to gain frommodelling a DBN using a time granularitysmaller than the sensor sampling period, due to the lack of new sensor data beingincorporated into the beliefs in each time slice.
Therefore, in this thesis, the time granularities of all DBNs are chosen to be thesame as those of the sensor sampling periods. We further approximate any processdynamics that are faster than the time granularity of the DBN as intra time slice bymodelling the quasi-steady-state behaviour of the process. To illustrate, consider acontroller’s manipulation of a tank’s outflow: this is modelled as occurring within a timeslice, whereas the effect thereof (i.e. of the change in that outflow) on the contents ofthat tank is modelled as occurring across time slices.
3.4.1.3 Modelling sensors
Sensors provide an interface for observing actual process behaviour. If a skeleton2-TBN describes actual process behaviour, then sensor models added to that 2-TBNprovide an mechanism for incorporating observations. In other words, sensor modelsdescribe probability distributions for observations of PV values, whereas the nodesin the skeleton 2-TBN describe probability distributions for the underlying (actual) PVvalues. This means that for each observed PV, a DBN contains two nodes: one for theactual value and another for the observation.
Sensors are typically noisy and add white noise to actual PV values. Therefore,a node describing an observed PV value includes an additive sensor noise componentwhich increases the variance of the probability distribution for the observed PV valuegiven the actual PV value. Furthermore, when a sensor is functioning normally, themean of that probability distribution should be similar to the actual PV value.
On the other hand, when a sensor is faulty the probability distribution for theobserved PV value may behave entirely differently. One typical case is that of a biasedsensor. In this case, the mean of the probability distribution for an observed PV valuemay be quite different to the actual PV value, while the variance thereof (i.e. for the
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observed PV) remains the same as the sensor’s normal variance (i.e. that defined bythe white noise). In other cases, the sensor may report some uniformly random value,zero, or no reading at all. However, this thesis only considers the cases of normallyfunctioning and biased sensors.16
Figure 3.7 shows how we model a sensor in a DBN (Lerner, 2002). S describesthe status of the sensor (i.e. normal or faulty). If the sensor is functioning normally,then its reading at time slice t + 1 is the underlying PV value (PV(t+1)) plus thesensor’s white noise component. Alternatively, if the sensor is faulty, then its readingat time t + 1 is the sum of the sensor’s bias (B(t+1)), PV(t+1), and the sensor’s whitenoise component.
S(t)
B(t)
S(t+1)
B(t+1) PV(t+1)
M (t+1)
Figure 3.7: Illustration of modelling a sensor model in a DBN. S represents the sensor’sstatus, M the sensor measurement, PV the underlying PV value, and B the sensor’sbias.
The bias term RV:Modelling a sensor in the above manner allows one to estimate the sensor’s biasfrom observations of process behaviour. It also allows for the sensor’s bias term Bto change over time, enabling it to grow in situations where the sensor drifts out ofcalibration.
Biases are initialised with a mean of zero and reasonably large variance — inthis thesis, the square of underlying PV’s nominal value). Growth of the bias over timecan be modelled using a linear Gaussian,B(t+1) = B(t) + V , where V is a white noisecomponent with relatively small variance — in this thesis, a small fraction 0.01% of theinitial variance assigned to the bias).
To ensure that B does not grow spuriously over time, Lerner (2002) also introduced acontraction factor, ψ, to the model for B(t+1) — in this case B(t+1) = ψ · B(t) + V ,
16Different sensor models may be investigated in future work.
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where ψ has a range between 0 and 1. In this thesis, the value of ψ is chosen to be thesame as in Lerner (2002), viz. 0.9999.
Faulty sensors:New observations processed by the inference engine influence the belief of B overtime, enabling better estimation of sensor bias over time. However, in our case it ismore difficult to distinguish between a normally functioning and a faulty sensor givenan observation while the sensor’s bias term is near zero. This happens because thenormally functioning sensor’s probability distribution over the observed RVs has thesamemean as that for the faulty sensor. Note that these situations were not discussedin Lerner (2002), therefore it is unclear how this was dealt with in the original work.
In this thesis, it is assumed that sensor variance for a normally functioning sensor isknown. When a sensor functions normally, the observed value probability distributionshould typically be highly peaked around the actual underlying PV value. On thecontrary, when a sensor is biased or faulty, it is expected that this distribution shouldbe less peaked. The sensor model used in this thesis, therefore, chooses one of twodifferent white noise variance levels to add to the underlying PV value.17 These whitenoise variance components depend on the status of the sensor and are denoted as
σ20,n for normal and σ20,f for faulty status.
Since sensor variance for a normally functioning sensor is assumed to be known, σ20,nis known. It is also possible adjust σ20,f in relation to σ20,n. In particular, when given thesame mean, the Gaussian with variance σ20,f should be less peaked than the Gaussianwith variance σ20,n. This means that the PDF for the Gaussian with variance σ20,fwill (for the first time) intersect that for the Gaussian with variance σ20,n some (real)number of standard deviations away from the mean value (as illustrated in Figure 3.8).Therefore, the desired relation between σ20,f and σ20,n can be specified by choosing anumber of standard deviations away from a given mean at which point the two PDFsshould first intersect.
To illustrate this, let σ20,n = 1, the given mean equal 0, and the first intersectionpoint for the PDFs be 2 standard deviations away from the mean. This is shown inFigure 3.8.
17Note that this modelling decision is not consistent with actual sensor behaviour, but is usedintentionally.
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Figure 3.8: Illustration of a sensor model’s observed value probability distributions. Thevariance for a faulty sensor is modelled such that the PDFs first intersect two standarddeviations away from the same mean.
In this thesis, the given mean value used to determine σ20,f for each sensor is thenominal value of the actual underlying PV incorporated by linear Gaussian. The PDFsare all chosen to intersect three standard deviations away from these values for eachsensor.
It is important to note that σ20,n and σ20,f are only base variances for the linearGaussian model which describes an observed PV value. Mathematically, the full CPDstructure for a sensor is shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: CPD at time slice t+ 1 for a sensor. S represents the sensor’s status,M thesensor measurement, PV the underlying PV value, andB the sensor bias. The sensor’swhite noise component is σ20,n when normal and σ20,f when faulty.
S Pr
(
M |S,PV , B)
normal N (µM = µPV , σ2M = σ20,n + σ2PV)
faulty N (µM = µPV + µB, σ2M = σ20,f + σ2PV + σ2B)
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3.4.1.4 Modelling faults as changes in process model parameters
Parameter change faults in a DBN are modelled in a similar manner to sensor biases,i.e. enabling model parameter values to drift over time under the fault condition (Lerner,2002). The key difference is that instead of the component status influencing theprobability distribution of a measurement, it influences that of a PV.
Consider a parameter change fault such as a change in the constriction resistance ofa pipe in the two-tank system in Appendix B. A portion of a DBN modelling such a faultis shown in Figure 3.9.
S(t)
k
(t)
change
S(t+1)
k
(t+1)
change k
(t+1)
Flow(t+1)
Figure 3.9: Illustration of a model parameter fault model in a DBN. S is the modelparameter’s status, k is the model parameter, kchange is a bias term for the modelparameter, Flow is a PV affected by changes in k.
Note here that the status RV, S , describes the status of the flow RV. A normal statusdescribes the CPD of the flow RV under nominal operation, in this case the flow wouldbe dependent only on the constriction resistance, k, and the tank pressure, P , as inEquation 2.15 and would have reasonably low variance. On the other hand, a faultystatus changes the dependency of the flow RV as shown in Equation 3.21
F =
(
k + kchange
)√
P (3.21)
The RVs kchange is a bias term for k and has the same CPD as that of a sensor bias,allowing it to grow slowly over time but tending toward zero as result of a contractionfactor. Additionally, this means that when the status for Flow is faulty, the underlyingPV value’s variancemust be higher than that when the status forFlow is normal to avoidspurious detection of fault conditions. In this thesis, the same approach as for faultysensor variances is used here. However, the increased variance for a faulty status isinstead determined in relation to the variance (under NOC ) of the underlying PV values.
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3.4.1.5 Dealing with regulatory control and recycle structures
Regulatory control and recycle structures in processes pose an interesting problem formodelling in a DBN because these structures are inherently cyclic and BNs are requiredto be acyclic. Yu and Rashid (2013) deal with this problem by adding additional “dummy”RVs to each time slice of a DBN. These RVs account for the cyclic interaction betweenthe PVs involved. For example, consider the interaction between a manipulated (MV )and controlled (CV ) variable in a control loop; the MV inherently has an open-loopinfluence on theCV , but theCV influences theMV as result of feedback control. Yuand Rashid (2013) model this as shown in Figure 3.10 for one time slice. It should benoted that this approach assumes that the dynamics of the control loop is faster thanthe time granularity of the DBN.
MV CV MV dummy
Figure 3.10: Illustration of the BN modelling approach for a regulatory control structureused in Yu and Rashid (2013). MV is the manipulated variable, CV is the controlledvariable, andMV dummy is an additional variable used to model the feedback effect.
Dealing with regulatory control and recycle structures in this manner, however, isnot sufficient for designing DBNs for use with our fault diagnosis approach. Thisis because the DBNs used in the approach by Yu and Rashid (2013) only modelNOC , while this work also considers a suite of possible faults. Therefore, control andrecycle structures need to bemodelled more explicitly in a DBN for use in our approach.
Regulatory control structuresMarlin (2000) presents two approaches for digital implementation of theproportional-integral-derivative (PID) control algorithm, namely the full-positionand velocity implementations. These implementations are also useful for modellingproportional-integral (PI) control loops in a DBN because time is discrete for thecontroller implementation and the DBN. In this thesis, the full-position implementationis used since it incorporates the initial controller output. We discuss it next.
This implementation assumes that the controller output, MV , remains constantbetween time slices and updates as new sensor readings are observed. The controllercalculations are similar to that of an analogue controller, in that the time t controlleroutput is based on the difference between the controlled variable’s set point value andits observed value at time t, namely the error Et:
Et ≡ SP t − CV t. (3.22)
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The full-position digital controller implementation approximates the integral mode ofthe controller by a Riemann sum. This is done by accumulating the error from previousexecutions of the controller in Sacc,t and adding to it the current error, Et, as shown inEquation 3.23.
MV t = Kc
(
Et +
∆t
TI
Sacc,t
)
+MV nominal
Sacc,t =
t∑
i=1
Ei = Et + Sacc,t−1
(3.23)
where Sacc,t−1 = t−1∑
i=1
Ei is stored from the previous controller execution. Furthermore,
Kc and TI are controller parameters, ∆t is the time granularity of the DBN, and
MV nominal is the initial controller output.
Figure 3.11 shows the full-position PI controller implementation in a portion of aDBN.
S
(t)
acc
CV (t)
S
(t+1)
acc CV
(t+1)
MV (t+1)
Figure 3.11: Full-position PI controller implementation in a portion of a DBN.
Recycle structuresRecycle structures are simpler to model in a DBN than regulatory control structuresbecause these structures do not explicitly require storing or accumulating previousvalues of variables. Furthermore, we limit our attention to flow stream recycle, it is fairto assume that the dynamics of the recycle is faster than the time granularity of the DBN.Therefore, the flow through the recycle stream is determined (almost) instantaneouslywithin a time slice and propagates across time slices to affect PVs in the next time slice,i.e. the effects of the recycle stream is modelled as an inter-time slice edge in a DBN.Note that in systems with slower recycle dynamics, this may be a bigger issue.
3.4.2 Dealing with non-linear PV relationships
An important practical issue is the modelling of non-linear relationships between thecontinuous RVs in a DBN model of a process. Recalling Section 2.3.2, PVs are oftenmodelled as Gaussian RVs with linear relationships between them. Typically, these
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linear Gaussian relationships represent linearised forms of the non-linear relationshipsthat exist between these PVs. Therefore, linearisation yields β0 and β for each linearGaussian relationship between PVs.
Although these linear representations of non-linear functions are not ideal, thefamily of Gaussian distributions is more computationally convenient and not usingthis may (and typically does) make inference more complex and typically intractable.Therefore, remaining within the Gaussian family of continuous probability distributionsismore desirable than attempting tomodel non-linear functions exactly. The unscentedtransform (Julier and Uhlmann, 2004) enables just-in-time linearisation of non-linearfunctions and is typically a superior linearisation method when compared with Taylorseries approximation (Marlin, 2000). The linearisation approach used in this thesis isfurther detailed below.
Given a non-linear function, Y =f(x), of the PVs, X, and the probability distribution,
Pr (X), over X; f may be linearised by sampling from Pr (X), propagating thesamples through f , and finding β0 and β by means of regression (i.e. from thepropagated function values to the samples). Let S be a collection of samples suchthat each sample, xn18 in S, when propagated through f yields a new yn = f(xn).The idea is to generate a few yn which may be used to approximate the probabilitydistribution over Y by a Gaussian with mean µy and variance σ2y . Assuming that Xhas the distribution N (X : µ,Σ), it is desired to determine the S that maximisesthe information (Cover and Thomas, 2005) gained from each yn for the approximationof Pr (Y ). The unscented transform is a technique which does exactly this andapproximates Pr (Y ). The technique is well established and is part of the freelyavailable EKFUKF toolbox for MATLAB® by Hartikainen et al. (2011).
Although the unscented transform offers direct approximation of Pr (Y ), limitationsin practice19 means that this cannot be used directly and needs to be integrated withthe linear Gaussian framework. Thus we need to compute the weights β0 and β for
Pr
(
Y |X) by way of regression using results obtained from the unscented transform.
Furthermore, since f may be any function, the use of the unscented transformalso allows the application of constraints to the output of f for each xn. For example,let Y be the flow, F , and X be the pressure, P , in the Bernoulli Equation 2.15 andsuppose an xn (P ) is negative (and thus not physically possible), f may be defined aspiece-wise dependent on the value of xn (P ) such that it outputs 0 when xn < 0 andEquation 2.15 elsewhere. This may limit the extent to which Pr (Y ), obtained from theunscented transform, exceeds the physical limitations of some PV values.
18Where each entry in xn is an assignment to one RVs in X.19The Bayesian Network Toolbox (BNT) (Murphy, 2002) currently does not support non-linearGaussian CPDs.
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This linearisation method was tested on the draining liquid level case study inAppendix A.3. The results thereof showed minimal loss in process state tracking abilitywhen all observations are close to actual process behaviour and linear degradation inprocess state tracking ability when all observations are completely inaccurate.
3.4.3 Defining CPD parameters in DBNs
There are two sets of CPDs that are used to define a DBN model for a process.The first set is the initial RVs CPDs, i.e. representing time slice 0. These CPDsare relatively easy to define and may be determined from component reliabilitydata for the discrete RVs and from historical process data for the continuous RVs.The second set is the 2-TBN CPDs which collectively define all possible processstate transitions between successive time slices. These are more difficult to defineand may require some trial and error tuning to achieve desired diagnostic performance.
In this section, we present the methods used to define CPDs for the DBN modelsused in this thesis. The methods presented here aim to provide some suggestedrules-of-thumb and guidelines for determining CPD parameters, these may be helpfulfor future work using this PD approach.
Initial process state CPDs These consist of both discrete and continuous RVsCPDs. The discrete RVs CPDs are discussed first. These are marginal probabilitydistributions describing the initial status for each component modelled in the DBN. Inpractice, the probability of a component being in a faulty (or defective) status may bedetermined by the reliability of that component. However, in this thesis all componentsare assumed to have equal reliability and thus a single initial probability of fault valueis used to define all discrete CPDs in the initial process state. This value is discussedin further detail when the component status CPDs are considered, since it is chosen tobe the same as the probability for the transition of a component in the normal statusto a fault status. Note that since we use a single initial probability of fault value, wealso choose the initial probability of each fault status for a component as being equalto this value.
The continuous RVs CPDs are either Gaussian or linear Gaussian. For the GaussianCPDs, the mean and variance of a PV may be estimated from historical process data.This is done by fitting a Gaussian distribution to the observed values of each PVover time, specifically under NOC . Note that although these observed RV probabilitydistributions (Gaussians) include the additive white noise variance due to sensor noise,this is not subtracted when estimating the variance for the CPDs in the initial processstate. This is because subtracting sensor noise at this point would imply high certaintyabout distribution of PVs in the initial state, which may result in incorrect tracking ofthe state over time. On the contrary, being less certain about the distribution of PVsin the initial state allows for inferred probability distributions of PV to become betterover time, i.e. with respect to higher certainty about the process state. This is further
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discussed when we consider the PVs CPDs which are not part of the initial processstate.
In this thesis, most linear Gaussian CPDs will have their β0 and β determinedby the just-in-time linearisation method described in Section 3.4.2. Allowing a set ofnon-linear functions to be specified as a property for each continuous RV node in aDBN facilitates the use of this method. Next, given β0, β, and the means of the CPD’snode’s parents, the mean of the marginal of these parents can be computed as perEquation 2.40. For this reason it is not necessary to specify a mean value parameterfor such a linear Gaussian CPD20. On the other hand, computation of the variance ofthe marginal using the same equation, requires further specification of a base varianceparameter, i.e. σ20 . This base variance is determined in the same way as previouslydescribed for Gaussian CPDs.
Further note that the continuous RVs CPDs for the initial process state are thesame regardless of process operating mode and are duplicated for the cases ofabnormal operating modes.
Component status CPDs These CPDs describe the transition of discreteRVs from time slice t to t + 1, i.e. by defining the probability that a componenttransitions from a normal to a normal/abnormal status or from an abnormal to anormal/abnormal status. The (approximate) process state at time slice t describes aprobability distribution for each component’s status at time slice t. Recall that theseprobability distributions are the result of combining various hypotheses, which attemptto explain observations for time slice t, with one another. Also note that the componentstatus CPDs affect the likelihoods of computed transitions which, in turn, affects thelikelihoods of the hypotheses created from those transitions.
It is assumed that process components generally have low likelihood of showingabnormal behaviour. Because of this, the probability for a component transitioningfrom a normal to an abnormal status should be low. This prevents spurious detectionof faults in components which had been previously determined to be functioningnormally with high likelihood. In this thesis, a value, αnf = 0.001 is assumed as theprobability for a component transitioning from a normal to an abnormal status over asingle time step. However, note that for processes with many operating modes (dueto the number of components or the number of component statuses) this value is toolarge.21 Therefore, a Bonferroni correction (Miller, 1981) is applied to scale this valuewith respect to the number of operating modes,mopmodes, the DBN of the process canencode. The number of operating modes is the product of the number of statuses for
20Note that the BNT (Murphy, 2002) requires the user to specify a mean value parameter for linearGaussian CPDs, for the aforementioned reasons this is set to zero in our implementation.21This is due to the problem of multiple comparisons (Miller, 1981) — an increased number ofoperating modes results in an increased number of possible hypotheses which describe abnormalprocess behaviour all of which are tested for significance (or likelihood in our case) simultaneously.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. PROBABILISTIC FAULT DIAGNOSIS APPROACH 85
all the components in a DBN — in this thesis all components have only two possiblestatuses. A Bonferroni corrected probability for a component transitioning from anormal to an abnormal status is calculated by dividing αnf by mopmodes. This valueis also used to define the time slice 0 probability for a fault status in a component.Together with low transition probability from a normal to an abnormal status, thismakes it more difficult for fault conditions to be spuriously reported.
A uniform probability distribution is assumed for fault status transitions, i.e.fault-to-fault and fault-to-normal. Doing this ensures that spurious hypotheseswhich report fault conditions do not perpetually grow in likelihood over time whenobserved process behaviour does not agree with them.22
Table 3.5 illustrates the parameters for a component status CPD for a componentwhich has two possible statuses, i.e. normal and faulty.
Table 3.5: Modelling of 2-TBN transition probabilities from time t to t + 1 for acomponent with two statuses.
S(t) S(t+1) Pr
(
S(t+1)|S(t)
)
normal normal 1− αnf
mopmodesnormal faulty αnf
mopmodesfaulty normal 1
2faulty faulty 1
2
PV CPDs These linear Gaussian CPDs describe the intra time slice relationshipsbetween PVs in a DBN, i.e. they describe process behaviour using the time scale ofthe DBN model. This procedure uses uncertain inputs, i.e. the probability distributionsof PVs at time slice t, to determine probability distributions of PVs at time slice
t + 1. Additionally, non-linear relationships between PVs are linearised here usingthe unscented transform from Section 3.4.2. This means that uncertainty aboutdistributions of PVs at time slice t + 1 comes from uncertainty about those values attime slice t, error introduced during linearisation, and modelling inaccuracies. Notethat although the linear Gaussian framework compensates for uncertainty in PVs attime slice t as per Equation 2.40, it does not consider uncertainty in the values of β0and β.
Therefore, the σ20 parameter for each PV CPD is used to define a base variancefor that PV. This base variance can be estimated from historical process data for eachPV given the variance of the sensor.23 Since sensor noise is assumed to be additive
22Note that this approach does not, nor attempts to, realistically model fault status transitions forprocess components.23Note that all PVs aremonitored by sensors in this thesis. Therefore in practice, these base variancesmay need to be determined from functional relationships between monitored and unmonitored PVs.
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white noise, the sensor noise simply needs to be subtracted from the variance of theobserved PVs.
Note that this modelling approach, in addition to specifying higher initial uncertaintyfor the distribution of PVs, facilitates robust estimation for the (distributions of) valuesof PVs over time assuming normal operation. This is because initial uncertainty isreduced over time as more data is observed to fit the model predictions. Subsequently,the observation of anomalous data which does not match the expected distributionsof PVs is more likely to cause the approach to report the detection of fault conditions.
Recall from Section 3.4.1.3 and Section 3.4.1.4 that the bias RV approach usedin this thesis may result in spurious detection of fault conditions. Therefore, for aparticular PV, the aforementioned base variance parameter only applies under NOC,and a different base variance parameter applies under the condition of abnormalbehaviour for that PV.24 The same approach and standard deviation threshold as forfaulty sensors is used here, i.e. that the PDFs intersect three standard deviations awayfrom the nominal value of the PV.
3.5 Conclusion
In closing, this chapter details first how the PD approach presented in Lerner et al.(2000) and Lerner (2002) works, and then how specific design decisions were madefor this work. Our approach is similar to that of Lerner (2002) and deviates in partswhere the source material was too vague. We also make use of alternative methodsto what was implemented in Lerner (2002) and extend upon their approach to includecyclic process structures such as regulatory control and recycle.
It is also important to note that while we provide a reconstruction of the PDapproach presented in Lerner et al. (2000) and Lerner (2002), our approach still makesuse of simple probabilistic methods. We also implement the same computationalenhancements and experienced similar implementation issues — discussed in Section5.3.3. While it is possible to extend upon this implementation with further optimisationand simple probabilistic methods, more advanced methods may address some of ourlargest challenges and issues. In particular, variational inference methods such asexpectation propagation (Minka, 2001; Koller and Friedman, 2009) may greatly reducecomputational requirements and mitigate the need for ad hoc optimisation methods.
The next chapter contextualises our study by considering various other studiesusing DBN-based PD approaches in the context of chemical and mineral process faultdiagnosis.
24Note that this only applies to PVs which are modelled to have abnormal statuses, such as in sensormodels.
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Literature Review
Fault diagnosis in industrial operations has been applied and continuously improvedfor many years (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003b; Aldrich and Auret, 2013). Beforecomputers became readily accessible and available to industry, fault diagnosisapproaches would rely primarily on humans for fault detection and root cause analysis.This resulted in late detection of faults and/or incorrect root cause diagnosis whichcould escalate fault conditions on-site, resulting in significant loss. The techniquesused were based on available process knowledge at the time, and produced tools suchas hazard and operability (HAZOP) manuals that could be used to diagnose faults(Lees, 2012).
Early software for fault diagnosis used qualitative model-based techniques, suchas expert systems (Rich and Venkatasubramanian, 1987), to reduce the effortrequired by human operators to isolate faults. However, human operators still had tocontinuously monitor the process and sensor data in order to detect faults. The firstquantitative model-based fault detection techniques made use of observers (Willsky,1976; Isermann, 1984; Chen and Patton, 1999). Typically, an observer maintains andupdates an internal plant model as it observes new sensor data. Using this model,it then attempts to predict future process behaviour. Deviation of the process fromthe observer’s predictions generates residuals which are continuously monitored,making fault detection easier. However, accurate root cause analysis while preservingrobustness to uncertainty still remained elusive (Patton and Chen, 1997).
DBN-based PD approaches enable fault detection and root cause analysis in a singleframework. This chapter presents the recent advancements in these approaches,focusing on how the techniques have improved with each new study. It will becomeapparent that approaches can not be directly compared to each other, because of theuse of different testing methodologies and lacking quantitative performance metrics.Therefore, the approaches are qualitatively evaluated and compared in terms ofdesirable characteristics of fault diagnosis approaches (see Section 2.2). The chapterconcludes with a critical analysis of the state of DBN-based PD research.
87
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4.1 DBN-based probabilistic fault diagnosisapproaches
Lerner et al. (2000) proposed using a DBN to unify fault detection and root causeanalysis in one framework. They reason that this approach inherently modelsuncertainty in operations which should mitigate the lack of sensitivity in traditionalqualitative model-based techniques. Their approach incorporates process knowledgedirectly into the structure and CPDs of a DBN with explicit models for all faults ofinterest.
The DBN used represents a collection of linear1 fundamental process models(i.e. a switching linear dynamical system (Gertler, 1988)) each of which may beselected by different particular assignments to the network’s discrete RVs (nodes).Every combination of values assumed by the set of discrete nodes in the networkrepresents a single operating mode for the process, which can range from normaloperation to one particular sensor fault to multiple process component faults. In thisway, Lerner et al. (2000) reduced the task of fault detection and root cause analysis toperforming inference in a DBN.
Unfortunately the DBN resulting from the approach in Lerner et al. (2000), isintractable for exact inference any complex process. Lerner et al. (2000) thereforefurther describe an approximate inference algorithm to track the state of the processby considering only the most probable changes in operating mode over time, i.e. thetrajectories of the process state with respect to time. A first order Markov assumptionis applied to avoid exponential blow-up of the number of trajectories over time. Sincethe set of most probable trajectories may feature multiple similar trajectories, theseare combined to create a set of hypotheses which are used to approximate the processbelief state. The approximate belief state is then used (iteratively) to detect anddiagnose fault conditions in discrete time.
One major constraint of this approach is that the computational time required toprocess a sample increases as more operating modes are added to the DBN model.This makes fault detection slower since the number of possible trajectories areexponentially larger than the number of operational modes. Roychoudhury et al. (2006)tackled this problem by considering fault detection and root cause analysis in separatestages within one framework. Their approach was divided into three stages: (1) faultdetection, (2) qualitative fault isolation, and (3) quantitative fault isolation.
In the fault detection stage, Roychoudhury et al. (2006) use a DBN, modelledunder normal operation, to generate residuals for fault detection. Further analysis ofthe residuals over time yields qualitative deviations (i.e. increase, decrease, no change)
1Non-linear dynamics are typically approximated by first order Taylor series approximation in mostresearch.
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in the measured (observed) PVs which are used in the second stage. The second stagecompares the patterns in the qualitative deviations to a database of fault signatures(i.e. the effects particular faults are expected to have on the qualitative deviations ofthe observed PVs). The fault signatures which closely match the qualitative deviationsover a number of time steps are used to construct and initialise a new DBN containingmodels of these faults. Finally, in the third stage, a similar approach to Lerner et al.(2000) is used to isolate the fault cause from the reduced fault set.
It should be noted that the approach of Roychoudhury et al. (2006) only diagnosesincipient faults. Roychoudhury et al. (2008) extended this work to include the diagnosisof abrupt faults as well. The overall approach appears to be very similar in thetwo papers, with the latter study extending the qualitative fault isolation stage byconsidering fault signatures for both abrupt and incipient faults. Roychoudhury et al.(2008) additionally describe the use of particle filters (Koller and Lerner, 2001) forapproximate inference. Results from Roychoudhury et al. (2008) were positive for faultdetection, however, there was a fault for which the root cause could not to be isolated.The authors suggested this problem may be the result of sparse measurementinformation which affects the observability of the DBN.
Furthermore, the authors suggest that computational efficiency could be furtherimproved by distributing the diagnosis task amongst reduced DBNs derived fromthe global DBN. Roychoudhury et al. (2009) showed that the same approach inRoychoudhury et al. (2008) could be applied to such reduced (factored) DBNs,improving computational efficiency without sacrificing the accuracy of the diagnosis.This approach applies the same techniques as in Roychoudhury et al. (2008) to localdiagnosis modules which act on smaller subsystems. The factored DBNs of the localdiagnosis modules are designed in such a way that multiple modules communicateminimal measurement information to one another, yet still achieve local diagnosisresults that are globally correct.
Roychoudhury et al. (2010) compared the distributed diagnosis approach foundin Roychoudhury et al. (2009) to the centralised diagnosis approach found inRoychoudhury et al. (2008). Roychoudhury et al. (2010) showed that computationalefficiency was improved without sacrificing the accuracy of the diagnosis. Toour knowledge, this was the last study extending upon Lerner et al. (2000) andRoychoudhury et al. (2006).
Yu and Rashid (2013) present an alternative approach to fault diagnosis usingDBNs. Their approach uses existing process knowledge to obtain the structure of aDBN under NOC, including modelling of control loops and recycle streams which hadnot been considered in previous studies. However, their DBN only contains observedcontinuous PVs trained using historical process data to determine the CPDs for eachnode in the network under NOC, and does not model any operating modes of theprocess as in Lerner et al. (2000).
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Yu and Rashid (2013) use a similar approach to Roychoudhury et al. (2008) forfault detection, i.e. by computing the likelihood for abnormal operating conditionsbased on deviation of their model predictions from observed process behaviour.However, for root cause analysis, Yu and Rashid (2013) present a substantiallydifferent approach which was inspired by the contribution plots typically used in MSPMapproaches: Yu and Rashid (2013) decompose the abnormality likelihood for the entireprocess into abnormality likelihoods for each RV in their DBN and attempt to identifypossible fault propagation pathways leading to the identified fault symptoms byexploiting the structure of the DBN — assuming that the directed edges imply causality.
To our knowledge, PD approaches which use a DBN model to directly incorporateexisting process knowledge is limited to this set of studies. However, it should benoted that other researchers have attempted more naïve approaches using BNs inpurely data-driven environments with some degree of success (Dey and Stori, 2005;Verron et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2013; Zhang and Dong, 2014; Atoui et al., 2015; He et al.,2016; Askarian et al., 2016; Verbert et al., 2017). A major limitation of these approachesis that they often rely on the availability of data containing known faults, which is nottypically readily available.
4.2 Qualitative evaluation of the state of the art
An ideal fault diagnosis approach should be applicable to any process given sufficientobservability (i.e. by way of placement and number of sensors) and a priori knowledge(i.e. fault sets and models) of the process.
However, the case studies selected for testing fault diagnosis approaches inmost literature tend to be convenient, small systems which are vaguely described andnot easily replicated. These include: (1) simple systems such as two tank systems(see Appendix B) which tend to be used for presenting the inner workings of novelapproaches (Roychoudhury et al., 2006, 2008); (2) real physical processes whichshowcase the applicability of an approach in real-world scenarios (Lerner, 2002;Roychoudhury et al., 2009); and (3) unique, ad-hoc, simulated processes whichshowcase the applicability of an approach under complex scenarios (Lerner et al.,2000; Roychoudhury et al., 2010).
On the other hand, the Tenessee Eastman chemical process (Downs and Vogel,1993; Ricker, 1996) is a complex simulated case study that is widely used to test faultdiagnosis approaches. Although more frequently used in data driven studies (Atouiet al., 2015; Askarian et al., 2016), only Yu and Rashid (2013) chose to evaluate theirapproach using this case study.
Clearly no direct comparison can be made between the limited quantitative results of
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each study because of the authors’ diverse selection of case studies. Furthermore,none of the studies of interest presented quantitative performance metrics for faultdetection (Section 2.2.3). As a result, only a qualitative evaluation of each studyaccording to the desired characteristics for a fault diagnosis approach (Section 2.2)can be presented. Table 4.1 shows which requirements are claimed to be met by theapproach in each study of interest given the available information about each studyand its results.
Table 4.1: Comparison of characteristics of techniques presented in literature. Studiesin this table are cited as: [LPKB] Lerner et al. (2000), [RBK1] Roychoudhury et al. (2006,2008), [RBK2] Roychoudhury et al. (2009), [RBK3] Roychoudhury et al. (2010), [YR] Yuand Rashid (2013).
Characteristics LPKB RBK1 RBK2 RBK3 YR
Quick detection and diagnosis n.d.* n.d.* n.d.* 3 3
Isolability 3 3 3 3 3
Robustness n.d.* 3 3 3 3
Novelty identifiability 7 7 7 7 3
Classification error estimate 3 3 3 3 3
Adaptability 3 3 3 3 3
Explanation facility n.d.* 3 3 3 3
Modelling requirements High High High High Mid
Storage and computational requirements High High Mid Mid Low
Multiple fault identifiability 3 3 3 3 n.d.*
*n.d. - not disclosed
Each study in the columns of Table 4.1 tested their approach on different case studies,using different testing methodologies, and reporting different performance results.To better understand and compare differences between the performance of eachapproach in each study, a discussion of each study’s testing methodology and resultsare presented below. Features of the case studies used in each study are summarisedin Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Features of the case studies used to evaluate the fault diagnosis performanceof the techniques presented in literature. Studies in this table are cited as: [LPKB]Lerner et al. (2000), [RBK1] Roychoudhury et al. (2006, 2008), [RBK2] Roychoudhuryet al. (2009), [RBK3] Roychoudhury et al. (2010), [YR] Yu and Rashid (2013).
Feature LPKB RBK1 RBK2 RBK3 YR
Simulated process 3 3 3 3 3
Number of system volumes 5 2 8 12 5
Sensor noise 7 3 3 n.a.* 3
Control system 7 7 3 n.a.* 3
Recycle streams 7 7 3 n.a.* 3
Maximal number of PVs 11 5 17 12 41
of which observed 3 3 14 12 22
Number of faults tested 6 6 1 4 2
Abrupt/incipient manifestation Both Both Both Abrupt Abrupt
*n.a. - not applicable
[LPKB] Lerner et al. (2000) tested their approach using a simulated case studyof five tanks in series, connected by pipes at their bottoms. No sensor noise, regulatorycontrol system, or recycle streams were present in this case study. The case studycontained five pressure and six flow PVs, where three of the flow PVs were observed.A total of six fault conditions were simulated; three abrupt and two incipient faults inthe flow resistances as well as one abrupt sensor bias fault in two sensors. The casestudy presented a challenge for accurate state estimation given the sparsity of themeasurement information.
The authors tested their approach on stored data for a single run containing allsix fault scenarios which occur one after the other. Although generating data in thismanner is not ideal, the authors claim to produce successful detection and isolation ofmost of the faults within two to three time steps. This success was largely attributedto the use of a technique called smoothing which relies on the ability of the approachto process multiple samples within a reasonable time frame (in order to be of practicaluse).
Computation times were not reported in Lerner et al. (2000), therefore it is unclearwhether or not this approach may be used in real-time fault diagnosis and thus unclearwhether or not quick detection and diagnosis was achieved. Additionally, it is unknownif the approach is robust to noise since no noise was added in the simulated data.
It should be noted that a PhD thesis (Lerner, 2002) later extended upon Lerneret al. (2000) and tested the new approach using both simulated and real-worldversions of a reverse water-gas shift system. However, no further quantitative fault
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diagnosis performance results were reported.
[RBK1] Roychoudhury et al. (2006) and Roychoudhury et al. (2008)both tested their approach using a simulated case study of two tanks connected by apipe at their bottoms. No regulatory control system or recycle streams were present inthis case study. The case study contained two pressure and three flow PVs, where allof the flow PVs were observed. A total of six fault conditions were considered; threeabrupt and three incipient faults in the flow resistances. Roychoudhury et al. (2006)presented results for all of the incipient faults, whereas Roychoudhury et al. (2008)presented results for only one abrupt and one incipient fault.
The authors simulated one set of data (including normal operation) for eachfault and tested their approaches off-line, adding white noise to the measurements. Itwas noted that Roychoudhury et al. (2006) seem to show that faults were introducedinto the process during a transient state (i.e. not stationary nor steady-state) whichmay have affected the results of the study.
Roychoudhury et al. (2006) report detection of the incipient faults within 5 to 19samples (seconds) and isolation within 100 to 258 samples (seconds). Roychoudhuryet al. (2008) report detection of both faults within 2 seconds, but do not explicitlyreport time for fault isolation. The approaches in these two studies seem to be similar,save for the qualitative fault isolation stage (see Section 4.1), but an improvement indiagnosis performance was notable in the results of the latter study.
The qualitative fault isolation stage allows both approaches to have improvedexplanation facility over Lerner et al. (2000). However, additional effort is required togenerate fault signatures which may limit the applicability of the approach comparedto that of Lerner et al. (2000).
[RBK2] Roychoudhury et al. (2009) tested their approach using a simulatedcase study of a physical operation, namely the Advanced Water Recovery System ofPickering et al. (2001). Regulatory control and recycle streams were present in thecase study. The case study contained many PVs and was said to be well-instrumented,having seventeen of its PVs observed. A total of twenty abrupt and incipient faultswere considered, including incipient build-up and abrupt partial blockages in piping,decrease in equipment (pumps, blowers, heaters) efficiency and other system-specificfaults.
The study aimed to test the viability of a distributed diagnosis approach usingfactored DBNs. Two approaches were developed, one assuming user-specifiedsubsystems and the other generating its own subsystems. Three simulated datasets containing a reduced set of faults and varying degrees of observability (maximal,intermediate andminimal) were used to test each approach. However, results were only
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reported for one fault using the first approach, i.e. based on user-specified subsystems.
The choice of fault was an abrupt partial blockage in one of the pipes, wherewhite noise was added under minimal observability. The authors show the process ofrefining the set of faults, based upon their fault signatures, in each of the distributeddiagnosers. The local diagnosis in each distributed diagnoser was shown to produce aglobally correct diagnosis for the fault. Quantitative fault detection and isolation timeswere not reported.
[RBK3] Roychoudhury et al. (2010) tested their approach using a simulatedcase study of a twelfth order electrical system. The case study contained manyPVs, ten of which were observed. A total of twenty-two abrupt and incipient faultswere considered, including changes in capacitances, inductances, and resistances.However, results were only reported for four abrupt faults in the set.
Two approaches were tested, one using distributed diagnosers and the otherusing a centralised diagnoser. Fault detection time ranged from 0.2 to 118.3 secondsand from 0.2 to 196.8 seconds for the distributed and centralised approachesrespectively. Similarly, fault isolation time ranged from 3.02 to 163.3 seconds andfrom 2.8 to 377.4 seconds for the distributed and centralised approaches respectively.Ultimately, the results supported the authors’ claim that the distributed diagnosisapproach would be computationally less expensive than its centralised counterpart,without loss in the accuracy of the diagnosis.
[YR] Yu and Rashid (2013) tested their approach on the widely-used simulatedcase study created by the Tenessee Eastman company (Downs and Vogel, 1993; Ricker,1996). Noise, regulatory control, and recycle streams are present in this case study.The case study contains forty-one measurable output PVs, twenty-two of which areobserved. Two abrupt faults (of a possible twenty) were considered: the first was adecrease in one of the operation’s feed streams and the second was an increase in therandom variation of the reactor pressure.
The simulated data contains both measurement noise as well as random processdisturbances in order to mimic realistic data. The authors showed (visually) that theapproach was able to produce a low false alarm rate and was able to detect eachfault quickly with low misclassification rates, but do not report quantitative results.Additionally they show that their approach was able to correctly identify the root causeof both faults as well as both of their propagation pathways.
In contrast to the approaches in the previous studies, this approach does nottrack the evolution of the process’s state over time. Therefore, it may not performas well for diagnosis of incipient faults (not considered in the study). However, the
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integration of data-driven techniques with (non-naïve) probabilistic models showspromising results for fault diagnosis in complex processes.
4.3 Remarks
4.3.1 Comparability of state of the art approaches
It was not possible to quantitatively compare the studies discussed in this chapter dueto their use of different case studies, different testing methodologies, and incompletereports of quantitative fault diagnosis performance results. It is desirable that somestandardisation of case studies, testing methodology, and performance metrics beestablished for quantitative future comparison of fault diagnosis approaches.
One way to present case studies for better comparative evaluation may be to discussthe features of each case study. Any process may be characterised by its size (numberof system volumes, number of measurable PVs), complexity (sensor noise, processdisturbances, control loops, recycle streams), faults (number, type, severity, frequency),observability (number of observed PVs), model availability (theoretical/empirical), andthe time scale of causal relationships between PVs (for processes with both slow andfast dynamics). Comparison of performance metrics, even for different case studies,may be more useful given better comparative information about each case study. Thiswould enable rough extrapolation of performance to different case studies which havesimilar characteristics.
It is also important that simulated data from case studies are produced starting froma stationary state with noise and process disturbances present before introducinga single fault into the process for each data set. This would allow for more directcomparison of fault detection performance by means of the binary classificationmetrics discussed in Section 2.2.
4.3.2 Suitability of DBN-based probabilistic faultdiagnosis
DBN-based PD approaches directly incorporate process knowledge into a DBN model,producing good isolability of faults as found in the studies presented in this chapter.The model-based nature of the approach generally makes it more adaptable to processchanges (such as set point or minor structural changes) in comparison to a purelydata-driven approach, since fault diagnosis is reduced to the task of inference in aDBN. This allows for models to be updated and revised without the need to retrain apurely data-driven approach. However, CPD parameters may still need to be updated(possibly from data).
Naturally, this approach has higher modelling requirements since process knowledge
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is required to develop the structure of the DBN as well as to determine the values orparameters in the CPDs for each node (although these can also be learned from data,when available). Furthermore, computational speeds vary with the specific details ofthe approach, especially due to the way in which the DBN is designed and the way inwhich the inference engine is implemented.
Although the studies discussed in this chapter show promising results for rootcause analysis, their fault detection performance was seldom quantified. Furthermore,only one study adds random process noise in addition to measurement noise.Therefore, it is difficult to comment on the ability of the approaches to perform quickdetection and diagnosis whilst being robust to noise and modelling uncertainties.
The probabilistic nature of DBN-based PD approaches does, however, provideestimation of classification error in fault detection, i.e. by taking into account differenttypes of error by explicitly modelling uncertainty. This allows for tuning of the approach,which facilitates better decision-making under uncertainty. Therefore, it is possiblethat a DBN-based PD approach may be robust to noise and modelling uncertaintiesdespite this not being made apparent in the studies discussed in this chapter.
If this is true and faults may be reliably detected, it would be valuable if theapproach provided explanation facility for fault propagation from the root cause to itsobserved symptoms. Since DBN models explicitly model causal relationships, theyshould be able to provide explanation facility via some visualisation of the DBN CPDssimilar to that in Yu and Rashid (2013).2
Another useful feature of the model-based nature of the approaches is that theyallow for the identification of multiple simultaneous faults. This is a powerful capabilitywhich can be used to quickly diagnose multiple faults instead of detecting anddiagnosing each fault individually over a longer period of time.
In conclusion, DBN-based PD approaches show promise for use as fault diagnosis toolssince they possess most of the desired characteristics in Section 2.2. Furthermore,these approaches may also be combined with data-driven techniques for fast andreliable fault detection as presented in Yu and Rashid (2013). However, since the setof possible root causes is limited to observed PVs in the approach by Yu and Rashid(2013), we rather choose to extend the approach in Lerner (2002) in this thesis. Thisaffords us the ability to define our set of possible root causes from the ground up anddesign the diagnosis approach around them while maintaining a simpler approach (i.e.single stage) than those in Roychoudhury et al. (2006, 2008, 2009, 2010).
2Note we do not investigate explanation facility in this thesis. However future research mayinvestigate this based on the viability of the PD approach.
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Research Methodology
It is difficult to design and test fault diagnosis strategies using real process data.In order to collect even the simplest form of real process data (i.e. containing nofaults), one would first have to solve the fault diagnosis problem. Simulations ofprocesses provide an alternative source of data to design and test fault diagnosisstrategies and are used in most literature as discussed in Chapter 4. Although suchsimulations may not necessarily depict real processes to high degrees of accuracy,these allow their users to manipulate many more (simulated) PVs and quickly generatelarge quantities of useful data. In theory, a well-designed process simulation with areasonably accurate model should be able to produce fault diagnosis strategies thatare scalable to the real process.
Given the degrees of freedom in simulation, one must not lose sight of the realprocess and simulate unrealistic process conditions. This chapter discusses themethods used in this thesis to develop process simulations for benchmarking theapplication of fault diagnosis approaches. In particular, this research considers twocase studies, both of which have different configurations of increasing complexity.The first case study is used for evaluation of the proposed DBN-based PD approach ofChapter 3 and comparison thereof with the MSPM approach of Chapter 2 (Section 2.1).The second case study is used to analyse scalability of the PD approach. Penultimately,both fault diagnosis approaches are briefly summarised in this chapter, with additionalattention given to challenges in implementation of the PD approach. The chapter isconcluded with a discussion on testing methodology for fault diagnosis performanceevaluation and comparison.
5.1 Data generation
Ordinary differential equation solvers enable simulation of the time evolution ofmathematical process models. SimulinkTM in MATLAB® offers a number of ordinarydifferential equation solvers and a user-friendly environment to build processsimulations. Its graphical interface allows a user to create various perturbations to
97
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a process model, such as disturbances and faults, and observe the response of thatprocess model as time-series data.
Perturbing a mathematical process model with a single fault is useful for testingisolability of a fault diagnosis algorithm, but does not provide information about therobustness of that algorithm. This section is concerned with building realistic processsimulations which feature sensor noise, process noise (i.e. disturbance perturbations),and regulatory control systems.
5.1.1 Sensors
In practice, sensors provide an interface for observing the PV values of particularprocess units and streams. Sensor noise is typically high-frequency noise caused bythe fast sampling rates and the propagation of errors in measurement principles. Thiscombination causes sensor readings to be noisy, but generally centred around theactual PV value.
In simulations, this is mimicked by considering, conceptually, a mathematicalprocess model as the physical process whose actual PV values may only be observedusing simulated sensors. These sensors are assumed to have a fixed sampling rateand add white noise to their actual PV values as shown in Figure 5.1. Although thevariance of the white noise (i.e. sensor variance) depends on the type of sensor beingmodelled (since some are more precise than others), sensor variance is typicallymodelled as being a fraction of a PV’s nominal value for each sensor.
1
PV
random	number
sampling	rate
1
PV_m
sensor	noise
actual	PV measured	PV
Figure 5.1: Sensor implementation in SimulinkTM .
5.1.2 Disturbances
Disturbances are uncontrollable process inputs, such as varying feed conditions (e.g.in flow, temperature, pressure, composition, particle size distribution), or variationin ambient weather conditions (e.g. rain affecting open top process units such asflotation cells). In practice, disturbances create a “process” noise that is lower infrequency than the sensor noise but that directly influence nominal operation of thephysical process; hence, regulatory control systems are put in place to mitigate theeffect of disturbances on product quantity and quality.
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In simulations, disturbances should be treated as part of the actual process orat least as uncontrollable inputs into the process. Varying feed conditions are possiblythe most common type of disturbance to a process; typically this type of disturbancevaries slowly between known upper and lower bounds. Miskin (2016) models thisvariation as a one-dimensional random walk (Lawler and Limic, 2010), a special kindof autoregressive function which preserves the inertia of variations in a disturbancePV. The approach of Miskin (2016) is further discussed here and used to modeldisturbances in this thesis.
Consider a disturbance PV v which varies in time according to a variable l. land −l describe the gradients by which v increases or decreases between two discretetime steps (i.e. the sampling rate of the random walk). A uniformly distributed randomnumber between 0 and 1, xi, is generated for every time step i which produces acombination of gradients, si, according to Equation 5.1.
si =
{
+l xi < 0.5
−l xi ≥ 0.5
(5.1)
Each si indicates whether v increases or decreases between two time steps. Thetime-dependent value of v is therefore a numerical integration of all si up to time taccording to Equation 5.2.
v(t) =
t∑
i=1
si∆t+ v(0) (5.2)
where v(0) is the initial value of v.
It remains to bound the random walk of v with an upper and lower limit suchthat v(t) never increases above the upper limit of v and never decreases below thelower limit of v. This may be done by checking that v(t) is indeed between the boundsand if not, recomputing v(t) with an opposite gradient for the latest si.
Figure 5.2 shows the implementation of a random walk in SimulinkTM .
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Figure 5.2: One-dimensional random walk implementation in SimulinkTM .
5.1.3 Regulatory control
Regulatory control systemsmitigate the effects of disturbances on processes and alsoallow set point tracking. The simplest form of such systems uses feedback controlwhich takes action based on the (observed) difference between current processconditions and the desired (set point) operating conditions.
In practice, processes typically use multiple controllers from the family ofProportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controllers for regulatory control (Marlin,2000). Equation 5.3 shows the Proportional-Integral (PI) version of such a controller,which manipulates an input PV,MV , in order to control an output PV, CV , such thatthe difference between CV (t) and the set point value of CV , SP , is minimal.
E(t) ≡ SP(t)− CV (t)
MV (t) = Kc
(
E(t) +
1
TI
∫ t
0
E(t′) dt′
)
+MV (0)
(5.3)
In these equations the controller gain Kc and integral time constant TI tune theresponse of the PI controller, and MV (0) is the initial value of MV . Typically, arobust controller is expected to maintain a small (if not zero) error, E(t), without largevariation inMV (t).
Controllers are treated as separate from the physical process. Figure 5.3 shows
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the implementation of a PI controller in SimulinkTM . Note that MV (t) is bounded byupper and lower saturation limits in the simulation. This ensures that the controllercalculated values for MV (t) do not exceed the physical limitations of that MV . Forexample, this bounds position of control valves between fully open and fully closed.1
1
MV(t)
1
CV(t)
SP
set	point
K_c
controller	gain
1/T_I
integral	me
1
s
integrator
MV_0
MV_nominal
MV	saturaon
Figure 5.3: PI controller implementation in SimulinkTM .
5.1.4 Faults
The class of a fault dictates how it is implemented in a process simulation. Recallfrom Section 2.2.2.2 that there are generally four fault classes: (1) gross parameterchanges in a model, (2) structural changes, (3) malfunctioning sensors, and (4)malfunctioning actuators. The first two fault classes manifest within the physicalprocess (i.e. modifying the mathematical process model), whilst the third and fourthfault classes manifest within the sensor models and controllers respectively.
Consider a pipe blockage in the two-tank system shown in Figure 5.6 in Section5.2.1 (a class 1 fault). This fault may be simulated by decreasing one of k1, k2, or k12,causing reduced flow through the associated pipe. The manner in which the faultmanifests (i.e. abrupt or incipient) is defined by how that change occurs as shown inFigure 5.4: as a step for the abrupt case (Figure 5.4a) or as a ramp for the incipientcase (Figure 5.4b).
1Note that saturation of a manipulated PV does not necessarily imply abnormal process behaviour.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 102
1
faulty	parameter	value
k
nominal	parameter	value
Product
k_fault
change
step	from	0	to	1
(a) Abrupt case
1
faulty	parameter	value
k
nominal	parameter	value
ramp	from	0 saturate	at	1
Product
k_fault
change
(b) Incipient case
Figure 5.4: Parameter change fault implementation in SimulinkTM .
Now consider a class 3 fault: a sensor bias fault which manifests abruptly inside asensor model as shown in Figure 5.5. Notice that, in contrast to Figure 5.1, the actualvalue of the PV being measured has a constant bias fraction added to it before whitenoise and sensor sampling rate are taken into account.
1
PV
random	number
sampling	rate
Product
b
sensor	bias	fracon
step	from	0	to	1
1
PV_mactual	PV
sensor	noise
measured	PV
Figure 5.5: Sensor fault implementation in SimulinkTM .
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The implementation of faults in the manner shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 enable thesefaults to manifest at user-specified times, allowing for time-series data generationcontaining both NOC and fault conditions (after manifestation of a single fault —multiple simultaneous fault manifestations are not considered in this thesis).2
5.2 Case studies
This section discusses the case studies considered in this thesis: two and five tanks inseries. Both case studies were inspired by Lerner et al. (2000), but our versions includeadditional aspects, namely regulatory control and recycle structures.
5.2.1 Two tanks in series
Description Two tanks are connected by a pipe between their bottoms as shown inFigure 5.6. Both tanks are open to the atmosphere and drain out their bottoms naturallythrough a flow constriction. The first tank receives a feed flow of water.
P1
P2
F12, k12
F0
F1, k1 F2, k2
Feed
Drain 1 Drain 2
Figure 5.6: Two tanks in series.
Process model Appendix B.1 shows how the two-tank system is modelled,obtaining the Governing Equations 5.4 and the Constitutive Equations 5.5.
dP1
dt
=
ρg
A1
(F0 − F1 − F12)
dP2
dt
=
ρg
A2
(F12 − F2)
(5.4)
2Note that our simulations support multiple simultaneous fault manifestations, however we leavethis topic for future work.
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F1 = k1
√
P1 and F2 = k2
√
P2 and F12 = k12
√
|P1 − P2|× sign(P1−P2)(5.5)
Table 5.1 shows the initial and nominal model parameters which were used to simulatethis system. These values were chosen such that the system is initialised with itssteady-state values.
Table 5.1: Model parameters and nominal PV values for two-tank system.
Symbol Meaning Unit Nominal value
A Cross-sectional area m2 A1 = A2 = 1
k Constriction resistance m3.5 · kg−0.5 k1 = k2 = 1e−5
k12 = 2e−5
F Flow m3 · s−1 F0 = 1.70e−3
F1 = 0.90e−3
F12 = 0.80e−3
F2 = 0.80e−3
P Pressure Pa P1 = 8053
P2 = 6442
ρ Water density kg ·m−3 ρ = 1000
g Gravitational acceleration m · s−2 g = 9.81
Case study motivation Most industrial processes in chemical engineering andmineral processing involve hydraulic processes. The two-tank system is a simplisticrepresentation of such processes and is a good case study to show proof of conceptand trouble shoot initial implementation of the PD approach.
Configurations Complexity of the case study was varied by considering fourconfigurations: (sN) sensor noise only, no regulatory control, no recycle (see Figure5.6);3 (N) process and sensor noise, no regulatory control, no recycle (see Figure 5.6);(NC) process and sensor noise, tank pressure control, no recycle (see Figure 5.7a); and(NCR) process and sensor noise, tank pressure control, 80% of F2 recycled back to thefirst tank (see Figure 5.7b). The configurations were chosen such that the robustnessof the fault diagnosis approaches to noise and increasing process complexity could betested.
3Note that the sN configuration is purposely unrealistic andwas tested for the intention of evaluatingisolability in fault diagnosis performance.
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(a) [NC] System with regulatory control.
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(b) [NCR] System with recycle and regulatory control.
Figure 5.7: Two-tank system in configurations NC and NCR.
Sensors were sampled at a constant rate of 1 Hz and sensor noise was implementedby adding Gaussian noise with zero mean and a standard deviation equal to 1.5% of thenominal measured value, to each measured PV. Note that it is assumed that sensorbias faults do not affect the noise distributions of the sensors.
Two simple pressure-flow feedback control loops were introduced under the NCconfiguration, as shown in Figure 5.7a, to regulate the pressure within each tank. Theregulatory control system was tuned to have a conservative response for re-use underthe NCR configuration. The tuning parameters, i.e. Kc and TI for Equation 5.6, for
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each of the two control loops are given in Table 5.2.4
E(t) = Pnominal − P (t)
F (t) = Kc
(
E(t) +
1
TI
∫ t
0
E(t′) dt′
)
+ Fnominal
(5.6)
In these equationsPnominal andP (t) are the set point andmeasured value of one tank’sactual pressure and Fnominal and F (t) are the nominal and manipulated value of thattank’s flow out of its drain, respectively.
Table 5.2: Controller parameters for the two-tank system.
Symbol Meaning Unit Value
Kc Controller gain m3 · s−1 · Pa−1 Kc1 = −2.53e−7
Kc2 = −2.32e−7
TI Integral time constant s TI1 = 128.75
TI2 = 126.25
Process noise was implemented as a random walk function for F0 with bounds 10%above and below its nominal value and a gradient of 0.0005 m3 · s−2 sampled every 2minutes.
The NCR configuration had the same implementation as the NC configurationfor process and sensor noise, and regulatory control. Recycling 80% of F2 back tothe first tank caused the steady-state PV values to change. All pressures and flowsmaintained the same nominal values as in the other configurations except for F1 whichwas changed to 1.54e−3 m3 · s−1.
Fault selections Four faults were tested for each configuration: (aConn) abruptpartial blockage in the connecting pipe; (iConn) incipient partial blockage in theconnecting pipe; (P1s) tank 1 pressure sensor bias; and (P2s) tank 2 pressure sensorbias.
aConn and iConn were implemented by changing the constriction resistance ofthe connecting pipe (see Figure 5.4). At its maximum, the partial blockage fault causeda 80% decrease in k12. This was implemented as a step input for the abrupt case andramped linearly with gradient 0.17 % · s−1 for the incipient case.
4Note that the values shown for Kc are small because the flow rates (i.e. manipulated PVs) aresmall while the pressures (i.e. controlled PVs) are large, thus a small change in a controlled PV shouldproduce a much smaller change in the appropriate manipulated PV.
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P1s and P2s were implemented as abrupt sensor bias faults (see Figure 5.5).Each fault caused a -20% bias (prior to noise) in the readings of the pressure sensor ofthe relevant tank.
5.2.2 Five tanks in series
Description Similar to the two-tank system of Section 5.2.1, five tanks areconnected by pipes between their bottoms as shown in Figure 5.8. All tanks are open tothe atmosphere and drain out their bottoms naturally through flow constrictions. Thefirst tank receives a feed flow of water.
F12, k12
F0
Feed
P2
F2, k2
Drain 2
P3
F3, k3
Drain 3
P1
F1, k1
Drain 1
P4
F4, k4
Drain 4
P5
F5, k5
Drain 5
F23, k23 F34, k34 F45, k45
Figure 5.8: Five tanks in series.
Process model The five-tank system has the Governing Equations 5.7 and theConstitutive Equations 5.8 and nominal model parameters listed in Table 5.3.
dP1
dt
=
ρg
A1
(F0 − F1 − F12)
dPi
dt
=
ρg
Ai
(
Fi−1,i − Fi − Fi,i+1
)
i = 2, . . . , 4
dP5
dt
=
ρg
A5
(F45 − F5)
(5.7)
Fj = kj
√
Pj, j = 1, . . . , 5
Fj,j+1 = kj,j+1
√
|Pj − Pj+1| × sign(Pj − Pj+1), j = 1, . . . , 4
(5.8)
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Table 5.3: Nominal values of model parameters for the five-tank system.
Symbol Meaning Unit Nominal value
A Cross-sectional area m2 Ai = 1, i = 1, . . . , 5
k Constriction resistance m3.5 · kg−0.5 ki = 1e−5, i = 1, . . . , 5
kj,j+1 = 2e−5, j = 1, . . . , 4
F Flow m3 · s−1 F0 = 1.70e−3
F1 = 0.66e−3
F2 = 0.41e−3
F3 = 0.26e−3
F4 = 0.19e−3
F5 = 0.17e−3
F12 = 1.04e−3
F23 = 0.63e−3
F34 = 0.36e−3
F45 = 0.17e−3
P Pressure Pa P1 = 4379
P2 = 1684
P3 = 699
P4 = 368
P5 = 295
ρ Water density kg ·m−3 ρ = 1000
g Gravitational acceleration m · s−2 g = 9.81
Motivation The five-tank system is a larger-scale version of the two-tank system,consisting of more PVs and subsystems. It is an ideal system to test the ability of thePD approach to scale to larger processes while still being able to relate results to thesmaller two-tank system.
Configurations Three configurations for the five-tank system were considered,namely: (N) process and sensor noise, no regulatory control, no recycle; (NC) processand sensor noise, tank pressure control, no recycle; and (NR) process and sensornoise, no regulatory control, 80% of the drainage from the fifth tank recycled back tothe first tank. Regulatory control for the NC configuration was implemented in thesame manner as in the two-tank system, i.e. where each control loop controls a tank’spressure by manipulating drain outflow from that tank.
The tuning parameters for the five pressure-flow PI control loops are given inTable 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Controller parameters for the five-tank system.
Symbol Meaning Unit Value
Kc Controller gain m3 · s−1 · Pa−1 Kc1 = −2.53e−7
Kcn = −2.32e−7, n = 2, . . . , 5
TI Integral time constant s TI1 = 128.75
TIn = 126.25, n = 2, . . . , 5
Fault selection Only one fault was considered, namely an abrupt partial blockagein the connecting pipe between tanks 2 and 3. The implementation of the fault was thesimilar to that in the two-tank system, but instead caused a 45% decrease in k23.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 110
5.3 Tested fault diagnosis approaches
This section provides a visual overview of both the MSPM approach and the PDapproach tested in this thesis. Specific settings and implementation methods arehighlighted as well.
5.3.1 Overview of MSPM approach
TheMSPMapproach (Figure 5.9) is a relatively simple data-driven approach. As detailedin Section 2.1, it captures the structure of variation in the data under NOC and thencompares new samples to this structure, detecting fault conditions when the deviationof a sample is unusual for those under NOC .
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Figure 5.9: An overview of the MSPM approach to fault diagnosis.
Since MSPM is a data-driven approach, its modelling requirements are not as highas those of the PD approach. Furthermore, it only requires the specification of onehyper-parameter (not including fault detection limits) for training, i.e. the minimumpercentage of variance explained by the retained PC — this was set to 70% in this thesis.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 111
The parameter is only required for the training phase of the approach, which determinesthe number of retained PC axes. Once the training phase is complete, the featureextraction procedure is used to extract features from new samples and the values oftheir T 2 and SPE statistics may be compared to the respective limits obtained from thetraining data. Note detection limits for these statistics are discussed later in Section5.4.
5.3.2 Overview of PD approach
In contrast to the MSPM approach, the PD approach, summarised in Figure 5.10, is amodel-based fault diagnosis approach.
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Figure 5.10: An overview the of PD approach to fault diagnosis.
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Note that there is no explicit training phase for this approach, instead a DBN designand modelling phase replaces it.5 This phase concerns the creation of the internalmodel of the approach and is required for the inference engine. The reader is referredback to Section 3.4 for particular DBN design and modelling choices made in this work.
Furthermore, as part of the design of the DBN, one must also specify how todistribute the process state RVs among the different subsystems. As discussed inSection 3.3.2, each subsystem must contain a unique subset of these RVs (i.e. notoverlapping with other subsystems) and union of the RVs in all the subsystems shouldbe the same as all the process state RVs. In this thesis and since our case studiesonly involve a number of tanks connected in series, each subsystem corresponds to atank in each of our case studies. The PVs associated with a tank are the inflow to thattank, the pressure within that tank, and the outflow from that tank excluding outflowthrough a connecting pipe or recycle stream. In addition, the sensor model RVs, aswell as any RVs pertaining to fault models, associated with a PV are also includedin the same subsystem. Lastly, the RVs pertaining to a control loop are included inthe subsystem containing the controlled PV for that loop. Table 5.5 illustrates thisapproach to defining subsystems for the two-tank system.
Table 5.5: PD approach: Illustrated subsystem decomposition for the two-tank system.The subscripts m and b indicate measured (observed) RVs and bias terms, respectively.Note that some RVs subsume model parameters.
Tank 1 Tank 2
F0 F12Status F0,m Status F12,m
F0,m F12,m
F0,b F12,b
P1 P2Status P1,m Status P2,m
P1,m P2,m
P1,b P2,b
Sacc,1 Sacc,2
F1 F2Status F1,m Status F2,m
F1,m F2,m
F1,b F2,b
The inference engine uses the DBN and initial beliefs to predict process behaviour andupdate its beliefs (decomposed into subsystems) with respect to the discrepanciesbetween its predictions and observed sensor readings. It also computes an abnormality
5Note that robust estimation of CPDs from data as well as DBN structure learning are topics forfuture research and are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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likelihood index (ALI) which is the probability of the process being in an abnormaloperating state. This procedure is repeated for each sample in the data set, but insteadusing the updated beliefs to predict process behaviour.
Unlike the feature extraction procedure of the MSPM approach, the inferenceengine updates its beliefs after each new sample. Therefore, new samples are notconsidered in isolation but instead each sample adds more information to the beliefs,further fine-tuning the CPDs in the DBN to ensure reliable model predictions overtime. For this reason, the validation and testing data are passed through the inferenceengine as a single data set instead of as separate, time-independent samples as withthe MSPM approach.
Hyper-parameters for the PD approach include: c and K as defined in Section3.2.2 on page 59, and Tmax and PrT in Section 3.3.1 on page 63. To recap, theseparameters determine: the threshold for the similarity metric when comparingtransitions (c), the maximum number of hypotheses permitted per subsystem (K),the maximum number of transitions that may be enumerated from an approximatedprocess state (Tmax), and the cumulative a priori probability threshold sufficient forenumeration (PrT ).
Tmax and PrT were chosen to be fixed in this work and was not further investigatedfor optimality. Their values were set to Tmax = 10000 and PrT = 1 − 1e−12. Thesechoices ensured sufficient transitions would be enumerated from each time slice forhypothesis generation, without enumerating all possible transitions.
The values of c andK , on the other hand, were chosen based on findings presented inLerner (2002). Lerner (2002) observedmore stable process state tracking performancefor a value of c = 1 versus c = 50 when varying the value ofK between 1 and 12 for asmall system with no subsystem decomposition. Therefore, the value of c was chosento be 1. The value of K was chosen to be 15 (per subsystem) to ensure sufficientconsideration of different and dissimilar hypotheses during belief state approximation.
These settings were used for the evaluation of the fault diagnosis performanceof the PD approach and comparison thereof with the MSPM approach using thetwo-tank system. It was also investigated how different choices of values for c and
K , namely c = {0, 0.0001, 1, 10000,∞} andK = {1, 5, 100}, affect fault diagnosisperformance using the two-tank system. Note that later tests for scaling the PDapproach up to the five-tank system used c = 1 and K = 5 due to higher memoryusage associated with higher values of K especially for larger processes, i.e. withmore components which are modelled in the DBN.
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5.3.3 Implementation challenges and solutions for PDapproach
Note that a number of challenges were faced during our implementation of the PDapproach in this work. Some noteworthy challenges and solutions which may affectthe description of the approach in Chapter 3 are discussed here. Additionally, sometesting was performed on a simplified version (with respect to the DBN model) of thetwo-tank system in Section 6.1 to verify our implementation of the PD approach.
Non-linear CPDs:A major issue with respect to implementation of the PD approach was the lack ofsupport for non-linear relationships between continuous RV nodes in the BNT (Murphy,2002). This issue was resolved using a particular linearisation method, based on theunscented transform, described in Section 3.4.2.
Numerical issues:The BNT performs inference calculations using canonical forms for probabilitydistributions. These forms specify all probability distributions in the form exp (Q(x))where Q(x) is some function unique to the particular type of distribution beingrepresented, namely Q(x), for Gaussians, is a quadratic function. The use of thesecanonical forms in the BNT meant that probability distributions often had to beconverted to and fro between the moment form (as in Section 2.3.2) and canonicalform. In particular, this causes issues for Gaussian probability distributions dueto limited precision in floating-point values and relatively ill-conditioned covariancematrices.
It was eventually found that most of these issues were caused by invalid covariancematrices resulting from calculations performed by the BNT. In particular, thesematrices would be non-symmetric and not positive semi-definite. In these cases whereit was necessary to use the moment form (such as when combining transitions), afunction by John D’Errico from the MathWorks Exchange, called NearestSPD6, wasused to find the symmetric positive semi-definite matrix nearest in Frobenius norm tothe invalid covariance matrix (Higham, 1988). This was also supplemented by anotherfunction which would perturb the diagonal of the covariance matrix slightly in order toimprove its condition number when NearestSPD would fail.
DBN design challenges:As discussed in Lerner (2002) the most challenging part of the PD approach is DBNmodelling. Anomalous results may be frequent due to bad or incorrect DBN designand specification because the PD approach relies heavily on model predictions. Thesolution to this problem is to use simple DBN designs with few tunable parameters
6NearestSPD is available at www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/42885-nearestspd.
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such as presented in Section 3.4. Although it is possible, in our case, to use one DBNdesign for multiple different configurations (i.e. by over designing) of the same system(such as for the two-tank system), doing so results in unnecessary complication ofthe DBN design. This not only makes it more difficult to identify modelling issues,but also causes simpler configurations to require more computational resourcesthan necessary. Therefore, this thesis uses different DBN designs for differentconfigurations of the same system.
State tracking challenges:A solution that arose during debugging of modelling issues was to separate thetransition from normal operating mode to normal operating mode from all othertransitions. This meant that this normal operating mode to normal operating modetransition would always be enumerated and never combined with any other transitions,ensuring that the normal operating mode hypothesis would be present in each timeslice even its likelihood was extremely low. Doing this avoids scenarios where thenormal operating mode to normal operating mode transition is not enumerated forevery time slice due the process state being tracked incorrectly. This subsequentlyreduces the likelihood of creating hypotheses which are not supported by, or have littlesupport from, the observations of process behaviour. Note that, in this thesis, thisnormal operating mode hypothesis does not contribute to the hyper-parameter K —thus, including this hypothesis,K+1 hypotheses are permitted for each subsystem.
Furthermore, note that in the event of incorrect process state tracking leading tono support from observations for any hypothesis, our implementation invokes aDBN reset. This reset reinitialises the DBN to the initial state at time slice 0 andthen attempts to resume process state tracking. If the process state still cannot betracked well enough after the reset or if the DBN needs to be reset repeatedly, one mayconclude that there is likely an issue with the DBN model which needs to be furtherinvestigated and fixed.7
Omission of smoothing:Smoothing considers multiple samples in a time frame of a particular size (i.e. awindow) and processes all of them before producing a result. Typically this result is adecision for a time slice a few steps behind the current observation, enabling the faultdiagnosis approach to “look ahead” before producing diagnosis results for a particulartime slice. Although Lerner (2002) incorporates this technique in their approach, we donot do this because the computational time required to process a sample was foundto be relatively high, i.e. on the order of seconds, without smoothing and this wouldincrease if smoothing were implemented.
Testing of concurrent faults:The manifestation of multiple faults in a sequence of fault data describes a case study
7Note this was not an issue in our experiments.
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which contains concurrent faults. Although the PD approach has the ability to detectand diagnose concurrent faults, we do not explore this in this thesis. We explicitly omitthis testing because there remains a number of issues with single fault case studieswhich need to be resolved before moving on to diagnosis of concurrent faults.
5.4 Testing methodology
This section presents additional details about the methods used for testing the faultdiagnosis performance of the MSPM and PD approach.
Computation details:All testing was performed using an Intel Xeon X5680 3.33 GHz processor with 16 GBRAM running 64 bit Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise (SP1). Code was implementedin MATLAB® R2017a and will be made available at a later stage under an open sourcelicense. Included in the open source code will be the SimulinkTM files for the casestudies, the MSPM approach, the PD approach, tools for computing fault diagnosisperformance, and reproducibility scripts to reproduce key results presented in Chapter6.
Data characteristics:The simulation data for each fault under each configuration was generated as acontinuous segment representing 30 minutes in real-time. In each data set a faultwould manifest after 15 minutes, producing even amounts of NOC and fault data. Sincethe sensor sampling rates were set to 1Hz, each data set contained 1800 samples witha fault manifesting at the 900th sample.
The NOC data was identical for all faults under each configuration and was splitin a 60:40 ratio for the training and validation phases of the MSPM approach. Thetraining portion of the split was used to determine the initial BN CPDs for the PDapproach.
Full observability was assumed, therefore all measured PVs were observed forboth the MSPM and PD approaches. In this work, these were all pressures and flowsfor the two case studies in Section 5.2.
Fault detection limit selection:Fault detection limits for both the MSPM approach and PD approach were based on99th percentiles. This was done to emulate realistic detection limit selection based onavailability of a priori knowledge.
In the case of the MSPM approach, the user typically only has available the scoresfor the monitoring statistics obtained from training data. Therefore, for this approach,fault detection limits were set to the 99th percentile value of T 2NOC for T 2limit and the
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99th percentile value of SPENOC for SPElimit.
In the case of the PD approach, although a similar approach to choosing a faultdetection limit may be used, doing so ignores important characteristics for the natureof the abnormality likelihood index. Recall that ALI is a likelihood for abnormality and isknown to range from 0 to 1, such that 1 indicates a reasonable certainty for abnormalbehaviour. Furthermore, realistic process data typically does contain minor deviationsfrom NOC (i.e. impulses) which could be considered abnormal if ALIlimit chosen to bea low value closer to 0. Therefore, it is better to choose ALIlimit such that it considersallowable deviation from NOC and does not spuriously report minor deviations fromNOC as the result of a fault. In this thesis, ALIlimit was therefore chosen to be 0.99.
Fault detection performance metrics:In Section 2.2.3, AUC was presented as a good performance metric for evaluating faultdiagnosis performance regardless of detection limit selection. This metric is usefulfor evaluating the overall ability of a fault diagnosis approach to discriminate betweennormal and abnormal process behaviour. However, more detailed fault detectionperformance metrics can be evaluated once detection limits are chosen.
Among these metrics are FAR, TAR, and F1 score also discussed in Section 2.2.3. SinceF1 score essentially combines the information contained in FAR and TAR into a singlemetric it is very useful for summarising this detail of fault detection performance.Therefore, F1 score is used in this thesis to evaluate the ability of a fault diagnosisapproach to discriminate between normal and abnormal process behaviour given aparticular set of detection limits.
It is important to note that each alarm reported by a fault diagnosis approachshould not immediately be treated as detection of fault conditions. Especially inthe case of the MSPM approach, because of the way in which detection limits wereselected, it is possible that a sample and several subsequent samples obtained duringnormal process behaviour may trigger the approach to report an alarm for the onesample and not for the others. In these cases it would be ineffective to attempt todiagnose fault conditions simply because there would be no fault to diagnose. Thiscan be avoided by instead treating consecutive alarm reports as indicative of faultconditions and only recognising the detection of fault conditions after a sufficientnumber of consecutive alarms had been reported.
In this thesis that number was chosen to be 10. This meant that fault conditions wouldonly be detected when alarms were reported for at least 10 consecutive samples.Therefore, the minimum delay in detection of fault conditions in our tests was 10samples. However, note that these 10 samples are excluded from values whendiscussing detection delays in Chapter 6 for ease of use. Therefore, a detection delayof 0 samples is indicative of immediate fault detection since 10 consecutive sampleswould in fact report alarms after manifestation of the fault.
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Root cause analysis performance metrics:We are unaware of any qualitative root cause analysis performance metrics, butmake an attempt to quantify the success of root cause analysis in terms of someobservations. In particular, if the root cause of a fault was identified among possiblefault symptoms on a contribution plot (see Section 2.1.4) or component ALI plot(see Section 3.2.3), then one can make certain quantitative observations about thenature of the root cause analysis result. This includes the number of fault symptomsidentified alongside the root cause as well as the ranking of the root cause in termsof its relative contribution or component ALI compared to the values for the identifiedfault symptoms.
Note creation of contribution plots and component ALI plots considers the averagerelative contributions and average component ALIs for over a particular numberof samples. These samples are the first 100 samples after the detection of faultconditions; this includes the 10 consecutive samples which triggered detection of faultconditions.
Conclusion:This chapter sets the stage for evaluation and comparison of fault diagnosisperformance for the PD and MSPM approaches. In particular, previous sectionsdetailed how we set up case studies and provided a short overview of each approachto refresh the reader. Finally, this section presented details on remaining aspects of thetesting methodology. Together, all of this information describes the typical methodsused to obtain the various results presented and analysed in the next chapter.
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Results and Discussion
This chapter considers the fault diagnosis performance of the PD approach in detail.First, our implementation of the PD approach with inference engine enhancements isverified to ensure that observation of anomalous results are not due to implementationerrors. Next, fault diagnosis performance results for the PD approach on the two-tanksystem are presented and discussed. Following this detailed analysis, overall faultdiagnosis performance for the PD approach on the two-tank system is summarised andpresented alongside a summary of overall fault diagnosis performance for the MSPMapproach on the same system. Following a comparative evaluation of the performanceof the PD and the MSPM approaches, the PD approach is further investigated forscalability. The chapter then concludes with some caveats and a discussion of thelimitations and some future directions of research for the PD approach.
6.1 Verifying implementation of the PDapproach
The intention of this section is to verify the implementation of the PD approach using thetwo-tank system described in Section 5.2.1, but with a simplified DBNmodel. The abilityof the inference engine presented in Section 3.2 to discriminate between normal andabnormal process behaviour is considered first. Next, the solutions described in Section5.3.3 for dealingwith numerical issueswere implemented and tested. Subsequently, thecomputational enhancements for the inference engine, presented in Section 3.3, wereimplemented and tested. The section concludes with a summary of the findings.
6.1.1 Case study and testing methodology
The case study considered in this section is the sN configuration of the two-tanksystem. Only the aConn fault is tested in this case and this is the only fault modelledin the DBN. Therefore, the DBN only models two possible operating modes: normaland abnormal operation caused by the aConn fault. As a result, there is no need tofurther consider root cause analysis since the detection of fault conditions will imply
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identification of the root cause. Also note that, unless otherwise stated, the sametesting methodology described in Chapter 5 applies to this subsection.
Hyper-parameters for the PD approach were chosen to be c = 0 and K = ∞.This ensures that no transitions are combined with one another when creatinghypotheses and, thus limits the degree to which combining transitions may affectobserved results. Also note that the values of these parameters are acceptable forthe particular DBN model being used since a maximum of only four transitions can beenumerated from an approximate belief state. Therefore, there is little need to managethe amount of transitions being enumerated from approximate belief states as well asthe number of hypotheses that may be created from these transitions — both valuesmay only be a maximum of four.
Furthermore, note that the hyper-parameters PrT and Tmax only apply to thetransition enumeration enhancement and are not used when the enhancement is notenabled.
6.1.2 Results for base case inference engine
Using the inference engine directly as presented in Section 3.2, the aConn fault waseasily diagnosed. Plotting the ALI values reported by the PD approach over time asshown in Figure 6.1 reveals that the PD approach was easily able to discriminatebetween normal and abnormal process behaviour for this case.
Figure 6.1: PD approach using base case inference engine: Abnormality likelihood indexmonitoring chart.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 121
Processing of all 1800 samples was completed in 6 minutes and 26 seconds, averaging0.2145 seconds processing time per sample.
6.1.3 Enabling solutions for numerical issues
Some challenges encountered during the implementation of the PD approach werehighlighted in Section 5.3.3. Among these challenges is a particular type of numericalissue which affected the covariance matrices of Gaussian probability distributions.Solutions to avoid these issues were presented in the same section. These weresubsequently incorporated into the base case inference engine and tested using thesame case study and hyper-parameters.
Fault detection performance was found to be no different from that in the basecase, suggesting that the added implementation of the solutions does not degradeperformance of the base case inference engine. However, a slight increase in averagesample processing time was observed compared to the base case inference engine. Inthis case average sample processing time was observed to be 0.2234 seconds, adding16 seconds to the total processing time for the base case. Note that all subsequenttests have these solutions enabled, this stabilises the base case inference engine.
6.1.4 Enabling transition enumeration
Recall from Section 3.3.1 that transition enumeration facilitates a more practicalapproach to performing the inference calculations which produce a new approximatebelief state. The enhancement does this by choosing which transitions to enumerateinstead of enumerating all transitions from a particular approximate belief state. Thisreduces sample processing times and becomes increasingly beneficial for DBNs whichfeature a large number of operating modes. However, it is important to be aware thatinadequate choices for PrT and Tmax may result in poor performance.
Setting PrT to 1 and Tmax to 2, limits the maximum number of transitions thatcan be enumerated from an approximate belief state to always be two. Since onlyfour transitions can ever be enumerated from an approximate belief state for thiscase, these settings severely limited the ability of the PD approach to investigate thelikelihoods of other transitions which were not enumerated. As a result, the normal tonormal transition was always enumerated alongside only one other transition. PlottingALI over time for this case, as shown in Figure 6.2, reveals that the fault could notreliably be detected using these settings. The results were observed due to the lack ofenumeration of the fault-to-fault transitions.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 122
Figure 6.2: PD approach using enhanced inference engine (transition enumeration withinadequate PrT and Tmax): Abnormality likelihood index monitoring chart.
For this case, with PrT = 1 and Tmax = 2, it was observed that transition enumerationactually worsened fault diagnosis performance of the PD approach. This insightreveals an important caveat for the PD approach with respect to the transitionenumeration enhancement. The implication thereof is that the user must ensure thata sufficient number of transitions can be enumerated for the purposes of diagnosingany particular fault or set of faults in the case of multiple simultaneous faults. Oneapproach to choosing values for PrT and Tmax is to first set Tmax according to thecapabilities of the computer on which the PD approach will run and then choose PrTas desired, keeping in mind the a priori likelihood for fault conditions.
Following this approach, it is known that Tmax cannot exceed four in our case,therefore choosing Tmax ≥ 4 is sufficient for the first part. The second part dependson the a priori likelihood for fault conditions since PrT operates on the a priorilikelihoods for transitions. This means that, in addition to the normal to normaltransition, at least those transitions describing normal to fault component statuschanges should be enumerated from every approximate belief state under NOC. Thea priori likelihood for fault conditions was discussed in Section 3.4.3. Using a valueof αnf = 0.001 (noting that mopmodes = 2), means that PrT should be at least
1− αnf
mopmodes
= 0.9995 to achieve the desired results.1 Choosing PrT = 0.9999 shows,in part, the benefits of using the transition enumeration enhancement for this case.
These settings have an interesting effect on the number of transitions typicallyenumerated from an approximate belief state under NOC. In particular, this number
1Note that 0.9995 is the absolute minimum recommended value for PrT and may still produce poorresults due to it being on the threshold below which the values for PrT will be inadequate.
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was always four transitions when using the base case inference engine, whereas withtransition enumeration, at PrT = 0.9999 and Tmax = ∞, this number was typicallyfound to be two transitions. After manifestation of the fault the number of transitionsenumerated using the base case engine remained four, whereas that number wasfound to typically be three for the implementation with transition enumeration. Thisgives evidence that reasonable settings for transition enumeration allows similar faultdiagnosis with reduced sample processing times: the ALI plot over time was essentiallythe same as in Figure 6.1. On the other hand, the average sample processing timewas found to be 0.1312 for the implementation with transition enumeration — a 41.3%improvement over the stabilised base case inference engine.
6.1.5 Enabling subsystem decomposition
Recall from Section 3.3.2 that subsystem decomposition aims to facilitate bettermanagement of hypotheses, allowing the PD approach to effectively maintain morehypotheses for, typically, the same amount of memory when compared to not usingsubsystem decomposition. Subsystems were specified in the same manner asdescribed in Section 5.3.2 for the case study investigated here. Note that the secondsubsystem (tank) is the only subsystem containing a discrete RV, i.e. the status ofthe connecting pipe. Also note that this does not negatively affect the ability of thefirst subsystem to maintain hypotheses, but only means that the first subsystemonly contributes to approximating the probability distributions of the continuous RVsassociated with the first tank.
In this subsection, subsystem decomposition was implemented on the stabilisedbase case inference engine without the transition enumeration enhancement, i.e.for comparison with and without subsystem decomposition. This meant that eachsubsystem would maintain four hypotheses at all times since one hypothesis would becreated from each transition for each subsystem. Similar fault diagnosis performancewas observed in both cases, i.e. with and without subsystem decomposition. However,when using subsystem decomposition,average sample processing time increased dueto the added computations needed to maintain double the number of hypotheses:sample processing times in this case was found to be 0.2334 seconds — a 4.5%degradation when compared with the stabilised base case inference engine.
Combining both transition enumeration (PrT = 0.9999 and Tmax = ∞) andsubsystem decomposition also had no negative impact on fault diagnosis performancewhen compared with results for the base case inference engine. Furthermore, averagesample processing time in this case was found to be 0.1402 seconds — a 37.2%improvement over the stabilised base case inference engine.
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6.1.6 Remarks
In this section it was observed that our implementation of the PD approach seemsto function as intended. Testing the PD approach using the base case version ofthe inference engine revealed that the PD approach was easily able to discriminatebetween normal and abnormal process behaviour. The result was found to be the samewhen solutions to avoid numerical issues were added to the base case version of theinference engine, and this also held to the enhanced, i.e. with transition enumerationand subsystem decomposition, versions of that inference engine.
Furthermore, we noted that enumeration had the largest effect on average sampleprocessing times. When compared with the stabilised base case inference engine,enabling transition enumeration reduced average sample processing time by 41.3%,and further enabling transition enumeration as well as subsystem decomposition sawthis change to a 37.2% reduction in average sample processing time. It was alsonoted that a particular caveat applies to the use of transition enumeration: unsuitablesettings for the hyper-parameters PrT and Tmax could nullify any gains in sampleprocessing times by making the PD approach unable to discriminate between normaland abnormal process behaviour as a result of enumerating too few transitions fromany particular approximate belief state.
6.2 Testing the PD approach on the two-tanksystem
The two-tank system (in Section 5.2.1) features different configurations of varyingcomplexity. Under each configuration, a number of different faults may manifest. InSection 3.4 and Section 5.3.2, the approach used to create the DBN models usedin our approach was broadly presented. To better contextualise the fault diagnosisperformance results presented in this section, some attention is first given to thespecific nature of DBN models for the two-tank system.
Firstly note that the sN and N configurations share the same DBN design but weuse different CPD parameters because of the introduction of process noise in the Nconfiguration. Secondly, the NC and NCR configurations each use a different DBNdesign due to regulatory control in the NC configuration and regulatory control withrecycle in the NCR configuration. Key differences between the DBN designs only affectcontinuous RVs and the edges between those RVs. Thus, the number of operatingmodes and therefore the total number of possible transitions that can be enumeratedfrom an approximate belief state are the same for all two-tank DBNs.
All sensors (i.e. flows and pressures) were modelled as binary status components
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and could be either functioning normally or be faulty.2 There were three of theseper tank. Additionally, the pipe connecting the two tanks was modelled as a binarystatus component as well. This meant that each of the DBNs for the two-tank systemmodelled a total of 128 operating modes with 1282 (or 16384) possible transitions froman approximate belief state. Even though the two-tank system is the smallest casestudy investigated in this research, the number of operating modes modelled by thetwo-tank system’s DBNs make this system challenging fault diagnosis using the PDapproach. Fortunately the enhancements for the inference engine presented in Section3.3 provide better management of computational resources in order to make sampleprocessing more efficient.
The rest of this section summarises the observed fault diagnosis performanceof the PD approach for the various configurations of the two-tank system. The rawdata for this section as well as plots of the simulated data are made available inAppendix D and Appendix C, respectively.
6.2.1 Configuration sN
The sN configuration features only sensor noise, no regulatory control, and no recycle.Under this configuration, all faults were easily noticeable on the data plots shown inAppendix C.1, Figures C.1 through C.4. This was observed due to the vast difference inthe magnitude of sensor noise compared to gross change in the values of observedPVs. It should be noted, however, that the incipient nature of the iConn fault causedaffected PVs to slowly drift away from their nominal values in contrast to all other faults— all of which were abrupt and immediately caused large changes in the observedvalues of affected PVs.
Fault detection:Unsurprisingly, the PD approach was able to detect all four faults under the sNconfiguration as summarised in Table 6.1. AUC was found to be relatively high in allcases, indicating good ability of the PD approach to discriminate between normaland abnormal process behaviour for this configuration. F1 scores were similarly highacross all faults, indicating low FAR and TAR under this configuration. Detection delayresults, however, show that the iConn fault was the only fault not detected immediatelyafter manifestation.
2Note that although this research focused on sensor bias faults, the use of bias terms in theimplementation of the faulty status (see Section 3.4.1.3) also enables diagnosis of sensor drift faults.
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Table 6.1: Two-tanks (sN): Fault detection performance of PD approach.
Metric\Fault aConn iConn P1s P2sAUC 1.000 0.936 1.000 1.000F1 score 1.000 0.908 1.000 1.000Detection delay (#samples) 0 168 0 0Sample processing time (sec) 16.885 17.905 15.189 15.517
Due to the nature of the iConn fault, detection immediately after manifestation of thefault is challenging. This happens because the PD approach only has available a historyof NOC process behaviour at the time when the fault manifests and since the firstsamples observed after manifestation of the fault are similar to NOC, no alarms arereported. In fact, the PD approach only detects the fault after processing 168 samples.Reducing the ALI limit may reduce detection delay by making the PD approach moresensitive at the cost of potential increase in FAR. However, even reducing the ALI limitto as low as 0.0001 to avoid increased FAR only lowers detection delay to 125 samplesin this case.
Therefore, an alternative approach to reducing detection delay for this fault isdesirable. In their research, Lerner et al. (2000) and Lerner (2002) use a smoothingtechnique which allows their fault diagnosis approach to use “future” process behaviourto influence diagnosis results. Although such a smoothing technique may benefitthe diagnosis of incipient faults for our approach, it was not implemented due to theincreased computational burden: the average sample processing times for the systemwere already high (see Table 6.1) and far exceeding the requirement for real-time faultdiagnosis, so a multiplicative increase in these times for smoothing is not practical.
The differences in average sample processing times between the data sets canbe attributed to the different behaviour of the PD approach after manifestation of afault. These differences in behaviour of the PD approach are caused by the recursivenature of transition enumeration, hypothesis creation, and belief state approximation.Therefore, average sample processing times vary depending on the number oftransitions enumerated and the number of hypotheses maintained per subsystem.Also note that since all the NOC data is the same for all four data sets under thisconfiguration, differences in average sample processing time is only due to behaviourof the PD approach after manifestation of a fault.
Root cause analysis:Analysing the component ALI plots for each fault, it was found that the correct rootcause was highlighted (almost) immediately for three of the four faults. In all three ofthese cases, the root cause was the only fault cause to be highlighted — showcasingexceptional isolability for these faults. The exception, as expected, was found to bethe iConn fault which did not have its root cause highlighted at all, but instead had twospurious fault causes highlighted. These results are summarised in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Two-tanks (sN): Root cause analysis performance of PD approach.
Metric\Fault aConn iConn P1s P2sRoot cause highlighted Yes No Yes YesRoot cause position 1st N/A 1st 1stNumber spurious causes 0 2 0 0
It is worth noting that since the PD approach can incorporate observations/evidenceabout discrete RVs as well, the correct root cause for the iConn fault could in practicebe obtained using a troubleshooting approach: if a user were to investigate the faultcause initially with the highest ALI, i.e. the sensor forP1 (see Figure D.2), and determinethat it is functioning normally, then the PD approach can incorporate this evidence intoits future analysis. Doing this highlights different fault causes which unfortunatelydo not include the root cause yet. However, investigating the new fault cause withthe highest ALI, namely the sensor P2, and determining it to be functioning normallyproduces root cause analysis results similar to that observed for the other faults underthe sN configuration. Employing this troubleshooting method forces the PD approachto spend more time investigating alternative fault causes as well as different estimatesfor bias terms. Doing this repeatedly for the iConn fault in this case, eventually enabledthe PD approach to better track the slow change in the constriction resistance causedby the fault.
6.2.2 Configuration N
The N configuration features process and sensor noise, no regulatory control, and norecycle. The addition of process noise in this case makes the N configuration morerealistic than the sN configuration without introducing large amounts of complexity.
Fault diagnosis results observed under the N configuration were very similar tofault diagnosis results observed under the sN configuration. In fact, only a minordifference was observed for the root cause analysis of the aConn fault where thesensor F12 was slightly highlighted as a spurious fault cause (see Figure D.5). Thiswas observed due to process noise increasing the variance of the PV F12, causingthe PD approach to consider the possibility of a slight bias in the sensor F12 aftermanifestation of the fault. Despite this, the correct root cause was highlighted andprocess behaviour was tracked correctly after manifestation of the fault.
Fault diagnosis performance is summarised in Table 6.3 for fault detection and Table6.4 for root cause analysis. Note that the PD approach exhibited the same behaviourfor the iConn fault under this configuration as it did under the sN configuration. Due tothe relative similarity of the two configurations, the same analysis of results observedfor the iConn fault under the sN configuration applies here.
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Table 6.3: Two-tanks (N): Fault detection performance of PD approach.
Metric\Fault aConn iConn P1s P2sAUC 1.000 0.935 1.000 1.000F1 score 1.000 0.906 1.000 1.000Detection delay (#samples) 0 191 0 0Sample processing time (sec) 17.926 18.761 15.892 16.122
Table 6.4: Two-tanks (N): Root cause analysis performance of PD approach.
Metric\Fault aConn iConn P1s P2sRoot cause highlighted Yes No Yes YesRoot cause position 1st N/A 1st 1stNumber spurious causes 1 2 0 0
6.2.3 Configuration NC
The NC configuration is significantly more complex than the N configuration due tothe introduction of regulatory control. In this case, the control system creates cyclicrelationships between PVs in the underlying system, making it more difficult to identifythe root cause of fault conditions when a fault is detected. The control system doesthis by introducing inverse relationships between P1 and F1, and P2 and F2. Thedata plots in Appendix C.3 show that the process was in a stationary state underNOC before manifestation of any fault. Once a fault manifests, the control systemattempts to reduce the effects of the fault on the controlled PVs, i.e. P1 and P2, byadjusting the manipulated PVs, i.e. F1 and F2. The action of the control system in thiscase essentially makes detection of abrupt faults easier, due to gross changes in theobserved values of multiple PVs. However, this also causes the effects of a fault toshow strong symptoms in measured PVs further away from the root cause, making itmore difficult to identify the root cause of fault conditions by inspection of the data.
Fault detection:The PD approach was able to detect all faults as summarised in Table 6.5. Similar faultdetection performance results to those for the sN and N configuration were observed:high AUC values, and high F1 scores, only the iConn fault featuring detection delay, andhigh sample processing times.
Compared to the sN and N configuration a significantly higher detection delayfor the iConn fault was observed, i.e. 271 samples under NC versus 191 and 168samples under N and sN respectively. This result was observed due to the joint natureof the fault and the actions of the control system. Since the iConn had a slow drifteffect on F12, the control system was able to efficiently counter the effects of the faulton P1 and P2 by slowly adjusting F1 and F2. This made it more difficult to detect the
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iConn fault early on — the PD approach still inferred normal process behaviour theentire time until abruptly detecting fault conditions (see the plot of ALI over time inFigure D.10).
It is also worth noting the higher sample processing times observed for the datasets containing the P1s and P2s faults. In both cases, the PD approach inferredpossible abnormal behaviour in two sensors (see Figure D.11 for the P1s fault andFigure D.12 for the P2s fault). Because these are marginal probabilities for abnormalbehaviour in these sensors, this meant that the PD approach reported simultaneousabnormal behaviour in both components. This was not the case in reality since onlyone sensor was faulty in either case. However, in both cases the two faulty sensorswere one for pressure and the other flow, and both sensors could be associated witha single control loop each time. This implies that the PD approach was diagnosingan issue with the control system and identifying the abnormal control loop in bothcases. Although this behaviour might be convenient for isolating control systemfaults to particular loops, it would still be better if only the root cause is inferredto be abnormal. This would not only benefit root cause analysis, but would alsoreduce sample processing times since the PD approach would need to enumerate lesstransitions in such a case.
Table 6.5: Two-tanks (NC): Fault detection performance of PD approach.
Metric\Fault aConn iConn P1s P2sAUC 1.000 0.860 1.000 1.000F1 score 1.000 0.823 1.000 1.000Detection delay (#samples) 0 271 0 0Sample processing time (sec) 13.155 13.026 15.395 17.475
Root cause analysis:Root cause analysis performance of the PD approach under the NC configurationwas found to be excellent overall as summarised in Table 6.6. However, it should benoted that, with respect to the spurious causes listed, those for P1s and P2s werediscussed above, while that for aConn was identified as due to process noise in theN configuration.
Table 6.6: Two-tanks (NC): Root cause analysis performance of PD approach.
Metric\Fault aConn iConn P1s P2sRoot cause highlighted Yes Yes Yes YesRoot cause position 1st 1st 1st 1stNumber spurious causes 1 0 1 1
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6.2.4 Configuration NCR
The NCR configuration introduces recycle to the NC configuration, further increasingcomplexity over the NC configuration. Note that the amount of water recycled back tothe first tank is dependent on the outflow from the second tank — a PV manipulatedby the control system. Therefore, the effect of recycle on process behaviour onlyplays a large role when an aggressive change in F2 is caused by the control system.3Similar process behaviour was observed for the data sets containing the aConn, iConn,and P1s faults since these data sets featured no aggressive change in F2 over time.In contrast, the data set containing the P2s fault featured aggressive change in F2immediately after manifestation of the fault which caused the effect of recycle to playa larger role in observed process behaviour.
In light of these observations, fault diagnosis performance results for the aConn,iConn, and P1s faults under the NCR configuration were expected to be similar to, ifnot the same as, those observed under the NC configuration. This expectation wasmet for fault detection as shown in Table 6.7, and partly met for root cause analysisas shown in Table 6.8. Naturally, the same explanations for most artefacts from theNC configuration apply here as well. One exception is that of poor root cause analysisfor the iConn fault, which could be diagnosed using the troubleshooting approachdescribed under the sN configuration.4
Furthermore, it was found that the PD approach was fully capable of handlingthe larger effect of recycle observed during the P2s fault. Fault diagnosis performancefor the fault was found to to be very similar to that under the NC configuration. Onceagain, high ALI values were reported for both P2 and F2 sensors in this case. Thisimplies that although the PD approach is capable of handling the effect of recycle, it isnot capable of decoupling associated PVs in control loops.
Table 6.7: Two-tanks (NCR): Fault detection performance of PD approach.
Metric\Fault aConn iConn P1s P2sAUC 1.000 0.858 1.000 1.000F1 score 1.000 0.822 1.000 1.000Detection delay (#samples) 0 272 0 0Sample processing time (sec) 14.451 15.748 16.287 19.527
3This can be seen when comparing the data plots in Appendix C.4 to those in Appendix C.3, i.e. NCRconfiguration versus NC configuration.4It should be noted that root cause analysis for the iConn fault worked flawlessly in past revisions.However, we were unable to note the cause for different results and document this update to reflect themost recent fault diagnosis performance of the PD approach.
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Table 6.8: Two-tanks (NCR): Root cause analysis performance of PD approach.
Metric\Fault aConn iConn P1s P2sRoot cause highlighted Yes No Yes YesRoot cause position 1st N/A 1st 1stNumber spurious causes 1 2 1 1
6.2.5 Effects of hyper-parameter selection
The effects of different hyper-parameter values for c and K was investigated andfound to have no negative effect on fault diagnosis performance over a selection ofvalues. However, varying c and K did have an effect on sample processing timesas a result of this altering the number of hypotheses maintained and the number oftransitions enumerated from approximate belief states. This investigation was doneusing the aConn fault data set under the N configuration of the two-tank system.Sample processing times are reported in Table 6.9.
Table 6.9: Effect of hyper-parameters c and K on sample processing time (seconds)using the aConn fault data set under the N configuration of the two-tank system.
c\K 1 5 1000 4.65 8.45 22.940.0001 4.61 8.38 23.281 4.82 8.61 23.6110000 16.54 18.59 18.72
∞ 18.76 18.59 18.84
Supplementing this table, Table 6.10 and Table 6.11 show the median number ofhypotheses maintained per subsystem and median number of transitions enumerated,respectively.5
Typically c and K , along with PrT and Tmax, control these values by intelligentlydiscarding improbable process behaviour trajectories. In this case, increasing c causesthe PD approach to combine more dissimilar transitions with one another to createhypotheses which contain all of the information of those transitions. Using thesehypotheses to then approximate a belief state results in an increased number oftransitions needing to be enumerated due to information from less likely transitionsbeing maintained. This, in turn, causes the observed overall increase in sampleprocessing time as c increases. Similarly, the observed overall increase in sampleprocessing time asK increases is caused by the same effect, albeit more directly — i.e.increasing K results in more hypotheses being maintained per subsystem, includingless likely and relatively unlikely ones for high values ofK .
5Note that median values were used in order to limit the effect of outliers.
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Table 6.10: Effect of hyper-parameters c and K on the median number of hypothesesmaintained per subsystem using the aConn fault data set under the N configuration ofthe two-tank system. Notemaximumnumber of hypothesesmaintained per subsystemisK + 1 (see Section 5.3.3).
c\K 1 5 1000 2 6 1010.0001 2 6 1011 2 6 10110000 2 3 3
∞ 2 2 2
Table 6.11: Effect of hyper-parameters c and K on the median number of transitionsenumerated using the aConn fault data set under the N configuration of the two-tanksystem.
c\K 1 5 1000 44 78 1770.0001 44 78 1771 44 78 17710000 122 177 177
∞ 177 177 177
6.2.6 Remarks
This section illustrated that the PD approach is capable of diagnosing an array of faultson multiple different configurations of the two-tank system. Typical fault detection androot cause analysis results were excellent for the PD approach. However, addressableissues with respect to the diagnosis of incipient faults and artefacts in diagnosisresults under the NC and NCR configurations were observed.
Unfortunately, due to lack of information these findings cannot be directly comparedwith those of Lerner et al. (2000) and Lerner (2002). However, Lerner et al. (2000) didclaim to reasonably track process behaviour under incipient fault conditions. Therefore,it was noted that implementation of smoothing, included in the systems of Lerner et al.(2000) and Lerner (2002), could benefit the PD approach by reducing detection delayfor incipient faults. However, since poor sample processing times were observed forour implementation of the PD approach, this was not further considered.
Nonetheless, it was found that even without smoothing the PD was able to eventuallydetect the iConn fault under all configurations of the two-tank system after longdetection delays. Furthermore, an addressable issue with respect to root causeanalysis of the iConn fault under the sN, N, and NCR configurations was discussed. In
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particular, the issue involved misidentification of the root cause when given only theprocess data. This was addressed by providing the PD approach with more informationabout the actual status of the misidentified components as might be obtained in atroubleshooting procedure on a real system. It was also noted that if the dynamicsof the iConn fault were known, this issue would be avoided in root cause analysis.This result indicates that it may be worthwhile to incorporate some informationabout various fault dynamics into DBN models instead of naïvely modelling faultdynamics. This might be done by learning fault dynamics from existing, labelled dataand incorporating this into the DBN model of a process.
The artefact in the fault diagnosis results for the P1s and P2s faults under theNC and NCR configurations was determined to be caused by the inability of the PDapproach to decouple associated PVs in control loops. This artefact would cause thePD approach to identify both controlled and manipulated PV sensors as faulty whenonly the controlled PV sensor was faulty in reality. Nonetheless, the correct root causewas identified in these cases.
Finally, to conclude the performance analysis of the PD approach on the two-tanksystem, the effects of changing the hyper-parameters c and K on fault diagnosisperformance was investigated. No negative effects on fault diagnosis performancewere observed, however the different values of c andK did affect sample processingtimes. Unfortunately, the lowest sample processing times observed were still far toohigh to achieve real-time fault diagnosis using the PD approach.
6.3 Comparison of the PD and MSPMapproaches for the two-tank system
The previous section showed that the PD approach was fully capable of diagnosing asuite of faults on the two-tank system under various different configurations. One ofour key research questions is whether the PD approach warrants further investigationwhen compared to another readily implemented fault diagnosis approach, such astraditional MSPM. The MSPM approach was therefore also applied to the sametwo-tank system case study in order to make such a comparison. The same data setsin Appendix C were used in testing the MSPM approach and its raw fault diagnosisresults are made available in Appendix E.
Note that fault diagnosis performance for both approaches is summarised ona per configuration basis in this section. This summary approach facilitatesdirect comparative evaluation of both fault diagnosis approaches for the differentconfigurations, allowing for commentary on the impact ofmore complex configurationson fault diagnosis performance. Further note that this section does not makean attempt to provide detailed analysis of fault diagnosis performance for the
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MSPM approach due to the abundance of research papers available on the topic(Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003c). Instead, this section focuses on the faultdetection and root cause analysis aspects of fault diagnosis for both PD and MSPMapproaches and remarks on these findings.
6.3.1 Fault detection
Fault detection performance was summarised using four metrics, viz. AUC, F1 score,detection delay, and sample processing time. Results observed for the AUC, F1 score,and sample processing time metrics were averaged across all four faults under eachconfiguration of the two-tank system. However, in all tests, non-zero detection delayswere only reported for the iConn fault, therefore it was elected to compare detectiondelay metrics using only data for the iConn fault — i.e. a worst case scenario. All of thisinformation is presented in Table 6.12 and is analysed in the text that follows.
Table 6.12: PD approach versus MSPM approach for two-tank system: Fault detectionperformance. Note all metrics, except detection delay, represent average values for asuite of four faults. Values for detection delay only represent the incipient iConn fault.
Configuration sN N NC NCRMetric\Approach PD MSPM PD MSPM PD MSPM PD MSPMAUC 0.984 0.987 0.984 0.949 0.965 0.953 0.964 0.947F1 score 0.977 0.991 0.976 0.976 0.956 0.979 0.955 0.976Detection delay(#samples) 168 52 191 68 271 49 272 49Sample processingtime (sec) 16.374 9.41e−6 17.175 8.43e−6 14.763 5.18e−6 16.503 2.50e−6
Overall we observe similar fault detection performance for both approaches. However,the PD approach takes considerably longer to detect the incipient iConn fault, andsample processing time is orders of magnitude slower for the PD approach. Wediscuss these findings in more detail below, before considering how the PD approachstacks up against the MSPM approach for root cause analysis.
The average AUC values were similar for both approaches, both doing well atdiscriminating between normal and abnormal process behaviour for all configurations.However, it is also worth noting that the observed average AUC values decreasedslightly overall when moving from less complex to more complex configurations. Thisphenomenon was also observed to be more noticeable for the MSPM approach whencompared with the PD approach.
However, average F1 scores for the MSPM approach revealed that this phenomenonhad little effect on maintaining low FAR and high TAR under all configurations.In contrast, the average F1 scores for the PD approach show the same trend as
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the average AUC values for the PD approach when moving from less complex tomore complex configurations. Findings in Section 6.2 reveal that the origin of thisphenomenon for the PD approach can be traced back to high detection delays for theiConn fault. For the PD approach, under all configurations, lower AUC and lower F1scores were only observed for the iConn fault — an explanation for the cause of theseobservation was also provided in Section 6.2.1.
Note that the impact of detection delays for the iConn fault on AUC values andF1 scores, when using the MSPM approach was found to be less noticeable. Thiswas observed due to the manner in which detection limits were determined for theMSPM approach. Since detection limits for the MSPM approach were based on NOCtraining data, F1 scores for the MSPM approach were generally found to be lower thanF1 scores for the PD approach under all configurations. Furthermore, compared withF1 scores for the PD approach, not as large a difference between the F1 scores for theabrupt faults and the F1 score for the iConn fault was observed when using the MSPMapproach.
Comparing detection delays for the iConn fault, it can be seen that the PD approachperforms significantly worse than the MSPM approach. Note that these long detectiondelays can potentially be addressed using a smoothing technique as described inSection 6.2.1. However, one would have to justify implementation of such a techniqueagainst additional sample processing time — recall that it was previously noted thatour PD approach implementation is not yet suited to real-time fault detection becauseof high sample processing time.
In terms of sample processing time, the lightweight MSPM approach was foundto be orders of magnitude faster than the PD approach. While processing a sample,the PD approach generally performs more computations than the MSPM approach,therefore the orders of magnitude differences were expected for this comparison. Thekey question, however, is whether or not these additional computations can yield betterroot cause analysis.
6.3.2 Root cause analysis
Overall root cause analysis performance across the different configurations of thetwo-tank system is summarised in Table 6.13 for both the PD approach and MSPMapproach. In the table, three metrics are presented. The first metric describes thenumber of times the correct root cause was highlighted, on a relative contributionor component ALI plot, out of all faults tested under a given configuration. Thesecond metric applies only to cases were the root cause was correctly highlighted,and describes the average position of the root cause, when ranking component ALIor relative contribution from highest to lowest, on a component ALI plot or relativecontribution plot. Finally, the third metric describes the average number of spurious
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fault causes indicated on a component ALI plot or relative contribution plot. Note thatthese averages were applied for all faults under a given configuration.
Table 6.13: PD approach versus MSPM approach on two-tanks system: Root causeanalysis performance. Note all metrics represent average values for a suite of fourfaults.
Configuration sN N NC NCRMetric\Approach PD MSPM PD MSPM PD MSPM PD MSPMTimes root causes highlighted 3/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 3/4 4/4Average root cause position 1 1 1 1 1 1.3 1 1.8Average spurious causes 0.5 4.5 0.8 4.3 0.8 4.5 1.3 4.3
The first metric shows that the MSPM approach was able to highlight the correctroot cause on each relative contribution plot whereas the PD approach could notdo the same on each component ALI plot. This difference in results was causedby misdiagnosis of the iConn fault by the PD approach under the sN, N, and NCRconfigurations. As noted in Section 6.2.1 this was found to be an addressable issue andshould, therefore, be viewed as relatively minor — especially in light of the performanceof the PD approach for the other two metrics.
That being said, when the correct root cause was highlighted by the PD approach, itwas found to be the highest ranked fault cause on all component ALI plots. In contrast,ranking of the root cause on contribution plots shifted lower down for the P1s faultas configuration complexity increased, causing an observed increase in average rootcause position for the MSPM approach. Since the MSPM does not model effects ofregulatory control and recycle, it simply produces higher relative contribution for theobserved PVs which deviate the most from NOC. This leads to the MSPM approachhighlighting all fault symptoms as possible fault causes and makes identification ofthe actual root cause of fault conditions a difficult task.
Unsurprisingly, Table 6.13 notes a high number of spurious fault causes highlightedon relative contribution plots under each configuration. In fact, since six PVs wereobserved, these spurious fault causes make up to 72% of the observed PVs. Therefore,even if the MSPM approach highlights the correct root cause of fault conditionson a relative contribution plot, one would still have to identify the actual root causeamong a number of spurious fault causes. Accounting for this, it can be seenthat the PD approach provides significantly better root cause analysis performancedue it highlighting significantly lower numbers of spurious fault causes under allconfigurations.
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6.3.3 Remarks
This section showed that the PD approach provides competitive fault detectionperformance when compared with the MSPM approach. However, the PD approachperformed significantly worse than theMSPM approach in detection delay for the iConnfault as well as in terms of sample processing time. These areas can be addressedin future research to make fault detection performance of the PD approach morecompetitive with that of the MSPM approach. In particular, topics for future researchwith respect to improving diagnosis of the iConn fault are discussed in Section 6.2.6.On the other hand, reduction in sample processing time can be achieved through moreoptimal hyper-parameter selection (see Section 6.2.5) and through optimisation of theimplementation (see Section 6.5.1).
It was later seen in this section that the PD approach provided significantly betterisolation of root causes when compared with the MSPM approach. In particular, thiswas due to the observation that the PD approach generally produced better isolationof root causes. Furthermore, we highlight that the set of possible fault causes is notlimited to observed PVs as is the case with MSPM. Rather with the PD approach, theuser has more control over the set of possible fault causes as well as their granularity.For instance, one could specify multiple fault statuses for a pipe — which could includea blocked, burst, or punctured pipe.
Given the significant advantage that the PD approach has over the MSPM approachin terms of root cause isolation and control over the set of possible fault causes aswell as their granularity, this warrants further investigation of the PD approach. Thisis further supported by Reis and Gins (2017) who remark that the fault diagnosis fieldhas been saturated with good fault diagnosis strategies, and that current and futureefforts should be directed toward to improving root cause diagnosis. The sentimentof the authors in this regard is to minimise process downtime while improving safeprocess operation.
6.4 Scaling the PD approach up to the five-tanksystem
In previous sections, the PD approach was tested on the two-tank system where it wasfound to provide good fault detection and root cause analysis performance, thereforewarranting further investigation. Since the two-tank system is relatively small, testingthe PD approach on a larger system such as the five-tank system became a primaryfocus for further investigation.
In this section only one fault was investigated under different configurations ofthe five-tank system. This fault would manifest as an abrupt partial blockage betweenthe second and third tank and is similar to the aConn fault in the two-tank system.
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Different DBN models were once again used for the different configurations of thefive-tank system, and again all DBN models modelled the same set of processcomponents. The same approach as in Section 6.2 was used to model thesecomponents, i.e. all sensors plus the connecting pipe which could have faults.However, after encountering memory usage issues it was decided to not model thesensor F0 as a component.6 In total the DBN models for the five tank system featured212 (4096) possible operating mode which could produce 224 16,777,216 possibletransitions.
The significantly more complex DBN models would prove to be very challengingfor the PD approach. This affected both design and modelling of the DBN models aswell as their use in fault diagnosis. In this section, observations and issues with regardto scaling up the PD approach are highlighted and discussed. Simulation data is madeavailable in Appendix F.
6.4.1 Configuration N
The N configuration for the five-tank, in similar fashion to that for two-tank system,features only process and sensor noise, no regulatory control and no recycle. Underthis configuration the PD approach again produced excellent fault detection andreasonable root cause analysis results, as seen in Figure 6.3.
The spikes in ALI observed around 200 and 750 seconds were anomalies fromthe specific data set — repeated runs on alternative data did not exhibit such spikes. Inthis thesis, the CPD parameters for underlying PVs are determined from process data(see Section 3.4.3). Therefore if the process data does not sufficiently capture thevariance of observed PV values, then this may cause a rapid increase and subsequentdecrease in ALI over time to be observed due to an unexpected observation under NOC.Process data generated with a different random walk pattern and different seeds forsensor noise, yielded results with different or no spikes in ALI.
6Note that this, i.e. assuming that a component is extremely reliable, is a naïve solution to thisproblem. In Section 6.5.3 we remark on better solutions which may be explored in future research.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure 6.3: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration N five-tank system withaConn type fault between tanks 2 and 3 manifesting after 900 seconds.
The component ALI plot highlighted the correct root cause and positioned the rootcause higher than the other spurious fault cause in this case. However, it should be
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noted that the highlighted spurious fault cause is related to the root cause and would,in fact, be identified as a root cause when using a traditional MSPM approach.
6.4.2 Configuration NC
The NC configuration adds regulatory control to the N configuration. For the five-tanksystem, this control system consists of five control loops each controlling one tank’spressure by manipulating that tank’s outflow.
Unfortunately, the PD approach was unable to handle this configuration andwould unreasonably escalate ALI values to unity for NOC data. In Appendix F it can beseen that the differences in the NOC data between the N and NC configurations wereminimal. Despite this, the PD approach consistently reported high ALI values for NOCdata, even for the same data used to define CPD parameters. Noting that artefactswere also observed in the fault diagnosis results from the two-tank system underconfigurations NC and NCR, it was therefore suspected that there may be some issuepresent in our implementation of regulatory control in the DBN model. The issue couldnot be resolved for the five-tank system in this work.
It should also be noted that this issue was further tested using similar three-and four-tank systems, and they were found to exhibit same behaviour. For the three-and four-tank systems under the N configuration, fault diagnosis results were similarto that observed under the N configuration of the five-tank system. Likewise, for thethree- and four-tank systems under the NC configuration, ALI values would increase tounity for NOC data.
6.4.3 Configuration NR
The NR configuration adds recycle to the N configuration. Since regulatory control wasobserved to cause issues for the PD approach beyond two-tanks, it was elected to testthe approach on a configuration with just process noise, sensor noise, and recycle,rather than NCR.
Despite abysmal performance of the PD approach for the NC configuration, thePD approach produced excellent fault detection and reasonable root cause analysisresults, as shown in Figure 6.4, for the NR configuration. Once again, spikes in the ALIvalues were observed for the same reasons as previously conjectured in Section 6.4.1.Once again, using different process data with a different random walk pattern anddifferent seeds for sensor noise, yielded results with different or no spikes in ALI. Rootcause analysis results also highlighted the same two fault causes as was seen underthe N configuration.
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Figure 6.4: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NR five-tank systemwithaConn type fault between tanks 2 and 3 manifesting after 900 seconds.
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6.4.4 Remarks
Scaling the PD approach up to five-tanks was computationally intensive as sampleprocessing times averaged above 160 seconds. Nonetheless, the PD approach wascapable of detecting and diagnosing the fault in both the N and NR configurations forthe five-tank system. The similarities between the fault diagnosis results observedin the N and NR configurations strengthen the impression that the PD approach iscapable of handling recycle and hence cyclic structures in processes. Furthermore, thefailure of the PD approach to correctly classify NOC data as normal process behaviourin the NC configuration strengthens the impression that there are issues with ourimplementation of regulatory control in DBN models.
DBN design and modelling was found to be a difficult task throughout this research.This task can certainly be improved with future research by, for example, investigatingdifferent approaches to learning CPD parameters from data given the structure of aDBN, or learning the entire DBN model from data.
6.5 PD approach: Caveats, limitations, andfuture research
This chapter showed that the PD approach can capably handle fault diagnosis on thetwo-tank system. For this system, fault detection performance is competitive with theMSPM approach, albeit with a longer detection delay for the incipient fault and longersample processing times. Scalability of the PD approach on the other hand, revealedthat our implementation was unable to deal with regulatory control on systemsfeaturing more than two-tanks. Nonetheless configurations without regulatory control,but including recycle, were capably handled by the PD approach.
These observations suggest that despite issues encountered with the PD approach,it performs well enough to warrant further investigation and future research. Theintention of this section is to highlight avoidable pitfalls and as well as some aspects ofthe PD approach that could benefit most from further research. Therefore, this sectionfocuses on important caveats, limitations, and some directions for future researchwith respect to the PD approach.
6.5.1 Profiling: Bottlenecks and potential speed-ups
Software profiling monitors the real-time execution of code and highlights thefunctions and lines of code which could benefit most from improvement, i.e. in termsof computational time and memory usage. This subsection discusses the results ofprofiling the PD approach in order to determine aspects of our implementation thatneed to be improved for the benefit of reducing sample processing time.
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The sN configuration of the two-tank system was tested for profiling.7 900 datasamples were generated with the aConn fault occurring after 600 seconds. The PDapproach maintained the same DBN model as was used in Section 6.2.1. However,hyper-parameters were changed to PrT = 1 − 1e−12, Tmax = 10000, c = 1, and
K = 5 in light of the results observed in Section 6.2.5.
The profiler noted a time of 2 hours and 21 minutes to complete inference forall 900 samples, corresponding to 7.81 seconds per sample. Recalling that the sensorsampling rate was specified to be 1Hz, this sample processing time is inadequate forreal-time fault diagnosis. Analysing the profiling results, however, it was found thatmost of the processing time is spent in one function and its children.
During inference for one time slice, this function (i.e. generate_gaussians)generates one Gaussian probability distribution for each transition, which had beenmarked for enumeration, using the DBN model. The profiler noted that 96.1% of theprofiling time was spent on this function and its children. In particular, most of thistime was spent on one child function in two separate function calls. This function, i.e.
enter_evidence8, computes a JPD for the DBN and was found to use 97.6% ofthe computational time used by generate_gaussians.
Naturally, since such a large portion of computational time was spent on thisfunction and its children, reducing the time required by generate_gaussiansand enter_evidence could massively reduce sample processing time.9 Therest of this section discusses two approaches that can be used in future research toaccomplishing this.
First, we discuss the requirement for computing a JPD twice in the same function.Given a transition to enumerate, the first computation uses the joint to determinethe likelihood of observations (i.e. part of the normalising constant), and the secondcomputation determines the probability distribution over the unobserved PVs at timeslice t + 1 given those observations. Naturally, one would want to obtain both ofthese items by only computing a JPD once. However, the BNT used does not directlyallow one to obtain the likelihood of the observations, hence this work-aroundwas used.
Second, generating a Gaussian for each transition simply involves conditioningthe DBN to only consider the set of particular component statuses specified by thattransition. For example, the normal to normal transition requires that a probabilitydistribution over the PVs be generated where all components are in, and maintain,the normal status. Considering this, it may be possible to generate these probability
7Note that only the computations of the inference engine were profiled.8Note that the enter_evidence function is part of the BNT by Murphy (2002).9It should also be noted that significant speed-ups may also be achieved through implementation ina different programming language — for example C++ which, per private communication with Prof. J.A.du Preez at Stellenbosch University, may be a factor of ten times faster compared to MATLAB® .
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 144
distributions in parallel rather than sequentially.
6.5.2 DBN modelling and learning from data
DBN modelling may be the most important aspect of the PD approach. Whenapproximating a belief state for a process, the PD approach relies heavily on thepredictions of process behaviour given a DBN model in order to explain processobservations. Therefore, if predictions of process behaviour receive little support fromprocess observations the PD approachmay be unable to recover and thus misdiagnoseprocess behaviour — similar to being stuck in a valley in optimisation problems.
Throughout the development of the PD approach for the two- and five-tank systems itwas found that most anomalous results were caused by DBNmodelling issues. For thisthesis, DBN models were specified manually. This meant that human error would be apotential factor in the DBNmodelling stage. Therefore, during the development processwhen the PD approach would report anomalous results, this would often be resolvedby analysing the DBN model. Throughout this process better solutions to managepotential issues were also discovered, as highlighted in Section 5.3.3. However, theissues causing long detection delay for incipient faults and anomalous results for largersystems with regulatory control could not be resolved in the available time. It is hopedthat alternative DBNmodelling approachesmay yield better performance in this regard.
One such approach may be to learn DBN models from historical process data.Although it is outside the scope of this research to investigate this, it should be notedthat Koller and Friedman (2009) describe a number of approaches to learning differentaspects of a DBN model. Of particular interest is that of learning CPD parametersgiven the structure of a DBN model. Adding this to the PD approach could allow a userto specify the structure of a DBN model from existing process knowledge, and thenlearn the parameters of CPDs from historical process data — at the very least underNOC. This may reduce modelling requirements for the PD approach as well as limit theextent to which human error may result in the specification of inadequate DBN models.Therefore, this should be investigated in future research.
Another topic of interest with respect to DBN modelling, is the incorporation ofnodes to diagnose the manifestation of novel faults. An important limitation of thePD approach in this thesis is that it can only diagnose faults for a defined set ofcomponents. This means that if the PD approach is able to detect the manifestation ofnovel faults, its root cause analysis will be severely limited by the set of user-definedcomponents. Therefore, a way to attribute the cause of fault conditions to a novelcomponent should be investigated in future research.
It may then be possible to combine the two aforementioned topics for learningfault behaviour, and then add the learned fault behaviour to the DBN model. This could
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facilitate learning the rest of a DBN model from the structure of that DBN model underNOC and historical process data containing labelled faults.
6.5.3 Scalability to larger processes
It is important to note that computational memory requirements and sampleprocessing time are dependent on the number of operational modes (i.e. total numberof combinations of component statuses). This is problematic for large processeswhichhave many components to model. Consider the Tennessee Eastman process (Ricker,1996) for which 21 faults are modelled. Without modelling any other possible faultsin a DBN model for the PD approach, this process features a total of 221 operationalmodes. This means that a total of 242 transitions could be enumerated from eachapproximate belief state. Even with the transition enumeration enhancement, scalingup to processes as large as this seems impractical — especially when consideringmemory requirements. In this case, just to store the probability of each transition in adouble precision array, MATLAB® would require approximately 36 TB of RAM.
A possible approach to tackling to this problem may be to use a two-stage DBN-basedPD approach. In particular, design the approach such that the first stage isolatesthe cause of detected fault conditions to a subsystem, then the second stage couldperform a more detailed root cause analysis within that subsystem. This approachwould allow for streamlined DBN models in the first stage, as the PD approach wouldonly have to determine the subsystem causing abnormal process behaviour. Thisshould also benefit sample processing time under NOC due to significantly lesstransitions needing to be processed when compared with the current PD approach.Subsequently, once a fault is detected the second stage could run in parallel with thefirst stage, offering more detailed root cause analysis while the rest of the process ismonitored continuously.
There also exists potential to combine such an approach with the ideas provided in theprevious section. Doing this could create a highly adaptable fault diagnosis approachwith excellent root cause analysis abilities.
As an alternative, one could exploit these root cause analysis abilities of the PDapproach and use it as a dedicated tool for root cause analysis. Doing this wouldinvolve using a faster fault detection approach, such as MSPM, and then using the PDapproach only to isolate fault causes once a fault is detected.
6.5.4 Implementation of variational inference methods
At the end of Chapter 3 (page 85) we mentioned that the inference engine used in thePD approach may benefit from more advanced probabilistic methods. In particular,we highlighted that the use of a variational inference method such as expectation
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propagation (EP) may greatly reduce computational requirements. EP attempts toapproximate a complex, intractable probability distribution p by a simple, tractable one
q using an iterative method which minimises the Kullback-Leibler divergence from pto q (Minka, 2001). In our case, p is the exact belief about the process state and qis our approximate belief about the process state. Using this approach q can still berepresented as a hybrid mixture of Gaussians and thus the same fault detection androot cause analysis methods described in Section 3.2.3 may be applied to q.
Some potential advantages of using EP for inference include:
1. Avoiding back and forth conversion between moment and canonical forms, thusavoiding the cause of numerical issues described in Section 5.3.3.
2. Integration of the process model DBN and belief network BN in a singleprobabilistic graphical model such as a cluster graph which can facilitatemessage passing techniques (Koller and Friedman, 2009).
3. The ability to extend upon a cluster graph implementation which would allowfor easier and less computationally expensive implementation of smoothingtechniques. Thismay resolve the issues had with the diagnosis of incipient faultsas previously mentioned.
4. Each cluster may also be used to represent the approximate belief about anindividual subsystem’s state. This can allow for more advanced subsystemdecomposition which may further reduce computational requirements for the PDapproach.
It is therefore recommended that future research also consider the use of advancedprobabilistic methods to further improve upon the inference engine presented in 3.
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Conclusion
Problem statement In efforts to reduce the impact of human error on theoperation of chemical and mineral processing plants, reliable process monitoringsolutions attempt to assist plant operators and engineers to detect and diagnoseprocess faults before significant loss is incurred. An existing solution, the traditionalMSPM approach, is able to reliably detect abnormal process behaviour, but strugglesto unambiguously identify the root cause of the abnormal behaviour. It was identifiedthat this is caused by a lack of incorporation of existing process knowledge into theframework of the MSPM approach.
Proposed solution and implementation It was proposed to investigate adifferent fault diagnosis approach which directly incorporates process knowledge intoits framework. Lerner et al. (2000) and Lerner (2002) present such an approach, usingprobabilistic methods to infer process behaviour given a particular process model.This model is in the form of a DBN, and would contain various models which eachdescribe particular process behaviour given information about the operational statusof various process components. In particular, these DBN models were able to describenormal process behaviour in addition to highly specific abnormal process behaviourcaused by, for instance, a sensor fault or a blocked pipe. Using optimised methods, theauthors could then use a DBN model to make predictions about process behaviour andinfer, given observation of actual process behaviour, which combination of componentstatuses best describe that observation. Therefore, solving the fault diagnosis problemcould be reduced to performing inference in a DBN using this approach.
A PD approach based on Lerner et al. (2000) and Lerner (2002) was thereforeimplemented and investigated in this thesis. A survey of recent DBN-based PDapproaches was also performed, and it was determined that relatively little researchhad been done on the topic. Furthermore, published results presenting fault diagnosisperformance for DBN-based PD approaches were typically found to not be useful formeaningful comparison with a traditional MSPM approach. In this regard, this thesisaimed to investigate the usefulness of the PD approach in comparison to the MSPMapproach, while providing useful fault diagnosis performance metrics to facilitate
147
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comparison with other fault diagnosis approaches.
The PD approach tested in this research also extended upon Lerner et al. (2000)and Lerner (2002) by including models for regulatory control systems and recyclestreams inspired by Yu and Rashid (2013). Additionally, from the same paper, theconcept of abnormality likelihood index (ALI) was implemented in the PD approach.This enabled the PD approach to function more similarly to the MSPM approach,facilitating direct comparison.
Findings Both fault diagnosis approaches were tested on a simple two-tanksystem case study. The case study featured multiple different configurations ofvarying levels of complexity, namely: (sN) sensor noise only, no control, no recycle;(N) process and sensor noise, no control, no recycle; (NC) process and sensor noise,control, no recycle; and (NCR) process and sensor noise, control, and recycle. Fourfaults were tested under each configuration, namely two structural faults (one abruptand the other incipient) and two sensor bias faults (one for each tank pressure sensor).
It was found that the PD approach could provide competitive fault detectioncompared to the MSPM approach. However, longer detection delay for the incipientfault under all configurations as well as multiple orders of magnitude slower sampleprocessing time compared to the MSPM approach would count against the faultdetection performance of the PD approach. On the other hand, it was found that thePD approach was performed better at isolating root causes when compared withthe MSPM approach. Generally, the PD approach was able to better isolate the rootcause for each fault even under more complex configurations. In contrast, the MSPMapproach struggled to isolate the root cause for each fault, with root cause analysisgetting worse under more complex configurations. We also note that the PD approachprovides more control over the set of possible fault causes than MSPM does — thiswould allow one to identify specific root causes instead of only closely related faultsymptoms.
These findings motivated further investigation of the PD approach in respect toscaling up to larger processes. The PD approach was thus tested on a five-tanksystem case study. This case study also featured different configurations of varyingcomplexity, namely N, NC, and NR (N plus recycle) configurations. Only one abruptstructural fault was tested under each configuration.
It was found that the PD approach could capably detect and diagnose the faultunder the N and NR configurations. Under the NC configuration, on the other hand, thePD approach could not discriminate between normal and abnormal process behaviour,incorrectly classifying NOC data as abnormal process behaviour. We conjecture thatthe cause for this is related to the modelling approach used for regulatory controlin the DBN model. Because of this, the PD approach would poorly predict process
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 149
behaviour under normal operation, this prediction would then not be supported byobservations which would then force the PD approach to infer abnormal processbehaviour. Unfortunately, the issue could not be resolved in this thesis.
Recommendations In conclusion, we believe that the PD approach warrantsfurther research, especially in the directions of reducing sample processing time,improving diagnosis of incipient faults, and improving our implementation of regulatorycontrol in DBN models. Future research may then focus on lowering modellingrequirements of the PD approach as well as improving its scalability to larger processes.In particular, DBN modelling could benefit from learning CPD parameters as well asfault models from historical process data. Furthermore, splitting the PD approachinto two separate stages, one for fault detection and the other for root causeanalysis, may improve scalability by reducing sample processing time for real-time faultdetection while providing powerful root cause analysis abilities. Alternatively, usingmore advanced probabilistic methods in variational inference, such as expectationpropagation, may produce a more robust and scalable inference engine.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Bibliography
Aldrich, C. and Auret, L. (2013). Unsupervised Process Monitoring and Fault Diagnosiswith Machine Learning Methods, vol. 48 of Advances in Computer Vision and PatternRecognition. Springer, London. ISBN 9781447151845.
Askarian, M., Zarghami, R., Jalali-Farahani, F. andMostoufi, N. (2016). Fault diagnosis ofchemical processes considering fault frequency via Bayesian network. The CanadianJournal of Chemical Engineering, vol. 94, no. 12, pp. 2315–2325. ISSN 00084034.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cjce.22603
Atoui, M.A., Verron, S. and Kobi, A. (2015). Fault detection and diagnosis in a Bayesiannetwork classifier incorporating probabilistic boundary. International Federation ofAutomatic Control (IFAC)-PapersOnLine, vol. 48, no. 21, pp. 670–675. ISSN 24058963.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2015.09.604
Barber, D. (2011). Bayesian Reasoning and Machine Learning. Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge. ISBN 9780511804779.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804779
Bullemer, P.T. and Reising, D.V.C. (2015). Managing Human Reliability: An AbnormalSituation Management Historical Perspective. In: Mary Kay O’Connor Process SafetyCenter 2015 International Symposium. Abnormal Situation Management Consortium,College Station, TX.
Chen, J. and Patton, R.J. (1999). Robust Model-Based Fault Diagnosis for DynamicSystems, vol. 3 of The International Series on Asian Studies in Computer andInformation Science. Springer, Boston, MA. ISBN 9781461373445.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5149-2
Cover, T.M. and Thomas, J.A. (2005). Elements of Information Theory. 2nd edn. JohnWiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA. ISBN 9780471748823.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/047174882X
Dai, Y., Wang, H., Khan, F. and Zhao, J. (2016). Abnormal situation management forsmart chemical process operation. Current Opinion in Chemical Engineering, vol. 14,pp. 49–55. ISSN 22113398.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.coche.2016.07.009
150
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
BIBLIOGRAPHY 151
De Keyser, V. and Leonova, A.B. (2001). Error Prevention and Well-Being at Work inWestern Europe and Russia. Springer, Dordrecht, Netherlands. ISBN 9780792371007.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0784-9
Dey, S. and Stori, J. (2005). A Bayesian network approach to root cause diagnosis ofprocess variations. International Journal of Machine Tools and Manufacture, vol. 45,no. 1, pp. 75–91. ISSN 08906955.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijmachtools.2004.06.018
Dong, D. and McAvoy, T. (1996). Nonlinear principal component analysis — Based onprincipal curves and neural networks. Computers & Chemical Engineering, vol. 20,no. 1, pp. 65–78. ISSN 00981354.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0098-1354(95)00003-K
Downs, J. and Vogel, E. (1993). A plant-wide industrial process control problem.Computers & Chemical Engineering, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 245–255. ISSN 00981354.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0098-1354(93)80018-I
Dynkin, E.B. (1965). Markov processes. In: Markov Processes, vol. 121/122 of DieGrundlehren der Mathematischen Wissenschaften, chap. 3, pp. 77–104. Springer,Berlin, Heidelberg. ISBN 9783662000335.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-00031-1_4
Eaton, M.L. (1983). Multivariate Statistics: A vector space approach. John Wiley & Sons,New York. ISBN 0471027766.
Fawcett, T. (2006). An introduction to ROC analysis. Pattern Recognition Letters, vol. 27,no. 8, pp. 861–874. ISSN 01678655.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2005.10.010
Gertler, J. (1988). Fault Detection and Diagnosis in Engineering Systems. Marcel Dekker,New York. ISBN 9780824794279.
Hartikainen, J., Solin, A. and Särkkä, S. (2011). Optimal filtering with Kalman filtersand smoothers. Version 1.4. Toolbox for MATLAB®, Department of BiomedicalEngineering and Computational Sciences, Aalto University School of Science, GreaterHelsinki, Finland.
He, S., Wang, Z., Wang, Z., Gu, X. and Yan, Z. (2016). Fault detection and diagnosis ofchiller using Bayesian network classifier with probabilistic boundary. Applied ThermalEngineering, vol. 107, pp. 37–47. ISSN 13594311.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.applthermaleng.2016.06.153
Higham, N.J. (1988). Computing a Nearest Symmetric Positive Semi-definite Matrix.Linear Algebra and its Applications, vol. 103, pp. 103–118. ISSN 00243795.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0024-3795(88)90223-6
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
BIBLIOGRAPHY 152
Himmelblau, D. (1978). Fault Detection and Diagnosis in Chemical and PetrochemicalProcesses. Elsevier, Amsterdam; New York. ISBN 9780444417473.
Isermann, R. (1984). Process fault detection based on modeling and estimationmethods — A survey. Automatica, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 387–404. ISSN 00051098.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-1098(84)90098-0
Isermann, R. (2006). Fault-Diagnosis Systems: An Introduction from Fault Detection toFault Tolerance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. ISBN 9783540241126.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-30368-5
Jolliffe, I. (1986). Principal Component Analysis. Springer Series in Statistics. Springer,New York, NY. ISBN 9781475719062.
Julier, S. and Uhlmann, J. (2004). Unscented filtering and nonlinear estimation. In:Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 92, pp. 401–422. Institute of Electrical and ElectronicsEngineers (IEEE). ISSN 00189219.
Kaushik, P. and Khanduja, D. (2009). Application of Six Sigma DMAIC methodology inthermal power plants: A case study. Total QualityManagement & Business Excellence,vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 197–207. ISSN 1478-3363.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14783360802622995
Kelly, B. and Lees, F. (1986). The propagation of faults in process plants: 1. Modellingof fault propagation. Reliability Engineering, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 3–38. ISSN 01438174.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0143-8174(86)90070-3
Koller, D. and Friedman, N. (2009). Probabilistic Graphical Models: Principles andtechniques. Adaptive Computation and Machine Learning. MIT Press, Cambridge,MA. ISBN 9780262259842.
Koller, D. and Lerner, U.N. (2001). Sampling in Factored Dynamic Systems. In: SequentialMonte CarloMethods in Practice, chap. 21, pp. 445–464. Springer, NewYork, NY. ISBN9781475734379.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3437-9_21
Kourti, T. andMacGregor, J.F. (1995). Process analysis, monitoring and diagnosis, usingmultivariate projection methods. Chemometrics and Intelligent Laboratory Systems,vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 3–21. ISSN 01697439.
Kullback, S. and Leibler, R.A. (1951). On Information and Sufficiency. The Annals ofMathematical Statistics, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 79–86. ISSN 00034851.
Lauritzen, S. (1996). Models for Mixed Data. In: Graphical Models, vol. 17 of OxfordStatistical Science Series, chap. 6, pp. 158–163. Oxford University Press, New York,NY. ISBN 9780191591228.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
BIBLIOGRAPHY 153
Lawler, G.F. and Limic, V. (2010). Random Walk: A Modern Introduction, vol. 123of Cambridge Studies in Advanced Mathematics. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge. ISBN 9780511750854.
Lees, F. (2012). Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard identification,assessment and control. 4th edn. Elsevier, Burlington, MA. ISBN 9780123971890.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/C2009-0-24104-3
Leopold, T.A., Ratcheva, V. and Zahidi, S. (2016). The Future of Jobs: Employment, skillsand workforce strategy for the fourth industrial revolution. World Economic Forum,Geneva, Switzerland.Available at: http://reports.weforum.org/future-of-jobs-2016/
Lerner, U.N. (2002). Hybrid Bayesian networks for reasoning about complex systems.PhD thesis, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305, USA.
Lerner, U.N., Parr, R., Koller, D. and Biswas, G. (2000). Bayesian fault detectionand diagnosis in dynamic systems. In: 32nd Conference on Artificial Intelligence(AAAI-00), pp. 531–537. American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Austin,TX.
Li, X., McKee, D., Horberry, T. and Powell, M. (2011). The control room operator: Theforgotten element in mineral process control. Minerals Engineering, vol. 24, no. 8, pp.894–902. ISSN 08926875.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mineng.2011.04.001
Lindner, B.S. and Auret, L. (2015). Application of data-based process topologyand feature extraction for fault diagnosis of an industrial platinum groupmetals concentrator plant. International Federation of Automatic Control(IFAC)-PapersOnLine, vol. 48, no. 17, pp. 102–107. ISSN 24058963.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2015.10.086
Marlin, T. (2000). Process Control: Designing processes and control systems for dynamicperformance. 2nd edn. McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA. ISBN 9780070393622.
Maurya, R.M., Rengaswamy, R. and Venkatasubramanian, V. (2004). Application ofsigned digraphs-based analysis for fault diagnosis of chemical process flowsheets.Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 501–518. ISSN09521976.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.engappai.2004.03.007
Miller, R.G. (1981). Simultaneous Statistical Inference. Springer Series in Statistics.Springer New York, New York, NY. ISBN 9781461381242.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-8122-8
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
BIBLIOGRAPHY 154
Minka, T. (2001). Expectation Propagation for approximate Bayesian inference. In:Breese, J.S. and Koller, D. (eds.), UAI ’01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference inUncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 362–369. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc.,San Francisco, CA.
Miskin, J.J. (2016). Control performance assessment for a high pressure leachingprocess by means of fault database creation and simulation. Masters Thesis,Department of Process Engineering, Stellenbosch University.
Murphy, K.P. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, inference andlearning. PhD Thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California,Berkeley.
Patton, R.J. and Chen, J. (1997). Observer-based fault detection and isolation:Robustness and applications. Control Engineering Practice, vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 671–682.ISSN 09670661.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0967-0661(97)00049-X
Pearl, J. (1985). Bayesian networks: a model of self-activated memory for evidentialreasoning. In: 7th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pp. 329–334.Cognitive Science Society, Irvine, CA.
Perry, R.H. and Green, D.W. (2007). Perry’s Chemical Engineers’ Handbook. 8th edn.McGraw-Hill. ISBN 9780071422949.
Pickering, K.D., Wines, K.R., Pariani, G.M., Franks, L.A., Yeh, J., Campbell, M.L., Finger,B.W., Verostko, C.E., Carrier, C., Gandhi, J.C. and Vega, L.M. (2001). Early resultsof an integrated water recovery system test. In: 31st International Conference OnEnvironmental Systems. SAE International, Orlando, FL.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4271/2001-01-2210
Powers, D. (2011). Evaluation: From precision, recall and F-measure to ROC,informedness, markedness and correlation. Journal of Machine LearningTechnologies, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 37–43. ISSN 22293981.
Reis, M. and Gins, G. (2017). Industrial Process Monitoring in the Big Data/Industry 4.0Era: from Detection, to Diagnosis, to Prognosis. Processes, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 35. ISSN22279717.
Rich, S.H. and Venkatasubramanian, V. (1987). Model-based reasoning in diagnosticexpert systems for chemical process plants. Computers & Chemical Engineering,vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 111–122. ISSN 00981354.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0098-1354(87)80012-1
Ricker, N.L. (1996). Decentralized control of the Tennessee Eastman challenge process.Journal of Process Control, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 205–221. ISSN 09591524.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0959-1524(96)00031-5
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
BIBLIOGRAPHY 155
Roychoudhury, I., Biswas, G. and Koutsoukos, X. (2006). A Bayesian approach toefficient diagnosis of incipient faults. In: 17th InternationalWorkshop on the Principlesof Diagnosis (DX-06), pp. 243–250. Peñaranda de Duero, Burgos.
Roychoudhury, I., Biswas, G. and Koutsoukos, X. (2008). Comprehensive diagnosis ofcontinuous systems using dynamic Bayes nets. In: 19th International Workshop onthe Principles of Diagnosis (DX-08). Blue Mountains, Sydney.
Roychoudhury, I., Biswas, G. and Koutsoukos, X. (2009). Distributed diagnosis ofdynamic systems using dynamic Bayesian networks. In: 20th International Workshopon the Principles of Diagnosis (DX-09), pp. 329–336. Stockholm.
Roychoudhury, I., Biswas, G. and Koutsoukos, X. (2010). Distributed diagnosis inuncertain environments using dynamic Bayesian networks. In: 18th MediterraneanConference onControl and Automation (MED’10), pp. 1531–1536. Institute of Electricaland Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Marrakech, Morocco.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MED.2010.5547832
Sheridan, T.B. (1981). Understanding Human Error and Aiding Human DiagnosticBehaviour in Nuclear Power Plants. In: Human Detection and Diagnosis of SystemFailures, pp. 19–35. Springer, Boston, MA. ISBN 9781461592303.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-9230-3_3
Thulasiraman, K. and Swamy, M.N.S. (1992). Directed Graphs. In: Graphs: Theory andAlgorithms, chap. 5, pp. 97–125. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA. ISBN9781118033104.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118033104
Venkatasubramanian, V., Rengaswamy, R. and Kavuri, S.N. (2003a). A review of processfault detection and diagnosis — Part II: Qualitative models and search strategies.Computers & Chemical Engineering, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 313–326. ISSN 00981354.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0098-1354(02)00161-8
Venkatasubramanian, V., Rengaswamy, R., Kavuri, S.N. and Yin, K. (2003b). A review ofprocess fault detection and diagnosis — Part I: Quantitative model-based methods.Computers & Chemical Engineering, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 293–311. ISSN 00981354.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0098-1354(02)00160-6
Venkatasubramanian, V., Rengaswamy, R., Kavuri, S.N. and Yin, K. (2003c). A reviewof process fault detection and diagnosis — Part III: Process history based methods.Computers & Chemical Engineering, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 327–346. ISSN 00981354.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0098-1354(02)00162-X
Verbert, K., Babuška, R. and De Schutter, B. (2017). Bayesian and Dempster-Shaferreasoning for knowledge-based fault diagnosis — A comparative study. EngineeringApplications of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 60, pp. 136–150. ISSN 09521976.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.engappai.2017.01.011
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
BIBLIOGRAPHY 156
Verron, S., Li, J. and Tiplica, T. (2010). Fault detection and isolation of faults in amultivariate process with Bayesian network. Journal of Process Control, vol. 20, no. 8,pp. 902–911. ISSN 09591524.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jprocont.2010.06.001
Wakefield, B., Lindner, B., McCoy, J. and Auret, L. (2018). Monitoring of a simulatedmilling circuit: Fault diagnosis and economic impact. Minerals Engineering, vol. 120,pp. 132–151. ISSN 08926875.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mineng.2018.02.007
Wasserman, L. (2004). All of Statistics: A concise course in statistical inference.Springer Texts in Statistics. Springer, New York, NY. ISBN 9781441923226.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-21736-9
Willsky, A.S. (1976). A survey of design methods for failure detection in dynamicsystems. Automatica, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 601–611. ISSN 00051098.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-1098(76)90041-8
Yoshikawa, H. and Zhang, Z. (2014). Progress of Nuclear Safety for Symbiosis andSustainability. Springer, Tokyo, Japan. ISBN 9784431546092.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54610-8
Yu, J. and Rashid, M.M. (2013). A novel dynamic Bayesian network-based networkedprocess monitoring approach for fault detection, propagation identification, and rootcause diagnosis. American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) Journal, vol. 59,no. 7, pp. 2348–2365. ISSN 00011541.
Zhang, Z. and Dong, F. (2014). Fault detection and diagnosis for missing data systemswith a three time-slice dynamic Bayesian network approach. Chemometrics andIntelligent Laboratory Systems, vol. 138, pp. 30–40. ISSN 01697439.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chemolab.2014.07.009
Zhao, Y., Xiao, F. andWang, S. (2013). An intelligent chiller fault detection and diagnosismethodology using Bayesian belief network. Energy and Buildings, vol. 57, pp.278–288. ISSN 03787788.Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2012.11.007
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Appendix A
Probabilistic Fault Diagnosis: Drainingliquid level example
This demonstration considers a single component fault in a simple system and aimsto showcase the inner workings of our DBN-based PD approach.
Consider the simple scenario in which a single tank is filled with water up to50% of its maximum capacity and drained at a rate directly proportional to the currentlevel in the tank. A level sensor measures current level of water in the tank and hasa tendency to report noisy and/or inaccurate measurements of the actual level ofwater in the tank. This system was first introduced on page 46, but its schematic isreplicated below for ease of reference.
L
Lm
Replicate of Figure 3.1: Schematic for draining liquid level example. L is the actual levelof liquid in the tank and Lm is its measured value.
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A.1 Start up and one time slice inference
Data collectionThe data for the one tank systemwas generated synthetically based on the assumptionthat the liquid level in the tank decreases by 0.1L after each time slice. The sensoraccurately measures the actual liquid level with a fair amount of noise up to time slice3, after which it malfunctions and reads the last measured value for every subsequenttime slice. Table A.1 shows the data used in this example.
Table A.1: Process data for the draining liquid level example.
Time Slice 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8Actual 0.5 0.45 0.4050 0.3645 0.3281 0.2952 0.2657 0.2391 0.2152Measured 0.46 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
It is also assumed that the sensor has a known variance of 0.001 when functioningnormally and 0.03 when faulty.
DBN modellingThe structure of the DBN for this system was previously described and shown on page47 and is replicated below for ease of reference.
L
(t)
m
L(t)
S
(t)
L
L
(t+1)
m
L(t+1)
S
(t+1)
L
Replicate of Figure 3.2: 2-TBN for draining liquid level example. L is the actual level ofliquid in the tank and Lm is its measured value and SL is the status of the sensor.
The DBN is initialised with the following CPDs:
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Table A.2: CPDs for draining liquid level example DBN in Figure 3.2.
S
(0)
L Pr
(
S
(0)
L
)
normal 0.9faulty 0.1
Pr
(
L(0)
)
= N (µL = 0.5, σ2L = 1e−4)
Pr
(
L
(t)
m |L(t), S(t)L = normal
)
= N
(
µLm = L
(t), σ2Lm = 0.001 + σ
2
L(t)
)
Pr
(
L
(t)
m |L(t), S(t)L = faulty
)
= N
(
µLm = L
(t), σ2Lm = 0.03 + σ
2
L(t)
)
S
(t)
L S
(t+1)
L Pr
(
S
(t+1)
L |S(t)L
)
normal normal 0.8faulty normal 0.1normal faulty 0.2faulty faulty 0.9
Pr
(
L(t+1)|L(t)
)
= N
(
µL = 0.9L
(t), σ2L = 1e−6 + 0.9× σ2L(t) × 0.9
)
Initial hypothesisApproximate belief states are used to track process behaviour over time. The initialbelief state typically consists of a single hypothesis describing part or all of the initialprocess state probability distributions. This includes a single multivariate Gaussianover all unobserved PVs and a discrete probability table over all process componentstatuses. The initial hypothesis can be obtained from the initial BN, B0, i.e. the JPDover all RVs in time slice 0. In this example the initial hypothesis contains a Gaussianover L and a discrete probability table over SL. Recall that Lm is an observed RV andtherefore is not part of the belief state or Q.
One time slice inferenceSince the initial hypothesis represents the belief state at time slice 0, the time slice 0to 1 transitions can be computed from the initial hypothesis. This involves propagatingthe hypothesis through the 2-TBN to create a set of possible process behavioursdepending on the transition of process component statuses from one time slice to thenext. The transitions differently affect expected probability distributions for observedRVs at time slice 1 and therefore the transitions have different probabilities for beingcorrect given their prior probability and observations of the process at time slice 1.Furthermore, the transitions also differently affect expected probability distributionsfor the unobserved RVs at time slice 1. Given observations of the process at timeslice 1, these distributions describe different beliefs about the distributions of theunobserved RVs in the process at time slice 1. In order to determine which transitionsshould be combined with one another, the posterior probability distributions for theunobserved RVs at time slice 1 are compared for similarity according to Algorithm1 on page 59. Upon finishing the inference procedure, each subset of transitions is
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combined into a separate hypothesis and stored in the time slice 1 belief network.
Each of these steps are further detailed below in the context of the drainingliquid level case study. Parameters for Algorithm 1 are set to c = 0.005 and K = 2and no inference engine enhancements are applied. Also note that no discrete RVs areobserved in this example and therefore X∆ and Q∆ can be used interchangeably, butfor the sake of clarity and conciseness discrete RVs are referred to by X∆ here.
Computing Pr(X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ ):
SL is the only discrete RV in this case study and is also not observed. Since SL hastwo possible assignments, there will be a total of four transitions to compute from onetime slice to the next. First the JPD over the discrete RVs in time slice t and t + 1 iscomputed by way of
Pr
(
S
(t)
L , S
(t+1)
L
)
= Pr
(
S
(t+1)
L |S(t)L
)
× Pr
(
S
(t)
L
)
. (A.1)
From t = 0 to t = 1 this produces the probability distribution:
S
(0)
L S
(1)
L Pr
(
S
(0)
L , S
(1)
L
)
normal normal 0.8× 0.9 = 0.72faulty normal 0.1× 0.1 = 0.01normal faulty 0.2× 0.9 = 0.18faulty faulty 0.9× 0.1 = 0.09
Computing Pr(O(t+1)Γ = o(t+1)Γ |X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ ):Next the expected probability distribution for the observed RVs, i.e. Lm, in time slice 1needs to be determined. Since the RVs in time slice t would be marginalised anyway,calculations show direct computation of the Gaussians over the RVs in time slice t+ 1rather than the JPD and its marginal. This will not affect the results, but makes theexplanation more concise and easier to follow.
Recall that L(t+1) is only dependent on L(t) and L(t+1)m is only dependent on
{S(t+1)L , L(t+1)}. Therefore, it is better to first compute Pr
(
L(1)
) and use it to later
determine Pr(L(1), L(1)m |S(1)L ). This first part is done by propagating Pr(L(0))through the 2-TBN and marginalising it out of the resulting JPD over L(0) and L(1), i.e.according to Equation 2.40:
Pr
(
L(1)
): µL = β0 + βTµ σ2L = σ20 + βTΣβ
= 0 + (0.9)(0.5) = 1e−6 + (0.9)(1e−4)(0.9)
= 0.45 = 0.000082
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The same Equation 2.40 can be used to determine Pr(L(1)m |S(1)L ), the expectedprobability distribution for the observed RVs given various process operating modes.
In this case the JPD over L(1) and L(1)m is computed from Pr(L(1)) and the BN (i.e.
CPD of L(1)m ), then L(1) is marginalised out from that JPD. Note that there are twoJPDs because of the dependence of L(1)m on S(1)L , i.e. a JPD needs to be computedfor each assignment to S(1)L . Once again using Equation 2.40, for each assignment to
S
(1)
L , Pr
(
L
(1)
m |S(1)L
) is computed as:
Pr
(
L
(1)
m |S(1)L = normal
): µLm = 0 + (1)(0.45) σ2Lm = 0.001 + (1)(0.000082)(1)
= 0.45 = 0.001082
Pr
(
L
(1)
m |S(1)L = faulty
): µLm = 0 + (1)(0.45) σ2Lm = 0.03 + (1)(0.000082)(1)
= 0.45 = 0.030082
Each of these Gaussians are associated with the transitions which agree
on their assignment to S(1)L , i.e. Pr
(
L
(1)
m |S(1)L = n
) is associated with
Pr
(
S
(0)
L = n, S(1)L = n
) and Pr(S(0)L = f, S(1)L = n).
The likelihood of an observation for a given Gaussian can be computed by substitutingthe observation for L(1)m into the Gaussian function, Equation 2.35. Doing this resultsin:
Pr
(
L(1)m = 0.46|S(1)L = normal
)
=
1√
2pi(0.001082)
exp
(
−(0.46− 0.45)
2
2(0.001082)
)
= 11.5805 (A.2)
and,
Pr
(
L(1)m = 0.46|S(1)L = faulty
)
=
1√
2pi(0.030082)
exp
(
−(0.46− 0.45)
2
2(0.030082)
)
= 2.2963. (A.3)
Computing Pr(X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ |O(t+1)Γ = o(t+1)Γ ):These likelihoods can be used to determine the posterior probabilities of the transitions
using Equation 2.31. In this case the likelihood function is Pr(L(1)m = 0.46|S(1)L ), the
prior is Pr(S(0)L , S(1)L ), and the normalisation constant is the sum of their products
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for each set of assignments to {S(0)L , S(1)L }. The resulting a posteriori probabilitydistribution over the set of transitions is then:
S
(0)
L S
(1)
L Pr
(
L
(1)
m = 0.46|S(1)L
)
Pr
(
S
(0)
L , S
(1)
L
)
Pr
(
S
(0)
L , S
(1)
L |L(1)m = 0.46
)
normal normal 11.5805 0.72 0.9189faulty normal 11.5805 0.01 0.0128normal faulty 2.2963 0.18 0.0456faulty faulty 2.2963 0.09 0.0228
Computing Pr(Q(t+1)Γ |X(t)∆ ,X(t+1)∆ ,O(t+1)Γ = o(t+1)Γ ):
The multivariate Gaussians over {L(1), L(1)m } associated with each of these transitions
can be determined using Equation 2.42, Pr(L(1)), and Pr(L(1)m |S(1)L ). Equation 2.42
simply determines the covariance between L(1) and L(1)m given S(1)L and is used tocomplete the covariance matrix for each multivariate Gaussian, resulting in:
Pr
(
L(1), L
(1)
m |S(1)L = normal
): µL,Lm =
[
0.45
0.45
]
σ2L,Lm =
[
0.000082 0.000082
0.000082 0.001082
]
Pr
(
L(1), L
(1)
m |S(1)L = faulty
): µL,Lm =
[
0.45
0.45
]
σ2L,Lm =
[
0.000082 0.000082
0.000082 0.030082
]
Pr
(
L(1)|L(1)m = 0.46, S(1)L
) is required to determine which transitions should be
combined with one another to form hypotheses for the time slice 1 belief state. Giventhe above multivariate Gaussians, it easy to compute this probability distribution byconditioning on L(1)m = 0.46 for each assignment to S(1)L . This is done according toEquations 2.44 and 2.45 where L(1) represents Q and L(1)m represents O, resulting in:
Pr
(
L(1)|L(1)m = 0.46, S(1)L = normal
)
: N (µL = 0.4508, σ2L = 0.00007586)
Pr
(
L(1)|L(1)m = 0.46, S(1)L = faulty
)
: N (µL = 0.45, σ2L = 0.000081776)(A.4)
Note that there are four transitions, but only two unique Gaussians because of theindependence structure of the BN. Once again each Gaussian is associated with thetransitions which agree on their assignment to S(1)L .
Comparing similarities between transitions:Since there are only two unique Gaussians, only one similarity value needs to becomputed, viz. the similarity between:
N1 : Pr
(
L(1)|L(1)m = 0.46, S(1)L = normal
)
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and
N2 : Pr
(
L(1)|L(1)m = 0.46, S(1)L = faulty
)
.
Note that we do not interpret the Kullback-Leibler divergences between N1 and N2directly as these values cannot be used as distance measures. Thus we only interpret
J (N1,N2) — by comparison with c as presented later.
Using Equation 3.10,DKL (N1||N2)may be computed as:
DKL
(N1||N2) = 1
2
(
0.00007586
0.000081776
− 1
)
+
1
2
(
log
0.000081776
0.00007586
+
(0.45− 0.4508)2
0.000081776
)
= 0.0053. (A.5)
Similarly,DKL (N2||N1)may be computed as:
DKL
(N2||N1) = 1
2
(
0.000081776
0.00007586
− 1
)
+
1
2
(
log
0.00007586
0.000081776
+
(0.4508− 0.45)2
0.00007586
)
= 0.0057. (A.6)
J (N1,N2) can then be calculated using Equation 3.11:
J (N1,N2) = 1
2
(0.0053 + 0.0057)
= 0.0055.
(A.7)
Combining transitions and creating hypotheses:Since J (N1,N2) is greater than c, the twoGaussians are deemed dissimilar. Therefore,only the transitions with the same Gaussians, due to the independence structure in theDBN, are combined with one another. In accordance with Algorithm 1, this creates twohypotheses (the maximum) which populate the belief network at time slice 1. The CPDsof the belief network are thus:
Table A.3: Belief network CPDs at time slice 1, given the observation L(1)m = 0.46, fordraining liquid level example.
q∆ SL Pr
(
∆
(1)
bel, H
(1)
bel = 1
)
Pr
(
∆
(1)
bel, H
(1)
bel = 2
)
Pr
(
∆
(1)
bel
)
1 normal 0.9317 0 0.93172 faulty 0 0.0684 0.0684SUM 0.9317 0.0684 1
Pr
(
Γ
(1)
bel|H(1)bel = 1
)
: N (0.4508, 0.00007586)
Pr
(
Γ
(1)
bel|H(1)bel = 2
)
: N (0.45, 0.000081776)
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Computing P˜r(Q(t+1)∆ ,Q(t+1)Γ |O(t+1) = o(t+1)):The approximate belief state at time slice 1 can be computed by marginalising out
H
(1)
bel from the time slice 1 belief network. The distribution over ∆(1)bel had already beencomputed in Table A.3 as the sum of entries in Pr(∆(1)bel, H(1)bel) which agree on their
assignment to ∆(1)bel. This leaves the distribution over Γ(1)bel to be computed. This isdone by considering Pr(Γ(1)bel|H(1)bel) as a hybrid mixture of Gaussians which can be
collapsed using Pr(H(1)bel) as the set of weights. Doing so produces the Gaussian:
Pr
(
Γ
(1)
bel
): µ˜ = n∑
i=1
wiµi Σ˜ =
n∑
i=1
wiΣi
= (0.9317) (0.4508) +
n∑
i=1
wi (µi − µ˜) (µi − µ˜)T
+ (0.0684) (0.45) = (0.9317) (0.00007586)
= 0.4508 + (0.0684) (0.000081776)
+ (0.9317) (0.4508− µ˜)2
+ (0.0684) (0.45− µ˜)2
= 0.000076315
This Gaussian is associated with all assignments to ∆(1)bel. Therefore this Gaussian
Pr
(
Γ
(1)
bel
) completes the approximate belief state for time slice 1.
A.2 Process state tracking performance
Tracking the process state is accomplished by using the approximate belief state fortime slice 1 and following the one time slice inference procedure, then doing the sameusing the the approximate belief state for time slice 2 and so forth. Since the beliefstate contains only one PV and one process component’s status in this case study,tracking of the inferred PV value versus actual process behaviour and componentabnormality status can easily be represented on two time-series plots.
Figure A.1 shows how the inference engine tracked the actual liquid level in thetank over time. Notice that even though the sensor malfunctioned after time step 3,the inference engine was still able to reliably track the actual liquid level in the tankover time.
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Figure A.1: Comparison of actual versus inferred liquid level over time.
This is because the PD approach detected the malfunction of the sensor after timeslice 3, as shown in Figure A.2, which caused it to effectively discard the readings ofthe malfunctioned sensor and rely more on the predictions of its internal DBN model.
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Figure A.2: Monitoring of process abnormality likelihood index over time. The dashedline indicates the start of fault conditions.
A.3 Non-linear liquid level drainage
In practice, natural liquid level drainage is not a linear function with respect to time. Amore accurate depiction of the liquid level drainage in the single tank system may be
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the non-linear function:
L(t+1) = L(t) − 0.1
√
L(t) (A.8)
The PD approach is equipped to handle non-linear CPDs by way of just-in-timelinearisation as discussed in Section 3.4.2. In order to evaluate how well this approachworks in practice, the DBN model for the liquid level drainage is changed to thenon-linear function in Equation A.8.
The ability of the PD approach to track the actual liquid level was tested undertwo scenarios, one where it would observe an accurate reading of the liquid level ineach time step and the other where it would observe a reading of 0 for the liquid level ineach time step. These scenarios were labelled as the best and worst cases respectively.In these tests, the PD approach was limited to maintain only one hypothesis in itsbelief network and not combine any transitions with one another.
The results of the tests (Figure A.3) show that the PD approach was still able toaccurately track the liquid level drainage with the non-linear function under both bestand worst case scenarios. Furthermore, the best case scenario results maintainedan average 0% error (in terms of deviation) from the actual liquid level with respect totime and the worst case scenario slowly increased in percentage error from the actualliquid level with respect to time as expected, due to lack of accurate, up-to-date, sensorreadings.
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Figure A.3: Accuracy of estimating a non-linear liquid level drainage using the PDapproach.
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Two-tank System: Process modelling,Simulation, and DBN
B.1 Fundamental process model
Consider the two tank system shown in Figure 5.6.
P1
P2
F12, k12
F0
F1, k1 F2, k2
Feed
Drain 1 Drain 2
Replicate of Figure 5.6. Two tanks in series.
Water flow F0 is directed into tank 1 which is connected to tank 2 by a horizontalconnecting pipe at their bottoms. The flowsF1 andF2 drain the two tanks, respectively.The flow in the connecting pipe F12 is determined by the driving forces (pressure) P1and P2 at the outlet of each tank respectively. The overall mass balances for each ofthe tanks are given by:
ρ
dV1
dt
= ρ (F0 − F1 − F12) and ρdV2
dt
= ρ (F12 − F2) (B.1)
167
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX B. TWO-TANK SYSTEM: PROCESS MODELLING, SIMULATION, AND DBN 168
where V1 and V2 are the volumes of water in each tank and ρ is the density of water.
The volumes Vi are a product of the cross-sectional area, Ai, and height ofwater, h; in each tank i, namely:
Vi = Ai × hi (B.2)
Each hi, in turn, may be written as a function of hydrostatic pressure in a tank, namely:
hi =
Pi
ρg
(B.3)
where ρ is the density of water and g is the gravitational acceleration constant.
Using Equation B.2, Equation B.2, and Equation B.3 yields the governing equations (seealso Equation 5.4) for the model.
dP1
dt
=
ρg
A1
(F0 − F1 − F12)
dP2
dt
=
ρg
A2
(F12 − F2)
(B.4)
The flow F0 is given by some input forcing function which is initially assumed tobe constant. The flows F1, F2 and F12 are modelled as flow through a constriction(Equation 2.15) and are the constitutive equations given by:
F1 = k1
√
P1 and F2 = k2
√
P2 and F12 = k12
√
|P1 − P2|× sign(P1−P2)(B.5)where k1, k2 and k12 are the constriction resistances of each pipe.
The fundamental process model for the two tank system consists of the governingEquations 5.4 and the constitutive Equations 5.5.
B.2 Simulation
Figure B.1 shows the implementation of the two tank system process model inSimulinkTM . The values of the constants are given in Table 5.1.
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F12
F0
P1
F1
Tank	1
P1
P2
F12
Connecng	Pipe
F12
P2
F2
Tank	2
F0
F0 Terminator Terminator1
(a) Main view
F12	=	k12*sqrt(abs(P2-P1))*sign(P2-P1)
1
F12
1
P1
2
P2
Add
Sqrt
k12
GainAbs
(b) Connecting pipe
dP1/dt	=	((rho*g)/A1)*(F0-F1-F12)
1
P1
2
F0
1
s
Integrator
(rho*g)/A1
Gain
Sqrt
k1
Gain1
1
F12
Add
2
F1
(c) Tank 1
dP2/dt	=	((rho*g)/A2)*(F12-F2)
1
P2
1
s
Integrator
(rho*g)/A2
Gain
Sqrt
k2
Gain1
1
F12
Add
2
F2
(d) Tank 2
Figure B.1: Two tank system process model implementation in SimulinkTM .
B.3 Dynamic Bayesian network
The ensuing subsections detail the development of the DBN for the two tank system.
B.3.1 Skeleton 2-TBN
Following Algorithm 3, the variables in Equations 5.4 and 5.5 are: P1, P2, F1, F2, and
F12. For Equations 5.5 an edge is made both in time slice t and t + 1: (1) from P1 to
F1, (2) from P2 to F2, and (3) from P1 and P2 to F12. For Equation 5.4 an edge is madefrom across the time slices: (4) from F1, F12, and P1 to P1, and (5) from F12, F2 and P2to P2. The result is the diagram in Figure B.2 where each of the edges are numbered inaccordance with operations in the text above. Note that F0 is subsumed by P1 in thisdiagram in the same manner as in Lerner et al. (2000) for consistency between the twoapproaches.
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Figure B.2: 2-TBN for two tank system. Solid lines represent intra-time slice edges anddotted lines represent inter-time slice edges.
B.3.2 Adding sensor and fault models
Next, sensor models are added for P1 and P2 including fault modes for a normal andbiased sensor. Additionally, a fault model is added for blockage of the connecting pipebetween the two tanks by changing the model parameter k12. This is shown Figure B.3.
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Figure B.3: DBN model for the two-tank system including sensor and fault models. Thesubscripts s, b, andm refer to status, bias, and measured RVs respectively. Note thatthis is not the complete structure of the 2-TBN used in this thesis which includes sensormodels for all flows (including F0) as well. This was done so as to not make the figuretoo busy.
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C.1 Configuration sN
C.1.1 aConn fault
Figure C.1: Two-tank system process data: Configuration sN with aConn faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
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C.1.2 iConn fault
Figure C.2: Two-tank system process data: Configuration sN with iConn faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
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C.1.3 P1s fault
Figure C.3: Two-tank system process data: Configuration sN with P1s fault manifestingafter 900 seconds.
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C.1.4 P2s fault
Figure C.4: Two-tank system process data: Configuration sN with P2s fault manifestingafter 900 seconds.
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C.2 Configuration N
C.2.1 aConn fault
Figure C.5: Two-tank system process data: Configuration N with aConn faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
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C.2.2 iConn fault
Figure C.6: Two-tank systemprocess data: ConfigurationNwith iConn faultmanifestingafter 900 seconds.
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C.2.3 P1s fault
Figure C.7: Two-tank system process data: Configuration N with P1s fault manifestingafter 900 seconds.
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C.2.4 P2s fault
Figure C.8: Two-tank system process data: Configuration N with P2s fault manifestingafter 900 seconds.
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C.3 Configuration NC
C.3.1 aConn fault
Figure C.9: Two-tank system process data: Configuration NC with aConn faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
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C.3.2 iConn fault
Figure C.10: Two-tank system process data: Configuration NC with iConn faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
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C.3.3 P1s fault
Figure C.11: Two-tank systemprocess data: ConfigurationNCwith P1s faultmanifestingafter 900 seconds.
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C.3.4 P2s fault
Figure C.12: Two-tank system process data: Configuration NC with P2s faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
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C.4 Configuration NCR
C.4.1 aConn fault
Figure C.13: Two-tank system process data: Configuration NCR with aConn faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX C. TWO-TANK SYSTEM: SIMULATED DATA 186
C.4.2 iConn fault
Figure C.14: Two-tank system process data: Configuration NCR with iConn faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX C. TWO-TANK SYSTEM: SIMULATED DATA 187
C.4.3 P1s fault
Figure C.15: Two-tank system process data: Configuration NCR with P1s faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
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C.4.4 P2s fault
Figure C.16: Two-tank system process data: Configuration NCR with P2s faultmanifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.1 Configuration sN
D.1.1 aConn fault
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.1: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration sN two-tank system withaConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.1.2 iConn fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.2: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration sN two-tank systemwithiConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.1.3 P1s fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.3: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration sN two-tank systemwithP1s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.1.4 P2s fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.4: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration sN two-tank systemwithP2s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.2 Configuration N
D.2.1 aConn fault
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.5: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration N two-tank system withaConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.2.2 iConn fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.6: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration N two-tank system withiConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.2.3 P1s fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.7: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration N two-tank system withP1s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.2.4 P2s fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.8: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration N two-tank system withP2s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.3 Configuration NC
D.3.1 aConn fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.9: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NC two-tank systemwithaConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.3.2 iConn fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.10: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NC two-tank systemwith iConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.3.3 P1s fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.11: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NC two-tank systemwith P1s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.3.4 P2s fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.12: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NC two-tank systemwith P2s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.4 Configuration NCR
D.4.1 aConn fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.13: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NCR two-tank systemwith aConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.4.2 iConn fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.14: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NCR two-tank systemwith iConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.4.3 P1s fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.15: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NCR two-tank systemwith P1s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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D.4.4 P2s fault
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(a) Abnormality likelihood index over time.
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(b) Average component abnormality likelihood indexes.
Figure D.16: PD approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NCR two-tank systemwith P2s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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Figure E.1: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration sN two-tank systemwith aConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.1.2 iConn fault
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(a) Modified Hotelling’s T 2 statistic over time.
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Figure E.2: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration sN two-tank systemwith iConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.1.3 P1s fault
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(a) Modified Hotelling’s T 2 statistic over time.
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(b) Squared prediction error statistic over time.
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Figure E.3: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration sN two-tank systemwith P1s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.1.4 P2s fault
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(a) Modified Hotelling’s T 2 statistic over time.
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Figure E.4: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration sN two-tank systemwith P2s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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(a) Modified Hotelling’s T 2 statistic over time.
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Figure E.5: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration N two-tank systemwith aConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.2.2 iConn fault
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Figure E.6: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration N two-tank systemwith iConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.2.3 P1s fault
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(a) Modified Hotelling’s T 2 statistic over time.
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Figure E.7: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration N two-tank systemwith P1s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.2.4 P2s fault
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Figure E.8: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration N two-tank systemwith P2s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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Figure E.9: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NC two-tank systemwith aConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.3.2 iConn fault
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(a) Modified Hotelling’s T 2 statistic over time.
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Figure E.10: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NC two-tank systemwith iConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX E. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL PROCESS MONITORING FAULT DIAGNOSIS:TWO-TANK SYSTEM 220
E.3.3 P1s fault
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(a) Modified Hotelling’s T 2 statistic over time.
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Figure E.11: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NC two-tank systemwith P1s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.3.4 P2s fault
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Figure E.12: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NC two-tank systemwith P2s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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Figure E.13: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NCR two-tanksystem with aConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.4.2 iConn fault
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(a) Modified Hotelling’s T 2 statistic over time.
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Figure E.14: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NCR two-tanksystem with iConn fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.4.3 P1s fault
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Figure E.15: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NCR two-tanksystem with P1s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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E.4.4 P2s fault
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(a) Modified Hotelling’s T 2 statistic over time.
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Figure E.16: MSPM approach fault diagnosis results: Configuration NCR two-tanksystem with P2s fault manifesting after 900 seconds.
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F.1 Configuration N
Figure F.1: Five-tank system process data: Configuration N with aConn type faultbetween tanks 2 and 3 manifesting after 900 seconds.
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F.2 Configuration NC
Figure F.2: Five-tank system process data: Configuration NC with aConn type faultbetween tanks 2 and 3 manifesting after 900 seconds.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX F. FIVE-TANK SYSTEM: SIMULATED DATA 229
F.3 Configuration NR
Figure F.3: Five-tank system process data: Configuration NR with aConn type faultbetween tanks 2 and 3 manifesting after 900 seconds.
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